Migration management: the radical violence of the international politics of migration by Oelgemoller, Eva Christina
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
 
1 
 
 
 
 
Migration Management:  
The radical violence of the international politics of migration 
 
 
 
Eva Christina Oelgemöller 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for the degree of DPhil 
University of Sussex 
January 2012 
 
2 
Statement 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole 
or in part to another University for the award of any other degree. 
 
 
Signature: …………………………… 
 
 
3 
University of Sussex 
Christina Oelgemöller 
Submitted for the degree of DPhil 
 
Migration Management:  
The radical violence of the international politics of migration 
 
Abstract 
In the 1980s, the narrative of international migration was significantly altered in Europe. 
This thesis examines how this new narrative was brought about by policy-makers and 
shows how the narrative re-configured our understanding of international migration.  
Empirically, the focus of the thesis is the Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, 
Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia (IGC). These 
consultations are situated in the context of debates in the 1970s and 80s concerning 
‘free-market conservatism’. The thesis argues that these debates comprised the 
conditions of possibility for the emergence of an 'informal plurilateralism'. Through thus 
far confidential memos between high ranking public servants, summaries distributed 
across embassies, background papers, minutes of meetings and personal letters, I 
trace the development of an altered discourse and the construction of a new figure: the 
‘illegal migrant’.  
‘Migration Management’, I argue, is best seen as a hegemonic paradigm which 
embodies a tool-box of mechanisms for governments to deal with international 
migration; introduces a distinctive way of treating human mobility; prescribes specific 
ways of constructing migrants, including a minority of illegal migrants who remain just 
outside of the European external boundaries, stripped of their juridico-political status. 
As such, these migrants are suspended from the community of those with a place and 
function. 
The figure of the suspended migrant points to the disappearance of the political, 
understood as a space where public encounter of the heterogeneous is possible. This 
raises crucial questions about what democracy is, how it works and how the political 
can be realised in a climate where the logic of necessity and efficiency has filled the 
space previously occupied by bipolar grand-narratives. Most urgently, it raises 
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questions about the way in which the value of a human being is established, granted or 
denied. Arendt and Rancière help me to start addressing these questions. 
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Chapter 1 
Illegal + Legal Migration = Migration Management 
Today, all of us are supposed to be “included” in a totality that is defined in 
consensual terms as an addition of groups each regarded to have its own 
identity 
(Rancière, 2001: 348) 
 
In the past few decades concern about international migration has moved from 
the realm of ‘low’ politics to that of ‘high’ politics. Those interested in ‘law and 
order’ find themselves in a seemingly new context where global 
interdependence demands governance beyond the nation-state. This is 
particularly the case where international migration is concerned: control of 
frontiers – those boundaries which grant or deny access – is part of the 
founding narrative of nation-states as bounded sovereign territories 
encompassing a people who are deemed legitimate political subjects, all with a 
place and function in the society it delimits. Not only does the myth of the 
nation-state face the challenge of globalization as a process based on free 
market conservatism. At the same time, international migration has become a 
problem of urgency as it undermines the myth of the nation-state and especially 
the particular conception of ‘law and order’ held in the Global North. 
There is a firm belief among governments, in particular European governments, 
that the nature of international migration is a threat to the stability of their nation-
states, because they have lost control and this control needs to be re-gained. 
This is particularly so, it is argued, where it concerns the seeking of asylum. 
Implicit here is the assumption that migration had been ‘under control’ at some 
point in the past and that it is possible to control the movement of people across 
borders providing the systems applied are efficient enough to bring about ‘law 
and order’.  
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It is in this context that Jonas Widgren1 gave birth to the Intergovernmental 
Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC) in the early 1980s. 
This came after a decade of thinking and discussing the pressing issue in the 
multilateral context of the Council of Europe – where debates about how to 
regulate in particular asylum mobility resulted in paralysis and was abandoned2. 
The IGC was invented in order to create a private space to think about ways to 
re-gain control over the unsolicited movement of people across borders. 
Widgren formulated these concerns coherently a further decade later for a 
conference in 1994:  
Taking into account current concerns at the world political level, [...] a new 
global migration order would be directed towards two major policy 
objectives:  
 a concerted and comprehensive international effort with a view to 
preventing mass movements from occurring, through appropriate 
security, human rights, humanitarian, social, environmental and 
economic policies (A);  
 the creation of orderly migration channels between continents and 
nations to avoid disorderly movements between them (B). 
Under these two objectives, a number of priority areas would have to be 
addressed: (i) the modalities for the protection and eventual voluntary return 
of internally and externally displaced refugees; (ii) the harmonization, at 
regional and global level, of national entry regulations, on the basis of 
human rights, humanitarian, economic and other concerns; (iii) the 
establishment of satisfactory mechanisms for return and reintegration of 
refugees and migrants; (iv) the joint consideration of norms to be applicable 
to further the smooth integration of newcomers; (v) the modalities for the 
joint fight against illegal and irregular migration and the trafficking in 
migrants; and (vi) the establishment of joint policy development and 
monitoring mechanisms to evaluate overall developments. 
(Widgren, 1994: 10) 
 
                                               
1
 Jonas Widgren was seconded by the Swedish Government to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and as a result of this formed the IGC, as well as later on 
the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). 
2 Council of Europe, Ad-Hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, 
Refugees and Stateless Persons (CAHAR), explained in UNHCR document MP/dm-22.5.85, 
Back up action; see also page 115 of this thesis. 
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This thesis argues that the IGC is in essence a deeply anti-democratic 
grouping, where high-ranking government bureaucrats specializing in migration 
meet – in secret, and in their private capacity. The reason why such meetings 
need to be secretive is that “distortions by the media”3 need to be avoided 
(conversation, Apave, 30 March 2011). Orderly international migration is thus 
reduced to a technical issue – and not one for political discussion.  Migration 
needs to be managed in terms of both its security component and in its 
economic component. The resulting technical regime has come to be called 
‘Migration Management’, a phrase that needs to be understood in these terms. 
The genesis and political consequences of Migration Management (a doctrine 
formation largely initiated by the IGC) are at the heart of this research. 
The contribution I seek to make in what follows is three-fold: (a) I offer an 
understanding of a particular form of governance, that I conceptualize as 
‘informal plurilateralism’, which has moved considerations of international 
migration onto the foreign policy agenda of countries in the Global North and 
South; (b) on the basis of this I then offer an alternative understanding of the 
historical conditions of possibility of what is normalized as Migration 
Management and I ask questions about the production of political subjectivity; 
finally (c) I offer a conceptual formulation of how the radical violence of not 
having a juridico-political status can be made intelligible even though the 
process of negotiating foreign policy does not acknowledge such violences. I 
label this violence of not having the validity to exist and being seemingly  
irredeemable ‘suspension’. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I first offer a brief account of what is at stake in 
this thesis. I set out the particular problems presented by a forum such as the 
IGC, the formulation of Migration Management and in particular the construction 
of the illegal migrant which is a result of discussions about asylum, as 
suspended. I then outline the involvement of academia in developing and 
                                               
3
 This statement ignores the fact that media – although often rhetorically versed – is situated in 
a wider discourse picking up on sentiments that are voiced by public officials, amongst others. 
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supporting the narrative as set out by the IGC, before offering an overview of 
how the thesis will address this problematic, theoretically and methodologically. 
Finally, I briefly outline the chapters to come. Overall the study argues that 
informal plurilateralism as a phenomenon within the context of what I call 
‘consensus-democracy’4 following Rancière (2001) neutralizes the political and 
exerts radical violence to the point that some people are killed socially in that 
their ability to establish political subjectivity is annihilated.  
 
What is the problem and why it is important 
Simply put, the problem is that the Global North, through its discourse of 
Migration Management and what it keeps silenced/invisible, creates a new 
world map in re-drawing the boundaries, as map 1 and 2 illustrate.  
 
Map 1: Boundaries of containment (source: Easterly (2009) How to write about poor people, aidwatchers.com) 
 
It is no coincidence that these maps highlight the overlapping and contrary 
boundaries so neatly. Those boundaries are geographical insofar as they create 
seemingly distinct spaces. At the point of the geographical boundary radical 
violence is done to few but nonetheless too many who are deemed to have lost 
their validity to exist because they are too tired and too poor.  
                                               
4
 As a way of incorporating and governing ‘free market conservatism’. 
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Map 2: Countries participating in the IGC (source: IGC leaflet, 2005) 
 
Visible markers of this phenomenon are the dead bodies of people from Africa 
or Asia found in the Mediterranean Sea. This radical violence is an outcome of 
the re-negotiation and marriage of neo- conservatism with neo-liberalism. 
According to Rancière (2001), this marriage is called ‘consensus-democracy’. In 
this thesis I argue that what is done in the name of democracy today neutralizes 
the political and exerts radical violence against those who are deemed not to be 
includable in consensus-democracy’s all-inclusiveness. Consensus-democracy 
is police order (Rancière, 2001). It is the management of the social as technical 
problem and, as such, it is deeply hierarchical, characterized by (often non-
coercive) domination and thus productive of inequality insofar as it allocates 
functions and places to those deemed capable of belonging and excludes those 
deemed to not have the capacity to belong.  
Within the discourse of consensus-democracy, Migration Management is a 
narrative composed of two articulations: that of securitizing migrants and that of 
entrepreneurializing migrants. What is radically excluded is the possibility of 
claiming political subjectivity by seeking asylum5. 
                                               
5
 This is not to say that there are no claims for asylum. Yet comparing figures provided by 
UNHCR (2011) shows how relative the ‘flood’ is. Of 43.3 million displaced people in 2009, 12 
million were (unofficially) estimated as being stateless, 1 million claimed asylum globally and 
just under 400.000 applicants were counted in countries of the European Union. In 2010, 
Europe is said to have received 33% fewer claims than in 2009. (UNHCR, 2011)  This figure of 
268.000 is a very small figure, given the wealth and affluence of European Union countries. 
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On the 6th of April 2011 EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, responsible for 
Home Affairs and particularly focusing on migration and security, wrote a blog 
as follows:  
A boat from Libya sank this morning in the Mediterranean with 265 
people on board. So far only 48 have been rescued. The latest 
information we’ve received is that 20 bodies have now been found and 
that the search is ongoing. 
It is awful that criminal networks exploit vulnerable people and make 
money on smuggling them to Europe. When I visited Tunisia last week, I 
was told that it costs 1500 Euros for a ticket to go on a small boat to 
Europe, with often more than 100 people on board and no life-vests. With 
a life-vest it’s even more expensive. 
In order to minimise the risk of people drowning in the Mediterranean a 
long-term effort is needed, including close cooperation with the countries 
in the region. In the short term, the Frontex mission remains crucial in 
detecting boats and saving people from drowning. Europol has also 
deployed a special group of experts to Italy to help the law enforcement 
authorities to identify criminal networks that make a fortune on the 
exploitation of people in need. 
At the same time, the right of people fleeing persecution or violent 
conflict to seek asylum must be guaranteed. People in such a situation 
should be given protection wherever they seek it, and I am very grateful 
to the authorities, international organisations and NGOs in Tunisia and 
Egypt who are making such great efforts to host the many refugees who 
have been fleeing Libya in recent weeks. I have also asked the EU’s 
Member States to make a gesture by agreeing to resettle some of them 
here in Europe. 
http: //blogs.ec.europa.eu/malmstrom/tragedy-in-the-mediterranean/ viewed June 2011 
On the face of it this sounds like a genuine concern for those people exploited 
by smugglers, dying on the high seas, asking European governments to resettle 
such people. However, herein already lies a clue to re-reading blogs like this in 
a more critical light. First, resettlement requires an administrative procedure by 
which a person has to ask to be recognized as a legitimate asylum seeker and 
thus be granted the status of refugee. Since seeking asylum has become a near 
impossibility before entering the physical territory of one of the European 
countries, seeking to be ’exploited by smugglers’ becomes a necessity when 
other avenues for international mobility are not granted. This then raises the 
question of how one gets to be regarded as either deserving and legitimate or 
not. It also begs the question of how seeking asylum can be done in a world 
where asylum seekers are claimed to be bogus, criminal and useless and 
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therefore they are fought – quite literally - by military helicopters, police vessels 
and large-scale surveillance technology.  
In a context where the Global North conceptualizes its Other in the following 
and not so subtle way, the above account of concern for such boat people by 
the EU Commissioner begins to have a different – cynical - meaning:  
West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, 
environmental and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as 
the real ‘strategic’ danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, 
scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of 
nation states and international borders, and the empowerment of private 
armies, security firms and international drug cartels are now most 
tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism. West Africa 
provides an appropriate introduction to the issues, often extremely 
unpleasant to discuss, that will soon confront our civilization. 
(Kaplan, 1994, in O Tuathail et al.1998: 189) 
Libya is in Africa6. The coast between Libya and Europe is patrolled by 
FRONTEX: the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union. FRONTEX became operational in 2005 and has conducted its activities 
until earlier in 2011 in a legal vacuum. The European Parliament called  
for the mandate of FRONTEX to explicitly include an obligation to meet 
international human rights standards and a duty towards asylum seekers 
in rescue operations on the high seas”; the European Parliament did so 
in order “to eliminate legal vacuums (…), setting out in particular the 
precise legal conditions for its sea rescue operations. 
(European Parliament (2008/2157(INI)) 
However, the call to meet human rights standards is beside the point. Activities 
undertaken by FRONTEX are couched in a narrative of Migration Management 
unconcerned with Human Rights other than by empty declaration, nor is it 
concerned with providing protection for asylum seekers, because at that point 
the asylum seeker is not constructed to be a rights-bearing subject vis-a-vis 
European governments. The practices have shifted altogether as can be seen 
                                               
6
 Geographically Libya is in North Africa. Yet, North and West Africa are the regions most 
prominently identified by European Union countries as causing a migration problem. Hence, 
most activity is focussed on the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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from the following analysis of FRONTEX conducted by migreurop7.  First, the 
narrative of Migration Management has turned ‘asylum seekers’ into ‘illegal 
immigrants:  
The Agency’s annual reports focus deliberately on statistical results in 
terms of detection, apprehension and “refusal of entry of illegal 
immigrants” at the main borders of the EU (FRONTEX, 2006: 7, 12). The 
2007 report, for example, states that 130,000 third-country nationals 
were refused entry to the EU; in the 2008 report the figure is 140,000. 
Neither report mentions the possible presence among those refused 
entry of potential asylum seekers or vulnerable individuals (lone minors, 
etc.).  
FRONTEX is only too willing to comment on the growing number of 
‘bogus asylum seekers’ allegedly trying to cross the EU’s borders, 
without referring to any method enabling it to distinguish [...].  
(Keller et al., 2011: 11) 
Second, the one premise that the League of Nations (LoN) and the United 
Nations (UN) had agreed on with regard to international mobility - namely that 
every person has the right to leave any country, including their own (Art 12.2 of 
the ICCPR) - is undermined. Further, the involvement of FRONTEX in the 
territorial waters of a third country makes a mockery of oft-heard claims to 
respect for self-determination granted to ex-colonies of European countries:  
The deployment by FRONTEX of operations in the territorial waters of 
third countries [...] poses serious risks in terms of respect for the principle 
laid down in the UDHR and the ICCPR. 
FRONTEX notes approvingly that its experts and the Spanish authorities 
had been able to identify “100% of the illegal migrants” that they had 
[apprehended and] interviewed. It goes on: “Through the information 
collected during the interviews, it was possible to detain several 
facilitators mainly in Senegal and to avoid the departure of more than 
one thousand people. 
(Keller, et al., 2011: 13) 
migreurop, somewhat polemically, asks how many of those 1000 people would 
have had a legitimate claim for protection and further what interrogation 
                                               
7
 http: //www.migreurop.org/ is an association of 42 organizations in Europe and Africa which 
include mostly non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and some research groups, located 
within universities. It was established in 2005.  
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techniques were used to achieve a 100% success rate to solicit information 
(Keller et al., 2011) 
Third, anecdotal evidence8 collected by media, NGOs and published 
testimonies, tells stories of physical violence used by FRONTEX. Stories cover 
capsized boats; calls for rescue at sea which are ignored for days until it is too 
late for many of the people on those boats; as well as actual killings through 
mal-treatment when European governments organize deportations with or 
without the involvement of FRONTEX. Those experts – as they are referred to 
above in the quote – have the mandate to make claiming asylum an 
impossibility. 
It is at this point where the European Parliament misses the point – a discussion 
about living up to human rights standards and granting of asylum points to the 
existence of institutions and instruments capable of application of its standards 
in such particular situation. It points to an acceptance that the existence of a 
person is valid and therefore care is extended. In contrast, Migration 
Management establishes altogether new knowledges and practices which do 
not accept the validity of the existence of some people. It kills and, if it does not 
kill physically, it kills by way of invalidating a person’s juridico-political status. 
Migration Management shifts the conceptualization of international migration 
from thinking about it within an approach of integration to one that 
instrumentalizes (Skeldon, 2011); it is thus about the integrity of the system 
rather than about the integrity of the person. 
It is this moment which shows that consensus-democracy has limits – despite 
its best efforts to portray itself otherwise. The problem is that consensus-
                                               
8
 For some examples see http: //www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1224133/Migrant-
dead-lorry-prepares-enter-Channel-Tunnel.html viewed 20 June 2010; http: 
//www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/read.main/2253119/ viewed 20 June 2010; 
http: //www.euroweeklynews.com/2010050578252/news/costa-del-sol/illegal-immigrant-dies-in-
motorway-fall.html viewed 20 June 2010; http: 
//www.repubblica.it/online/cronaca/palo/trovati/trovati.html viewed May 2010; or http: 
//www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jun/10/davidrose.rorycarroll viewed 20 June 2010. 
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democracy neutralizes politics - to the point where no debate can be had about 
what constitutes the functions it allocates on what basis. FRONTEX enacts the 
technical solution to a seemingly self-evident problem. Nor is it possible to ask 
probing questions about the character of what is in the first place. Consensus-
democracy dis-allows thinking proper (Arendt, 1978). For example, asking if the 
smugglers may not render a vital service made deadly by European policy or at 
least wonder if smugglers extent respect to those with the will to move where 
European governments assume – as common-sense – a lurking threat.  
What, exactly, is Migration Management? How has Migration Management 
come to be such a hegemonic narrative? How come Migration Management is 
normalized and given such prominence in the normation of other countries 
policies and behaviour around the globe? What are Migration Managements’ 
components and their function? And more importantly, what are its limits and 
the consequence of consensus-democracy for political subjectivity? 
But, first: Why wonder about Migration Management and why the IGC? In the 
early 2000s I was working in Geneva with the International Catholic Migration 
Commission (ICMC). The ICMC has consultative status with various UN 
agencies, among them the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). In this context I participated 
in many meetings which had discussions of refugee protection and the rights of 
the migrants at heart. Often in those meetings and during corridor discussions I 
heard reference to the IGC; however, without anyone really being willing to 
elaborate on what this organization is, what they do or who is participating. It 
was a regular reference point for justifying Migration Management, it’s benign 
nature and positive influence on getting international migration under control. I 
heard this from ambassadors, UN officials, and others working for both 
governmental and non-governmental organizations. On asking, I was regularly 
rebuffed, though politely. The IGC remained an opaque thing, not to be known 
or discussed in concrete terms. With time I came across documents which 
made reference to the IGC, such that I understood it was a non-formal forum, 
led by mainly European and other governments of the Global North, it sits in 
Geneva and is composed of people of diplomatic rank, government officials and 
technical experts.  
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In the late 1970s the UNHCR was pushed by its major donor governments, to 
institute a working group specifically to address questions of how Western 
European countries should cope with what they perceived as the ‘asylum crisis’ 
(Haddad, 2008). Negotiations in the Council of Europe were paralysed and a 
way out needed to be found. On the basis of this working group the IGC gained 
autonomous status in 1992. Yet, from the early 1980s it hosted annual 
plenaries, working groups, but mainly worked on the basis of ad hoc meetings. 
Its membership was hand-selected. I learned that, notably and more 
specifically, it comprised its membership from high ranking civil servants who 
had briefs in international migration recruited from interior, foreign and finance 
ministries; but also from police forces, international organizations and other 
parts of civil society. The IGC produced background and working papers to 
guide its work, however the communication between members was equally 
important and was supported by memoranda, personal letters and minutes of 
meetings drafted by its secretary, the only permanent post of the organization. It 
was based on the following aims: developing a sense of collegiality and mutual 
confidence among members; building trust and predictability to facilitate 
international agreements or at least policy coordination. It is stressed that 
discussion should be open and frank to also allow for differences to be 
confronted and ideally overcome in order to reach consensus. All activity takes 
place under ‘Chatham house rules’. The IGC - through its membership - is 
indirectly linked to more formal institutions involved in governing international 
migration. 
In this context UNHCR was blamed for not taking the ‘new situation’ seriously. 
Participating governments wanted a new pragmatic approach in order to avoid 
irregular movements and ensure orderly mobility arrangements. Thus, the IGC 
stated that its senior participants should be facilitated to meet within informal 
consultations as and when this was felt to be required in order ‘to nurse the 
totality of mobility related issues’ (Lopez-Pozas, IGC, 19 June 1991) and to 
coordinate common action by establishing a common and conceptual linguistic 
field – an explicit aim of the forum. 
In practice, participants with a brief in international migration attended and 
discussed within the IGC in their private capacity, since the IGC is a non-
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decision-making forum; definitions and solutions were discussed which were 
then taken back into the national context which served to formulate a national 
position which was then taken to European-level negotiations, where the agreed 
consensus was then formalized and implemented. Since a ‘common sense’ 
position and vocabulary had already been agreed within the IGC, there was no 
perceived need for further debate; more importantly international migration was 
constructed as technical problem and not a political question. This informality 
and confidentiality meant that there was no scrutiny as to how definitions were 
set and action taken as a consequence. The emphasis on consensus, efficiency 
and effectiveness also meant that disagreement and questioning of this new 
common sense is not possible. I understood that the IGC was a major reference 
point for doctrine formation. I further understood, with time, that the IGC’s major 
activities which would inform discussions in my time in Geneva had been the 
1980s, in their first decade of meetings.  
Further, it was intriguing that a direct link was established, by those working in 
the International Community, between the IGC and Migration Management as 
the major paradigm within which international migration was made sense of and 
within which it was governed. This is intriguing as success stories, which this 
seemed to be portrayed as, are usually told as biographical stories which centre 
a person or persons as having brought about change or formulated a solution. 
This was not the case, the reference was to the IGC as such and to Migration 
Management. The informality, secrecy and opaqueness around the IGC and its 
doctrine formation compelled me to undertake this research and ask what 
Migration Management is. 
 
Studying the Mobility of People across Borders 
The notion that “[i]nternational migration is part of a transnational revolution that 
is reshaping societies and politics around the globe” (Castles and Miller, 2009: 
7) has been accepted by almost all migration scholars. This, ‘age of migration’ 
Castles and Miller argue arises because of several tendencies. Firstly, 
globalization of migration means more and more countries are affected by 
human mobility. Similarly, an acceleration of international migration gives rise to 
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the impression of ‘mass migration’. Further the notion of a growing politicization 
of migration is noted, meaning that international migration is increasingly more 
often on the agenda not only domestically, but also regionally and 
internationally. In the early 1980s such a perceived crisis situation thus moved 
some governments of the Global North to come together to constitute the IGC 
with the aim to manage migration and to bring it under control.  
Castles and Miller thus provide succinctly the background and context for the 
evolution of Migration Management in the literature. Migration Management is 
further defined by Barbara Marshall (2006) The Politics of Migration - A Survey 
as  
An initiative to supplement the emphasis on restrictive migration controls 
by a more constructive approach. For the potential receiving country, it 
means transparency, i.e. the public acknowledgement of its needs for 
immigration (demographic developments, lack of skilled and less skilled 
labour etc.) and its humanitarian obligations. It also involves the 
integration of legal immigrants. When fully implemented, it would result in 
‘joined-up government’, with all departments making an input into 
migration policies. Internationally it involves regional co-operation (e.g. in 
the EU) and with sending countries. 
(Marshall, 2006: 250) 
What this account misses, however, is the logic behind 'restrictive migration 
control' in the European context and why an emphasis on legal migration is 
needed - in particular when Marshall in her introduction to the survey also writes 
that 'illegal migration' is such a fuzzy concept (Marshall, 2006: 6/7). In other 
words, it is not clear what it means. 
Christina Boswell has focused much of her research precisely on the evolution 
of migration policy-making at the level of the European Union. She describes 
and explains categories used in migration policy-making: labour migration, 
migration control/irregular migration, asylum systems and integration (Boswell, 
2006). Since questions of migrant integration are not covered by the narrative of 
Migration Management as conceptualized by the IGC explicitly I will not 
introduce the vast variety of thinking in this area. I will, however, give a brief 
overview of pertinent issues leading up to the formulation of the above definition 
of Migration Management. The argument put forth here, is that the introduction 
of Migration Management effectively reduces the perceived complexity of 
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international migration into two broad categories: first, illegal migration; and 
second, legal migration. 
What is Migration Management composed of then? The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), in their publication Essentials of Migration 
Management: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners (2004) indicates a 
broad schematic overview of what falls under the category of migration 
management as follows:  
 
 
 
Legal migration   illegal migration 
Figure 1: schematic illustration of Migration Management (source: author) 
 
As can be seen, the categorization of migration issues run along seemingly 
coherent lines and these are now repeated in almost all of the migration studies 
literature9 (Mitchell, 1989; Koser, 2007; Castels et al., 2009; Soysal, 1998; 
Portes, 2007). Academic literature, following deliberations in policy circles, 
evolved from a discussion about the ‘asylum-migration nexus’ to research on 
the ‘migration-development nexus’. The former, introduced in the 1980s, led to 
a blurring of juridical status concerning migrants, opening the door to a narrative 
of threat and security regarding asylum-seekers and other unwanted migrants. 
                                               
9
 In recent years, scholarship has developed which follows more critical lines of enquiry of which 
scholars such as Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans were among the first; more recently Jennifer 
Hyndman, Vicky Squire, and others have added their voices. I will draw on these critical voices 
in my analysis. However, throughout the elaboration of how Migration Management was filled 
with meaning I will draw on those ‘established’ scholars who are influential in policy terms. 
These scholars work in a more positivist-empirical tradition. 
Migration 
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Migration and 
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The latter in its current meaning was introduced in the early 2000s and offers a 
way to talk about labour migration when this form of migration had seemed to 
be discredited in the early 1970s. I will briefly introduce both nexi in turn as they 
will be relevant throughout the thesis. 
The basic argument advanced by the ‘migration-asylum’ nexus is that changes, 
noted above by Castles and Miller (1993), make it impossible to delineate 
clearly between those whose cause of movement is forced and those who move 
voluntarily. Forced movement is traditionally related to displacement due to war, 
violence and individual risks of persecution; while voluntary migration is usually 
thought to be movement for the purposes of finding employment or family 
reunification (King, 1993). While most migration scholars argue that drawing on 
supposedly clear categories formulated and applied until the 1970s (either one 
was a refugee or one was a labour migrant) does not work anymore, the 
prevalent cause-effect logic underlying much of the making sense of 
international migration is upheld. Thus, we can read statements like:  
Clearly, conditions in countries of origin are a major factor behind these 
changing patterns of mobility. [Programmes] certainly cannot absorb all 
would-be labour migrants. […] The limited scope of these programmes 
therefore contributes to the continued trend of irregular entry, stay and 
employment. 
(Boswell, 2006: 95).  
Yet, instead of questioning the level of analysis (cause-effect relationship) a 
wealth of new categories is created to cope with perceived rising complexity10. 
Thus movement became labelled ‘mixed’ in the late 1970s. The background to 
this logic is a discourse led by (western) European countries which stated that 
recruitment of labour migration was officially stopped after the 1973 oil crisis. 
Public discourse in Europe has remained rather anti-immigrant in its stance and 
served to legitimize more restrictive policies which were further justified by 
discrimination and racist harassment against ‘foreigners’ in white, Christian 
                                               
10
 According to the website of the UKBA there were in 2008 at least 44 different categories for 
occupational migration to the UK alone. http: //www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/employers/points/ 
viewed December 2008 – note: this web-page is regularly up-dated and may therefore change 
substantially. 
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European countries11. Europe never identified itself as a region of immigration. 
Yet, instead of completely banning migration for work, European countries 
formulated more specialized policies for the recruitment of what came to be 
termed ‘skilled migration’. “Today, labour migration fills critical gaps in the IT 
sector, engineering, construction, agriculture and food-processing, health-care, 
teaching, catering and tourism, and domestic services” (Boswell, 2006: 96). 
This list shows that so-called skilled migration is always such migration needed 
by European governments to fill shortages. Un-invited international migrants are 
seen to be un-skilled and therefore unwanted. Consequently they are unlikely to 
gain legal access to the territory of European countries. One regularly reiterated 
position is that governments, on the grounds of their country’s sovereignty, are 
‘naturally’ entitled to choose who they allow access to their territory (Sassen, 
1999; Weiner, 1993; Joppke, 1998; Noll, 2003). The 2003 IOM World Migration 
report puts this logic as follows:  
Distinctions in the treatment under international law of refugees and 
migrants are understandable. For reasons of national identity, security, 
political independence, tradition, and much more, nation states have 
been historically vested with the right and responsibility to protect their 
own citizens and to determine which foreigners may enter and remain in 
their territories. 
(IOM, 2003: 98) 
Such a statement is particularly interesting as it contradicts the otherwise widely 
held belief and argument about interdependence, according to which 
international migration is considered to be an issue for cooperation and – 
precisely – not a case for domestic policy-making anymore. Such a view is also 
reiterated in the context of forced migration and here is where the problem for 
western European governments lies. After the Second World War, the 
International Community - first and foremost European states - formulated a set 
of international legal regulations known as the Geneva Conventions or 
humanitarian conventions which regulate the relationship of states towards 
individuals – rather than just between states and citizens. One of these, the 
                                               
11
 For different perspectives: Geddes (2003); Huysmans (2000); Freeman (1995); Black (2001); 
Malkki (1995); other notable authors writing on this subject are Virginie Guiraudon (2000a) or 
Sandra Lavenex (2001a). 
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1951 Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugee, regulates the definition 
of who, under which conditions, can be defined as a refugee. The convention 
then proposes protection from political persecution in whichever state the claim 
for asylum has been filed. Importantly, the Convention was elaborated in order 
to deal with the 40 million (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1958) people displaced 
through the Second World War. Yet, at the same time the competition and 
enmity between the communist and the capitalist blocs formed, so that the 
Convention became a tool of its time: protecting those who fled the communist 
regime (Loescher, 1993; Hyndman, 1997; Weiner, 1992; Zetter, 1991; Roberts, 
1998).  The European ‘refugee regime’ was considered to be very open and 
liberal. Yet, “[s]ince the early 1980s, European States have virtually exhausted 
the repertoire of feasible restrictions to asylum systems – short of outright 
abandonment of the 1951 Geneva Convention” (Boswell, 2006: 100).  
The justification leading to these restrictions in the 1970s and 1980s was not 
only that there were numerically more refugees and asylum-seekers (e.g. boat 
people from south-east Asia, refugees arriving through the Mediterranean and 
refugees generated by the Iran-Iraq war pose the geo-political background) than 
there had been before12. Another more important argument for western 
European governments was that issues such as human rights abuses but also 
those aggravated by economic marginalization, poverty, environmental 
degradation, population pressure, and poor governance were seen as 
responsible for increased immigration into Europe (Weiner, 1995; Hein, 1993, 
1995; Suhrke, 1994; Zolberg, 1989). It is this view, which became the unspoken 
assumption and sedimented as grounding for justifications for the sorting of 
migrants into those who are seen to be valid and those who are not seen to be 
valid. This latter justification was expressed through a racism of Europeans 
which was excused by the fact that ‘newcomers’ were different from refugees 
known before in that they were of a different ethnicity and also visibly different 
(Miles, 1993; Lentin, 2004). A last argument was that the administration was 
                                               
12
 This is incorrect when compared to the number of Europeans being displaced just 20 years 
before. We are in fact talking about roughly 3 million refugees. 
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overwhelmed with refugee status determination, the welfare state drained by 
too many being dependent on it (Joly et al., 1989).  
All this leads to the proposition that restricted possibilities for legal entry make it 
necessary for migrants to move clandestinely (Collinson, 1993) or with the help 
of smugglers (Kyle et al., 2001) or worst being trafficked (Laczko, 2005). As a 
consequence, the illegal migrant was constructed. I will delve deeper into this 
articulation later in the thesis, suffice it here to say that the category of the 
illegal migrant is indeed very opaque – because it leaves unspoken many 
underlying political functions: it deals with those people who do not fit into our 
skilled categories, but gives them the status of the deviant; it supports our 
restrictive policies on refugees and asylum seekers, but allows for a juridico-
political status awarded ‘post-hoc’ for the deviant. Thus, between the 1970s and 
the 1990s the illegal migrant was constructed out of the ‘asylum-migration 
nexus’.  
The ‘migration-development nexus’ was originally a research project to re-
construct the legal migrant and mitigate the harshest outcomes of the ‘asylum-
migration nexus’ (conversation, Black, 10 September 2009). This happened in 
two ways; on the one hand the terminology of development allowed for thinking 
and researching forms of skill and employment with regard to migration, it was 
thus possible to re-include labour/ economic migration back into the narrative. 
On the other hand, the new nexus, while maintaining the cause-effect analysis, 
made it possible to think more about the sending country. While the link 
between migration and development was already debated in the 1980s and 
1990s, research and vocal incorporation of findings into policy-making gained 
momentum from the early 2000s13. Particularly researched were questions 
pertaining to whether or not migration is conducive to the development of 
countries of origin. An underlying issue, according to Castles and Miller, is 
whether or not development will reduce emigration (Castles and Miller, 2009: 
73). This articulation already present in the 1970s goes along the line of 
                                               
13
 French speaking countries in particular and the Dutch government had already in the 1970s 
discussed ‘co-development’; however, this was not widely taken up by the International 
Community  until its reformulation into the migration-development nexus in the 2000s. 
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argument that Europe does not have the capacity to care for all the poor people 
of the world.  
Plans for using development to reduce migration are based on the idea 
that migration is driven by poverty, underdevelopment and 
unemployment and that tackling these ‘root causes’ can keep people at 
home. This leads on to the notion of ‘virtuous circle’ of migration and 
development, in which circular migration is used to support development 
efforts, which will in the end reduce emigration. 
(Castles and Miller, 2009: 73; drawing on Bakewell, 2007) 
This discursive move, in particular mentioning positive effects of the temporary 
and circular nature of labour migration for developing countries, is supposed to 
make the idea of international migration more palatable to the European public. 
On this basis, it is thus possible to re-introduce legal migration as a possibility – 
the terminology used is ‘facilitated movement’, rather than regulated human 
mobility. The notion of the ‘migration-development nexus’ will be discussed 
more in-depth in order to show the shift from stopping migration to legal 
immigration from the perspective of European states, with particular attention to 
be given to the establishment of what is to be regarded as ‘norm’. 
Noteworthy, in relation to the study of the international politics of migration is the 
symbiosis between academia and policy-making even though both groups read 
each other selectively. Thus, policy-making thinks the asylum-migration nexus 
in security terms14; yet, the academic community was surprisingly blind to the 
re-articulation of the asylum seeker as illegal migrant. The same seems to be 
the case for the migration-development nexus which has adopted a more 
economic narrative; although academics seem to have been more independent 
from policy-making within this particular articulation. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The argument of this thesis, which centres around democracy, doctrine 
formation and political subjectivity, will be substantiated by using the 
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 For an in-depth and critical academic analysis see especially Didier Bigo (e.g. 2000) and Jeff 
Huysmans (e.g. 2000, 2006).With a slightly different focus Wiliam Walters (e.g. 2002, 2004) and 
Elspeth Guild (e.g. 2003). 
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international politics of migration as a case study. Thus, the last quarter of the 
20th Century has led to the discursive establishment of the paradigm of 
Migration Management with a particular consequence of suspending a certain 
minority of human beings from their existential/political validity to exist. 
 
Data 
In order to think about the evolution and meaning of Migration Management and 
its consequences this study relies on documentary evidence - which is not in 
the public domain but which I was privileged to have received to facilitate this 
research project, thus on the explicit understanding that I would be quoting from 
it in my research outputs - from the IGC15: speeches, memoranda of 
understanding, plans of action, resolutions, agenda for meetings, minutes of 
meetings, background documents etc. This documentation was produced in ad 
hoc meetings in which government experts participated, by way of discussions 
based on background papers circulated by the secretariat of the IGC. The 
documents I draw from were generated by the late Jonas Widgren, then 
coordinator of the IGC and seconded by the Swedish government. He made his 
personal archive available to Professors Sharon Stanton-Russell (Emeritus, 
Centre for International Studies at MIT) and Charles Keely (Emeritus, 
Georgetown University). The intention, according to Professors Stanton-Russell 
and Keely, was to allow research to support the endeavour that Jonas Widgren, 
a strong proponent of social democracy, had in mind. The Professors then 
made these documents, covering the period between 1982 and 1992, available 
to me for my analysis. 
This archive consists mostly of preparatory documents for conferences and 
faxes/memo’s between participants or diplomatic missions involved which 
concern pre-meeting discussions or post-meeting clarifications. Only some 
documents are authored by participating government experts. A few documents 
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 Friedrich Loeper, the current coordinator gave verbal acknowledgement of this on two 
occasions, the last having occurred during the Global Forum for Migration and Development on 
01 December 2011. 
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offer statistical data – which was not collected at that time in as a detailed and 
structured fashion as it is now – as well as answers to questionnaires which had 
been sent to governments in order to determine views on issues of discussion. 
Widgren’s personal archive is a selection of documents which were mainly 
relevant from his perspective as a coordinator. The archive thus offers a broad 
overview of all topics covered by the IGC in the period between 1982 and 1992 
of the discursive evolution of Migration Management. However, the selection is 
patchy, in that some background documents and conference papers referred to 
in the archive around two conferences held in Nyon during the period are 
purposefully (by Widgren) not included. It is reasonable to assume that other 
documents from this time from within the IGC are also not included in this 
archive. I was able to view some, for example, in Oxford’s Social Sciences 
library which holds a small archive of Guy Goodwin-Gill16 from his time when he 
was closely affiliated with UNHCR. Yet, during a conversation with the current 
coordinator of the IGC17 it became clear that there is no possibility to review the 
IGC’s archives either at the moment or for the foreseeable future (conversation, 
Loeper, 30 March 2011). 
Without the documents contained in Widgren’s archive this research would not 
have been possible. It is very difficult to find documents from the time and the 
source through individuals as those participating in the IGC did not do so as 
their primary task. Additionally participation often fluctuated according to which 
brief officials were given by their national governments. So, lists documenting 
attendance at IGC meeting changed frequently due to either re-deployment 
within government or because meetings were so specialized that different 
expertise was needed. Further, in order to shed light on the doctrine formation 
within the IGC it is important to highlight the internal logic of Migration 
Management as read through the IGC as a forum and not based on a people 
                                               
16
 Barrister and Professor of public international law at the University of Oxford and served as 
legal advisor in UNHCR from 1976 to 1988 – thus he was (although marginally) involved in the 
evolution of the IGC. 
17
 Friedrich Loeper has been the IGC’s coordinator since 2005. 
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story which would divert attention away from such formation, which is also in 
line with the theoretical approach taken here. 
The Widgren archive comes in a pre-catalogued fashion and is sorted according 
to time and logical unit. Logical units (relating to a conference or a particular 
chronological order) are termed ‘book’ with an assigned number. Overall there 
are just over 90 ‘books’, comprising more than a thousand documents. 
However, in the following I refer to each document by its reference number, or 
date and/or author whenever this information is available. As is analytically 
grounded further below, I have started reading these documents at face-value 
first in order to get an understanding of what the IGC discussed and how the 
issues were framed. After doing so, I then started to catalogue and re-read with 
a particular view to dominant themes and clusters of issues, thus focusing on 
what is actively ‘there’. This has informed the content and structure of the 
chapters which follow. In a further step I have then re-read the archive for such 
statements and information which indicate what is excluded as valid knowledge, 
valid political subjectivity and acceptable form of governance. In addition to this 
informal archive I also have drawn on publicly available documents from the 
Council of Europe, UNHCR, the European Union, the IOM or other relevant 
bodies, as well as some interviews.  
Throughout the course of this research I conducted interviews as verbal, open 
conversations. I have chosen this approach to give freedom to the interviewed 
person to offer their individual perceptions on historical events and their 
understanding of the meaning of concepts/issues that I had identified as 
relevant to this research. In this way I have held conversations with those 
persons engaged with the IGC today and in the past. Here, I have 
supplemented the above analysis with 10 explicit conversations and some 
additional conversations with staff from e.g. the UK Border Agency (UKBA), 
staff from diplomatic missions I have met at international conferences and think 
tank researchers (e.g. MPI and IPPR). Secondly, I have held conversations with 
academics who have, with their particular kind of knowledge production, filled 
many of the concepts with a more in-depth logic than policy-makers have done. 
Individual articulations of the narrative of Migration Management, by both policy-
makers and academics, are situated within the discourses they also mould. I 
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thus do not wish to imply here any notion of objectivity but want to rather 
emphasise these as accounts of knowledge production in their own right which 
– retrospectively - are meaning-giving exercises. 
The research I am presenting in the following chapters is based to a major 
extent on informality. The IGC is an informal forum, which does not hold its own 
formal archive where a researcher can ask for permission to gain access. 
Rather, and as mentioned above, it was thanks to Professors Stanton-Russell 
and Keely that I gained access to the Widgren archive. The archive portrays the 
very early documenting of what was evolving to be the IGC. Many people I have 
spoken to were willing to engage with me, however many have insistent to talk 
‘off the record’. Further, even those who have agreed to being quoted in some 
instances have been very particular about which information was ‘on’ or ‘off 
record’. This is not because activity surrounding the IGC is engaged in 
conspiracy, but rather because participants state to be concerned about the 
rhetorical climate within which international migration is discussed publically and 
emphasis the very real need to be and stay private about their thinking, learning 
and doctrine formation. Thus, the reader will, in the following, notice that parts 
of this research portrays an ‘absence’ of the IGC. The reason for this is not that 
there was no information in these instances, but rather my concern for those 
who have engaged with me in paying respect to their wishes.  
This informal material and the informal nature of conversations, thus shed light 
on the IGC as a major reference point in the doctrine formation to become 
Migration Management. It also raises questions, more broadly, about the nature 
of theory applied in the social sciences which too often assume linearity, 
formality and positivism. My research shows that the self-assuredness of some 
theoretical approaches may possibly not be warranted. 
 
Theory and Methodology 
With the exception of the last chapter I will thus engage in portraying the 
internal logic of Migration Management as read through the IGC. In what follows 
here, I next outline and discuss the theoretical approach within which my 
thinking about the political consequences of the particular construction of social 
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meaning, that is Migration Management, is situated. There would have been 
alternatives to the way I am approaching this thesis. Yet, by way of asking for 
the meaning that is produced and its effects I am focussing on a particular 
relationship between words and actions/practices that make meaning. The 
international community and governments acting at the level of the international 
‘do’ words, before they enact in practice. Practice then produces more words to 
make sense of itself and justify actions and actors.  
I will turn to what Todd May (1994) has termed ‘tactical philosophy’, and more 
concretely, post-structuralism, in order to help me think about Migration 
Management and its consequences.  Post-structuralism pictures the world as 
an intersecting rhizome, build on, and sustained through, differences. Most 
importantly, it does not conceive of any centre within which power resides. In 
other words, the political – as agonistic moment - is understood to be irreducible 
to an essentialized, singular ‘cause’. The interplay of many sites from which 
power arises creates the social world as a dynamic, pluralistic web of 
relationships. At the same time as the elements of this plurality try to stabilize 
themselves to a degree, this interplay has the capacity to rupture the social 
world as it attempts to totalize itself. It then follows that poststructuralist thought 
is sceptical about top-bottom conceptions of the world. The exercise of power 
does not consist in mere suppression; rather it comes into play in the very 
constitution of the world. May explains: “Tactical thought thus performs its 
analysis within a milieu characterized not only by tension between what is and 
what ought to be, but also between irreducible but mutually intersecting 
practices of power” (May, 1994: 11). 
The appeal of this perspective is its concern for difference. I rephrase here 
closely Todd May’s arguments in his introduction to Reconsidering Difference 
(1997). Difference within this perspective is seen to be constitutive of our world, 
both in terms of sharing with, but also as obsession with the Other. It is this 
sharing of, and obsession with, the Other that is so pertinent in the political, and 
more concretely, in the policy-making processes focussed on international 
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migration. How does post-structuralism18 argue its engagement with difference? 
Why is it important? 
First, it argues that marginalization and elimination of difference is closely linked 
to foundationalism. Foundationalism designates an account that is exhaustive 
and indubitable. That the world and our experience of it can be brought under 
absolute conceptual categories as for example Migration Management seeks to 
do. Post-structuralism argues that this is an illusion. This capturing of an 
essence of a matter which cannot be surpassed is not only not possible but also 
dangerous as it leads to radical violence against those marginalized; that is, 
those who are not seen to be able to conform. 
Second, and closely related to the first argument against foundationalism, is 
that marginalization and the elimination of difference is closely linked to 
totalitarianism theoretically but also, by extension, empirically. Totalitarianism 
constrains the world into narrowly defined parameters, giving an absolute 
account of what reality is to be. So much so that it does not marginalize, it 
eliminates.  Such accounts, thus, are not only false; they are also ‘evil’ in the 
Arendtian sense (1976). Historically, two events in the 20th Century gave 
impetus to poststructuralist thinking and the focus on totalitarianism and 
difference. The experience of the holocaust and of May 1968 in France came as 
a deeply seated shock in the case of the former and in the latter case the 
reactionary role of the communist party came as a surprise to those who were 
engaged in critique. A brief look at the characteristics of the May 1968 
demonstrations is helpful. These demonstrations had no leadership – as 
proposed by some strands of Marxism; their demands were multiple and not 
singular; and lastly, the participants were diverse, rather than exclusively 
composed of workers rising against the bourgeoisie. May states  
Thinking of community in terms of a common substance that we all must 
participate in marginalizes those who are different from the participants in 
that common substance; thinking of language in terms of presence 
masks the difference that subtends it; thinking of ethics in terms of the 
likeness or analogies of others to oneself refuses the insight that what is 
                                               
18
 I am here not reducing poststructuralism to Todd May, as will be seen throughout my thinking 
is informed by a variety of poststructuralist thinkers. 
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ethically relevant is often the difference of others from oneself; thinking of 
ontology in terms of identity precludes considerations of ontological 
possibilities that are irreducible to any identity. 
(May, 1997: 4) 
It is in this context that any discursive practice which proclaims to be superior 
and indubitable and assumes power to reside in an essentialized centre – either 
implicitly or explicitly – needs close scrutiny. This is also the ethical motivation 
of poststructuralist thought. Any form of thinking and living that is reductive of 
others who are constructed to not be like us, or not treatable to become so, and 
which therefore marginalizes is not acceptable. By extension, any practice 
which contributes to such reduction and marginalization is therefore radical 
violence and needs to be unequivocally abandoned. The IGC, by forming the 
doctrines which compose Migration Management, construct such a reductive, 
essentialized system through the way they meet as well as through the ideas 
they attempt to mould into a totalizing coherence and homogeneity. The IGC is 
not open to scrutiny. The move to form the IGC and the practices of re-ascribing 
meaning is remarkable because, the fact and effect of Migration Management is 
accepted as unavoidable but: (a) the concentration of power is an invitation to 
abuse; and (b) the practices established within the IGC are not inevitable, nor 
are they necessarily transparent in their effects to those policy-makers which 
hold their government’s brief on international migration. The sedimented 
hegemonic narrative does not absolve anyone from the responsibility that the 
IGC’s brain child is ultimately answerable for suspension and killing of those 
migrants the European Union does not want. 
Post-structuralism then focuses attention on the reproduction and 
transformation of hegemonic orders and practices in order to show how we are 
held by a particular discourse while making plain that there are counter-
discourses. On the basis of these counter-discourses the theoretical approach 
insists on the primacy of politics. Thus, in the following I will not only explain 
why things exist, but also how they exist as essentially unstable. In this sense, 
neither the purely hermeneutical nor the positivist accounts will help to clarify 
the constructed and political character of social phenomena. Rather, I propose 
to view the phenomenon of Migration Management as a dialectic between 
incompleteness and acts of identification to sustain stability. On the basis of this 
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I propose to view change as brought about by rupture made possible on the 
presupposition of equality. This is particularly important in order to 
conceptualize not only what stabilizes but also to conceptualize the 
consequences of Migration Management, i.e. suspension. Rancière’s argument 
that equality is not a goal to strive for but rather the presupposition that politics 
needs to start from will help me to re-think politics as a sporadic agonistic 
endeavour and to formulate a ‘bottom-line’ on which basis I can assess where 
the practices of what we identify as democratic become unacceptable.  
Thus, thinking about the consequences of Migration Management, it is – at this 
point difficult to see how those people that I conceptualize as suspended will 
likely be able to establish themselves as being visible enemies – an 
antagonism, rather than an agonistic possibility for action and rupture. Rather, 
the power differences are so asymmetrical that in thinking about how to 
undermine this power differential, there may be the chance of the suspended 
establishing themselves as adversaries on the level of everyday practices, as 
occasional rupturing events so as to make themselves visible in the first place. 
Jacques Rancière and also – to an extent – Hannah Arendt help me overcome 
the difficulties experienced when trying to make sense of the particular doctrine 
formation that Migration Management as brainchild of the IGC poses. In 
particular when the suspended are to be conceptualized, when I am trying to 
analyse what the specific governmental logic of Migration Management is and 
when I am thinking about possibilities to disrupt this logic. 
Jacques Rancière helps me to think, on the one hand, social order in such a 
way that its logic is not necessarily restricted to the boundedness of the nation 
state, by employing his idea of ‘police order’ which is used in the broader 
Foucaultian sense. He offers the tools to understand the fusion of policing and 
policy-making. On the other hand, he helps me to think the radical violence of 
exclusion which makes comprehensible the suspended person – as being 
beyond norm and deviance as the person without ac/count. In a final step, I 
employ a rather more eclectic mix of thinking by Hannah Arendt and Jacques 
Rancière to develop a notion of agonistic politics which breaks the police order 
and helps me think about suspension as also containing a generative moment.  
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Jacques Rancière, on the basis of his breaking with Althusser, develops the 
most important and unifying element of his academic endeavours: the 
conviction that equality is neither an essence and a value, nor a goal. In other 
words, equality in Rancière’s terms is neither formal nor substantial as 
understood in the more orthodox theoretical traditions. Rather, it is the first 
presupposition from which the political starts (Rancière, 1998). 
What kind of equality are we speaking about? It is not the equality of the 
contemporary liberal view – an end to achieve as a good for those who have the 
capacity to achieve equality who already inhabit a place and a function in the 
social hierarchy. In short it is not about equal opportunities. Rancière explains:  
There is order in society, because some people command and others 
obey, but in order to obey an order at least two things are required: you 
must understand the order and you must understand that you must obey 
it. And to do that, you must already be the equal of the person who is 
ordering you. 
(Rancière, 2010: 16)  
Equality is a presupposition, it is not a “founding ontological principle but a 
condition that only functions when it is put into action” (Rancière, 2004: 52). 
“Equality is not a given that politics then presses into service, an essence 
embodied in the law of a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining. It is a mere 
assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it” 
(Rancière, 1998: 34). 
Rancière’s political thought starts with criticising philosophy’s presupposition 
that there is a rational way to account for community. In doing so, the motivation 
is to find principles of justification for social and political orders. It needs an 
underlying principle (arkhe) for how people are tied to particular political 
functions. This, so Rancière argues, justifies domination on the one hand and it 
denies the capacity for being politically active (in the Arendtian sense).  For 
Arendt ‘activity’ is the political being-in-the-world as experience, appearance 
and distinctively ethical mode. Beyond Arendt, I understand this being public as 
wider than speaking in the agora. It is, rather, the discursive circularity of being 
ac/counted for which manifests in speech, practice, interaction as well as in a 
physical and tangible space. Yet, it is in particular the human capacity to begin, 
to initiate – something that she captures with her idea of natality (Arendt, 1958).  
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Natality, the capacity to initiate is – like Rancière’s equality - something that is 
inherent to every human being. Therefore, the focus on polis and the focus on 
the social as the place for the distribution of function and power - in short, the 
establishment of a hierarchy - contradicts fundamentally equality and natality as 
rooted in the demos. By extension then, the traditional relation of the social and 
the political as radical opposites does not make sense. Rather, for Rancière, the 
social is always the field of hierarchy and domination which denies an 
independent ontological status to the political, it de-politicises an established 
logic of inequality.  
The structure that regulates the social is called in the terms of Rancière ‘the 
police’, thus he speaks of police order (Rancière, 1998). More broadly he 
criticises the contemporary as ‘consensus-democracy’. Deranty explains 
‘consensus-democracy’: “Modern democracy is no longer governed through the 
logic of agonal rhetoric and the challenge to the laws, it is ruled by experts, the 
policy-makers and the statisticians” (Deranty, 2003: paragraph 17). It thus 
creates the impression of all-inclusiveness, hiding the fact that it not only 
includes its own exclusion, but that it suspends. Suspension, I understand to be 
radical violence. The political, in opposition, is based on radical equality – the 
equality of anyone with anyone else - and thus is in essence democratic. This is 
why, logically, the social cannot provide for the political as it divides, it 
distributes places, roles and functions.  
It is in the evolution where natality and equality work via the political to found 
the social and where the social is ruptured by the political. Within the context of 
Migration Management the citizens – as justification for policy-makers to 
regulate - demand to be recognized by the migrants as rights holders, thus they 
demand to be recognized as rightfully dominating migrants. Yet, for this 
inequality to work, citizens must rely on migrants to acknowledge this inequality 
– the migrant’s capacity to understand their position and place in that order as 
being dominated must be recognized by the migrants – and this relationship 
introduces the ‘logic of the wrong’, of torsion. “The social order is wrung 
because it must produce ontological inequality since hierarchy is its basic arkhe, 
while at the same time this inequality is only logically possible on the basis of 
radical equality” (Deranty, 2003: paragraph 5). It is this torsion which accounts 
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for the possibility of struggle and the moment where natality comes to bear. The 
verification of equality is always punctual and is something which cannot be 
theorized or generalized as it needs to be quite simply done – it happens in the 
moment when the suspended - the subject which both is and is not, the person 
without juridico-political status - claims recognition. This process is termed by 
Rancière subjectification (Rancière, 1998). It is the process of quarrelling about 
who is entitled to take part as meaningful speaker, who is a subject to start with 
and what can be quarrelled about.  
It is at this point that Rancière’s thinking is helpful, as the police order can more 
easily be thought within the context of international politics and in particular 
within the international politics of migration. It also is his thought which helps to 
make the person without juridico-political status which is outside of the 
boundaries of territorial sovereignty intelligible. Thus the dynamics between the 
norm and the deviance (subjects which are both political subjectivities and 
subjected, both holding subject positions – citizens, legal and illegal migrants) 
are comprehensible through the partage du sensible (the police order) as much 
as the suspended can be understood with Rancière as those wronged and 
without ac/count – not as those engaging in struggle about identity, but in 
struggling to claim the stage in order to become political subjects in the first 
place. And it is then their capacity to initiate, to become politically active - to 
claim a place on the stage and be recognized as having voice - which instigates 
to think about agonistic politics as focusing on struggle rather than consensus. 
That is: giving primacy to the political, rather than to the social. I will elaborate 
on this in more detail in the context of chapters seven and eight. 
Having thus situated myself theoretically, I am interested in taking academic 
and policy-making aspects of the relevant research area into account. I do not 
wish to imply that the policy discourse I am mainly focusing on is the master 
discourse: there is a wide array of research into the role of media and public 
opinion which is not dealt with here. I will, as stated above, however, draw on 
academic discourse. Doing this, I hope to show how the organization of ideas, 
subjects and technology in both the academic and policy arenas are vital 
elements in understanding the historical processes that lead us to adopt and 
unquestioningly accept most of the concepts we take for granted today to 
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comprehend and steer international migration. The research field of 
international migration is a particular case, as both policy and research are so 
closely enmeshed (see for discussions: Black, 2001, Bakewell 2008, and 
O’Connell Davidson and Anderson, 2006) with policy more often than not 
providing the ‘concepts’ for academia to substantiate and legitimize (see for 
example Boswell, 2003a and b).  
I make use of the thinking that post-structuralism offers as this supports my 
endeavour to show how the last quarter of the 20th Century lead to the 
seemingly coherent paradigm19 of Migration Management. In doing so, I hope to 
show the multifaceted development without reducing it to a sequential, 
inevitable history which can be understood in terms of determinism, causality 
and linearity. In effect, this will also mean that I cannot eradicate ambiguities 
from the narrative, it is precisely in accepting the undecidability that foreclosure 
of certain lines of thought and understanding is avoided. However, in what 
follows below I insist that this is not an ‘anything goes’ approach, but on the 
contrary that it is informed by its ontological premises and empirical givens. The 
‘theoretical analytic’ I employ aims to describe, understand (in the sense of 
Verstehen) and explain particular historical events and processes by way of 
asking how, for which reasons and under which circumstances meaning (and 
with that order) is constructed, contested and changed. I will outline in a linear 
way below what is necessarily an interconnected process of analysis, 
explanation, interpretation and critique. 
Thus, first the phenomenon – in this case Migration Management, its condition 
of possibility, sedimentation and possible rupture – will be problematized in 
such a way that the theoretical and empirical object of investigation is 
constructed. This arises out of a concern with the present. In other words, I will - 
in the following chapters - pose the problem of the institutional set up in which 
Migration Management was conceived. I will also pose the problem of 
                                               
19
 I understand ‘paradigm’ in the Kuhnian way. Although this notion is problematic and has 
generated many discussions. Suffice it to say at this point that paradigm is understood to be a 
philosophical and theoretical framework of a discipline within which theories are bound together 
to form a broader understanding of a social phenomenon. 
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consequence arising from the particular narrative of Migration Management, 
which is suspension as a devastating but also generating phenomenon. 
In order to make plain the necessary conditions of possibility for Migration 
Management I will, secondly, engage in what Howarth et al. (2007) call 
retroductive reasoning. Thus, I am going to start from the familiar and taken-for-
granted position that migration needs to be managed. Such an analysis is done 
by way of a ‘double reading’ – deconstruction as textual labour in Derridian 
terms – of the data described above: On first reading the empirical resources 
are taken at face-value to follow the dominant interpretation. The first reading 
seeks to describe through making clear the premises, the concepts it puts forth 
and the argument it states and executes. On second reading that which is 
excluded - the limits that are established - are traced by paying attention to 
repressed and inferior interpretations of the undercurrent of the text (Torfing, 
1999: 65). By taking this approach the dependency and undecidability of 
elements within a discourse on each other can be shown and thus the political 
moments of decision-making and ‘truth’-establishment can be highlighted and 
explained. More importantly, though, this approach enables me to point to the 
deeply seated ambiguity of any discourse that constructs a field of acceptable 
meaning as hegemonic and therefore seemingly closed totality. 
A third step is then to provide the content, by pointing to the three interrelated 
logics which capture the point, the rules and ontological preconditions of 
regimes of practice (as opposed to causal laws, mechanisms or contextual self-
interpretations as distinct methodologies). The three logics are the social (what 
Rancière calls police order, in other words the rules informing practice); the 
political (Rancière’s disagreement or rupture, in other words the historical 
emergence and formation of changed social practices and forming 
hegemonies); and lastly, fantasmatic logics (the moment of identification, which 
accounts for how subjects/subject-positions are held and sustained by a regime 
of practice) (Howarth, 2007). 
These logics are, fourthly, articulated. I will use the term ‘articulation’ to explain 
how a phenomenon achieves being, what its meaning is. Articulation employs 
genealogy as a tool for the explanation of how meaning is established (Laclau, 
2005). Thus, within the context of this thesis international migration is made 
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sense of in its relation with and context of ‘security’, ‘development’ (and to a 
lesser degree ‘integration’) within a particular ideology of growth, stability and 
competition. It is NOT made sense of – articulated - in the context of 
community, hospitality, or freedom, for example. 
Finally then, I will engage in evaluation and critique. In order to do so the 
‘bottom line’ within the context of my understanding of post-structuralism is that 
any form of thinking and living that is reductive of others who are constructed to 
not be like us, or not treatable to become so, and which therefore marginalizes 
is not acceptable. By extension, any practice which contributes to such 
reduction and marginalization is therefore radical violence and needs to be 
unequivocally abandoned. Thus evaluation and critique will be the step which 
seeks to go beyond explanation in order to think about what could transcend the 
existing order towards something different (May, 2007). Again, these five steps 
are interrelated. I will apply my theoretical analytic to archival material and some 
conversations as described above. 
 
Brief outline of the thesis 
I will differentiate in the following between discourse, narrative and articulations. 
By discourse I will understand the underlying logic of free market conservatism 
or in Rancière’s language consensus-democracy (chapter two). Migration 
Management is a paradigm forms the narrative (chapter six) which is composed 
of different but interrelated articulations (chapters four and five) which are 
constructed by the IGC (chapter three) and then elaborated and implement by 
the European Union (EU). In chapters seven and eight I will offer a critical 
reading of the internal logic of the IGC as presented in chapters two to six. The 
below structure will be echoed in the concluding chapter. 
 
The discourse and the invention of a new narrative: Migration Management 
Migration Management, as it evolved since the 1970s, cannot be understood 
outside of the context of changes in thinking about and doing politics before this 
time. Chapter two, thus, brings into focus the broader transformation of ideology 
since the late 1960s and shows how this was relevant for changes in the way 
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international migration is perceived, understood and re-constructed. Thus 
Migration Management is one narrative of a broader discourse bounded by 
limits of what is intelligible within free market conservatism or consensus-
democracy. The problem is formulated as that of ‘excess’ and a ‘culture of 
poverty’ which undermines productivity and threatens the ethos of skill-
intensive, science-based and innovative self-management of the social. It is a 
re-inscription of the story of ‘the white man’s burden’ to avert the crisis of 
democracy on a global scale. On this basis chapter three introduces the 
concept of Informal Plurilateralism as an instrument to make sense of the IGC, 
what it does and how it goes about taking international migration on as an 
urgent problem for the period between the 1980s and 1990s. More concretely 
chapter three shows how the driving force was the problem of ‘mixed flows’ 
which were constructed as undermining the integrity of the system; a 
construction that makes asylum-seeking impossible to think as an option and 
re-represents international migration in line with the broader discourse. Informal 
plurilateralism as a new diplomatic tool for doctrine formation by private citizens. 
The IGC in this reading appears more like a conceptual machinery which is 
deeply anti-democratic as it moves without scrutiny directly from doctrine 
formation to implementation of policy. 
 
Articulating the Narrative 
Within the IGC two articulations take shape which are instrumental. Thus, 
chapter four turns to discussing the asylum-migration nexus through which the 
securitization of international migration is articulated. The asylum-migration 
nexus is the device to secure states identities by representing migration as a 
security issue through the invention of the ‘transit country’. This is a juridico-
political and geopolitical function which produces treatable deviance and 
irredeemable suspension as access categories. It is an articulation which 
cannot conceive of alternatives, such as those framed in terms of rights or 
hospitality. It thus constructs suspension as the deferral of the validity to exist. 
Chapter five offers a discussion of the migration-development nexus, which 
introduces the entrepreneurialization of international migration. The migration-
development nexus functions as the device to re-legitimate mobility which is 
 
48 
constructed as entrepreneurial, this construction is vital in order to secure the 
stability of Migration Management as a narrative. The juridico-political and 
geopolitical function here lies in the extension and sedimentation of Migration 
Management as a foreign policy tool vis-a-vis humanitarian action and migrant 
circularity thereby establishing the norm and making the category of the deviant 
more precise. It thus describes the ‘good’ migrant as self-managing, 
competitive, productive and efficient participant of the global order. Chapter six 
draws on those two previous chapters and shows how these two articulations 
compose the narrative of Migration Management. This is the chapter which 
elaborates on the meaning of Migration Management. Migration Management 
makes contradictory positions intelligible and sorts people into access 
categories along a typology of norm/deviance versus suspension; the juridico-
political status as sole condition to realize humanity. The suspended have thus 
neither a place nor a function. Importantly, they are poor and tired, yet, they are 
not victims. Thus, Migration Management simplifies and essentializes; it is the 
individualising, quantifying and representational tool with which the geopolitical 
powers of the Global North impose consensus and manifest domination. 
 
The Effects and Consequences of Discourse and Narrative 
What is needed, however, is an in-depth critique of consensus-democracy, that 
is Migration Management in particular, and how this is constituted through a 
technocratic approach which minimizes all considerations around international 
migration to a calculable problem for which a juridified solution can be found. 
Thus undermining precisely those values European countries claim to stand for 
– respect for life, freedom and equality – and producing the social and physical 
death of what I call the suspended. This critique will be offered in chapter 
seven. Chapter eight, however, then argues that suspension has not only a 
devastating side to it, but can also have generative potential. The potential 
generative of staging a conflict and thus claiming a place on the stage where 
roles and places in the social are questioned and negotiated. Chapter eight will 
be followed by a conclusion which asks if and how Migration Management can 
be destabilized and if there may be a disruptive response to ‘consensus-
democracy’.  
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Chapter 2 
Geopolitics, Consensus-democracy and the International Politics of 
Migration 
Order is the burden of the white man; efficiency may be the demonstration of it 
in a modern rationalized society 
Michel Crozier (1975: 45) The Crisis of Democracy 
 
In the previous chapter I briefly elaborated the reasons why Migration 
Management as a paradigm is at the heart of this thesis. Appealing to a 
perception of rising interdependence between countries in the 1980s, the 
international community - particularly the European Union - argued that the 
historical approach to migration must be revised fundamentally. This historical 
approach:  
[...] can be termed an ‘integrationist approach’, where migration is seen 
to be an integral part of a development process. Recently, a different 
approach has emerged, the ‘instrumentalist approach’, in which migration 
can be ‘managed’ in order to achieve specific [security and development 
related] objectives. As such, migration becomes a ‘tool’ of [...] policy. 
(Skeldon, 2011: 1)  
It therefore must be asked how such neutralization of politics is established so 
that a paragraph such as the one in the introduction by Robert Kaplan (1994) 
can be published and accepted as a valid opinion, if not legitimate knowledge. 
Three conditions (Foucault, 2007: 107) are important for consensus-democracy 
to have become a hegemonic discourse. First sovereign power needs to be 
understood as an improvement of the institutions of the nation-state geared at 
the welfare of the population (Foucault, 2007). Thus, state institutions must 
ensure continued growth for prosperity as well as for stability and security in 
order to remain competitive and enable the citizenry to fulfil its role and take its 
place within society. The nation-state cannot spend ‘good money’ on the 
administration of asylum seekers where these are potentially dangerous to 
competitiveness and national stability. In other words, the integrity of the nation-
state’s institutions is conceptualized to be at risk where bogus asylum seekers 
try to fraudulently gain access to the citizen’s resources.  
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Second, disciplinary power needs to be exerted on other nation-states to live up 
to their obligations in investing in development and the welfare of their 
populations enabling these populations to stay at home (Foucault, 2007). 
Democratization is to lead to a form of international conformity geared towards 
what is today often called ‘human security’. In this regard, European 
governments are keen to ‘convince’ rather than coerce their neighbours across 
the Mediterranean, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere to adopt standards of 
good governance, which include the rule of law, and within it legislation and 
enforcement mechanisms to deal with apprehended or returned would-be-
migrants and asylum seekers while combining this with the allocation of 
development aid. Disciplinary power, in this case, is normation into conformity.  
Third, governmental management is needed (Foucault, 2007). The welfare of 
populations cannot be guaranteed if they are not managed and, in order to 
manage well, population groups need to be known and stratified by statistical 
means so as to identify those who are normal (the citizen), and those who need 
to be targeted for improvement (resettled refugees, humanitarian refugees, 
victims of trafficking). Thus, overstayers, for example, those who have entered a 
member state of the European Union legally but have then failed to return to 
their country of legal residence when the visa expired, are listed by way of their 
country of origin, so as to feed the databases with those countries which pose a 
danger of causing the government to be inefficient as it has to deal with such 
law-breakers. Further, those migrants who are deemed skilled or semi-skilled 
are admissible in order to improve their skills and experience which they can 
then bring back to their country of origin and thus support its development. The 
same is true for those who have been granted refugee status – they are 
treatable. Thus the statistical stratification of the population modifies and 
normalizes a certain ‘common sense’ as to who counts and who is of no 
‘ac/count’ (Rancière, 2001).  
It is in the context of sovereign and disciplinary power and governmental 
management that Rancière states: “Today, all of us are supposed to be 
‘included’ in a totality that is defined in consensual terms as an addition of 
groups each regarded to have its own identity” (Rancière, 2001: 348). All those 
which have an allocated place, role and function within the social – and this 
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extends beyond the territorial and otherwise boundaries of a particular country – 
are included; with the myth of having left no-one ‘outside’. Yet, there are those 
without political subjectivity, without juridico-political status. These are the dead 
bodies found in the sea, but these are also people who live rough outside of 
those fences the European Union has established on the African continent. 
However, these few people are so radically excluded that we ‘don’t know’ about 
them – or rather do not want to know them as real persons - and thus can claim 
that Migration Management covers all there is to manage about international 
migration. FRONTEX thus enacts the schema of sovereign, disciplinary and 
governmental power. Elbe explains that the schema points to a “process by 
which security practices [such as those conducted by and through FRONTEX] 
themselves become infused with new tactics of governmental management 
operating at the level of population, which in turn are flanked by the concurrent 
recourse to sovereign and disciplinary forms of power that now are enlisted in 
this same effort to manage the welfare of populations” (Elbe, 2009: 71). 
As such international migration moved from low to high politics but a focus on 
strong regulation was kept intact. Thus, the 1980s set a process in train which 
would develop into a complete overhaul of the underlying meaning of those 
concepts which make international migration comprehensible. It therefore 
fundamentally changed the symbolic order ascribed to migration. 
How is it possible that our understanding of international migration and, by 
extension, policy-making concerning international migration was altered so 
substantially? How is it possible that these new knowledges normalized so 
quickly and without any major noticeable dispute? The challenge is to account 
for the establishment and impact of this new narrative: the process of 
production of meaning which originated in a European context but spread 
globally.  
This chapter outlines the discourse of the 1970/1980s which frames debates 
around the international politics of migration. The international politics of 
migration is firmly a question of a geopolitical discourse insofar as it constructs 
ideas of how places, populations, diplomacies and power-practices interrelate 
(O’Tuathail, 1996). In what follows I introduce this geo-political discourse which 
frames the boundaries or limits for what is intelligible to policy-makers and the 
 
52 
social more generally and within which ‘consensus-democracy’ as free market 
conservatism was conceived and established as hegemonic discourse. This 
major shift is an historic instance which answers the two questions posed 
above, namely how our understanding vis-a-vis international migration could 
change so substantially and normalize so quickly. This chapter thus sets out 
what the basic conditions of possibility are to enable a narrative of Migration 
Management such as we accept it now. It situates and builds the stage for the 
subsequent chapters which elaborate on the narrative and its articulations as 
portraying the internal logic of Migration Management as read through the 
archives of the IGC.  
The 1960s had experienced what Samuel Huntington termed ‘democratic 
distemper’ (in Crozier, 1975: 37). It is the Trilateral Commission’s analysis of 
what they perceived as counterculture of radical opposition (by e.g. women and 
ethnic minorities): a lack of constraint, lack of respect for authority and the 
undermining of order. Crozier (1975: 12) identifies two basic characteristics of 
the fundamental problem that Europe in particular was faced with in a study 
commissioned by the Trilateral Commission:  
 The European political systems are overloaded with participants 
and demands, and they have increasing difficulty in mastering the 
very complexity which is the natural result of their economic 
growth and political development. 
 The bureaucratic cohesiveness they have to sustain in order to 
maintain their capacity to decide and implement tends to foster 
irresponsibility and the breakdown of consensus, which increase 
in turn the difficulty of their task. 
According to the ‘Crisis of Democracy’ (1975) Atlantic Alliance states (North 
America, Western Europe and Japan) were in danger of becoming 
ungovernable through democratic overload. Populations, voicing demands for 
greater equality, rights and participation; but also more freedom from the state 
were asking for too much. The social movements of the 1960s were seen to 
have posed a considerable challenge to North America and Western Europe. 
Populations asked not only for welfare for parts of society that had not been 
seen to be eligible in their own right, (such as women having given birth out of 
wedlock); they were demanding a voice not given to them before (such as the 
black community and other minority groups). One such struggle was the call 
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from women to gain more freedom, for example with regards to their sexual and 
reproductive rights, but also on the other hand for government to more actively 
protect them as individuals for example vis-a-vis their husbands in cases of 
domestic violence. Minorities demanded equal rights not only with regard to 
political and civil rights. This ‘excess of democracy’ (Campbell, 1998: 163) 
posed a danger to being able to act at home and abroad. It poses a two-fold 
danger relevant for the purpose of this thesis, (1) the ’excess’ makes demands 
on being part of policy-making and (2) efficiency, not only in economic terms, is 
endangered by deranged, uneducated and tired migrants trying to entre Europe 
in an uninvited and unsolicited way. The discourse is a situated knowledge – 
‘the burden of the white man’ as the quote above puts it. 
The IGC, inspired by a particular form of social democracy, is an attempt to 
address both the above dangers. Migration Management needs to be situated 
and understood in a context where social democracy was re-thought and the 
management of the social emerged instead. It combined security and economic 
considerations such that they could build a coherent narrative which was 
‘globalizable’, yet tried to contain and fix social plurality within the limits of the 
nation-state. This is why I will briefly discuss the transformation of ideology in 
this chapter. I will first introduce Bilderberg and the Trilateral Commission. 
These two fora (as examples of informal plurilateralism) were vital in introducing 
a transformation of doctrine and providing a blue-print for how the governance 
of migration came to be thought up within the IGC. I will then look in more depth 
at the contours of this transformation and give an account of what kind of 
learning was to be done for this transformation to become hegemonic and how 
this transformed ideology was to be expressed. Thirdly, I will recount the history 
of the global political economy as it is relevant to international migration. Lastly, 
I will show how the governance of migration is constructed to pose a danger 
whether it is viewed as a domestic issues or one of international ‘high politics’. 
This chapter thus frames and portrays the background to the study which is to 
follow. 
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Bilderberg and the Trilateral Commission 
The political atmosphere in the late 1960s and early 1970s was perceived as 
de-stabilizing the order maintained by elites. However, the perceived stability of 
the ‘golden age of social democracy’ was at best exaggerated; dislocations 
within this system of nation-state governance had started almost with its 
inception after World War II. Embedded liberalism20, associated with American 
hegemony21 had come to be criticised by many western European countries. 
Europeans22 became critical on three accounts: first, there was growing 
dissatisfaction with US American occupation; second, obstacles to American 
investment in Europe developed and Europeans worried that America would 
withdraw from its engagement in reconstruction; and third, the American right 
became more and more dominated by an anti-communist hysteria (Campbell, 
1998). In European eyes, Strange comments:  
the ‘decline’ [of American power] arises partly from an original 
overestimation of America’s capacity to remake the whole world in the 
image of the U.S.A. In this vision, Washington was the centre of the 
system, a kind of keep in the baronial castle of capitalism, from which 
radiated military, monetary, commercial, and technological as well as 
purely political channels carrying the values of American polity, economy 
and society down through the hierarchy of allies and friends; classes and 
cultural cousins, out to the ends of the earth. The new kind of global 
empire, under the protection of American nuclear power, did not need 
territorial expansion. It could be achieved by a combination of military 
alliances and a world economy opened up to trade, investment and 
information. 
(Strange, 1982: 481-2) 
                                               
20
 Embedded liberalism is defined, by Ruggie (1982) as corporate liberalism, Fordism, 
Keynsianism, welfarism, retreat from colonies and a permanent arms economy through Cold 
War ideology. (see also Gill, 1990) 
21
 Here understood in its realist incarnation. 
22
 I am aware that it is generalizing to talk about ‘Europeans’ in this context. There was not a 
unified perspective in all (western) European countries. Britain is particularly difficult to subsume 
under this banner. However, British voices had also been critical – at least until the Labour 
government had to go to the IMF and introduced monetary policy in the late 1970s, before 
Thatcher then re-imaged the country in strongly neo-liberal terms. 
 
55 
Raymond Aron published The Imperial Republic in 1974 hinting at how some 
Europeans had conceptualized their relationship with the US. Another author 
writing from London, George Lichtheim, put it more succinctly in concluding that 
since the Atlantic Alliance was imposed on Europe, it had to live with the United 
States as a “temporary overlord” (Lichtheim, 1963: 217/18).  
In this climate of growing frustration first Bilderberg and then the Trilateral 
Commission were formed by ‘private citizens’ to foster closer cooperation and to 
nurture practices of working together across the regions of the Global North on 
issues perceived as a potential threat to order. 
 
Bilderberg 
Europeans, felt imposed on, without – precisely - being accepted as partners in 
an equal relationship where approaches to the way of doing the governing was 
free of influence. Bilderberg was established in 1952 (Gill, 1990: 129) as an 
informal, private counterpart to the formal institutions governing North Atlantic 
relations (Gill, 1990: 129). The membership was composed of a high proportion 
of social democrats (academics, corporate and banking chiefs, media people 
and unionists) along with centrist politicians, some military officials and the odd 
CIA senior. The CIA provided the funding for Bilderberg meetings. The 
meetings brought together those with “modernising and forward-looking 
internationalist tendencies” (Gill, 1990: 129). Although not new as a tool for 
governance – there had been the anglo-american round tables in the context of 
US aid to Britain in the Boer Wars – Bilderberg became an important blueprint 
for future informal governing of international, contentious relations in 
problematic issue areas. It was a form of diplomacy which believed in 
multilateralism and wide participation of ‘stakeholders’ but on the basis of a 
chosen and controlled membership which met secretively. Bilderberg smoothed 
over disruptions and conflicts between Europe and America, until the early 
1970s. At this point American unilateralism led to the establishment of the 
Trilateral Commission. 
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Trilateral Commission 
The Trilateral Commission formed in 1973 and comprised European states, 
Japan and the USA. It was a forum of ‘private citizens’ who met in order to 
discuss ‘matters of common concerns’ and to propose new ways of thinking 
about policy in the fields of the economy, the military and politics in order to 
assist mutual learning and to ensure that the domestic would not interfere with 
effective international cooperation. The Trilateral Commission and its forerunner 
‘Bilderberg’ brought about the transformation of ideology which ended the 
‘golden age of social democracy’ and led to its reformulation in the 1990s. The 
Trilateral Commission is not widely known, yet, it is not secretive in the sense 
that commissioned reports and other documents are available online23. 
The Trilateral Commission is highly relevant in the context of this study for 
various reasons: first, it introduced so-called a shift in thinking by marrying neo-
conservative and neo-liberal sentiments to form free market conservatism; 
second, it pushed the underlying view of interdependence in the world; and 
third, it engaged many diverse people, adding to the spread and acceptance of 
re-formulated ideas and methods of governance. These three factors would 
inform not only the way in which the IGC would operate but also the way in 
which the IGC would re-think international migration. It also transformed political 
subjectivity insofar as those deemed probable to undermine the efficiency of the 
social order, and were therefore a threat, were more subtly identified and more 
radically excluded. It created and disseminated the new hegemonic discourse 
that would guide thinking and governing in the 1980s and 1990s, the effects of 
which are notable on a global scale. 
The Trilateral Commission set out with three objectives summarised by Gill: 
First,  
‘significant groups of leaders’ from the three areas [North America, 
Western Europe and Japan] working together ‘on matters of common 
concern’ to lessen ‘communications breakdowns’ and to develop a 
‘shared understanding’ of common problems. Second, the Commission 
was intended to ‘propose policies’ which Trilateral states could follow, 
particularly in the economic, political and military fields, with respect to 
                                               
23
 www.trilateral.org 
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each other, the developing nations and communist states. ‘In the cases 
where it is not possible to reach agreement on what ought to be done, it 
may be possible to agree on certain things which ought not to be done.’ 
Crucially, the Commission would ‘suggest approaches to common 
domestic problems’ in order to assist in mutual education, and to ‘assure’ 
that domestic policies ‘do not raise obstacles to effective cooperation’. 
Finally, the third objective was ‘to foster understanding and support of 
Commission recommendations both in governmental and private sectors 
in the three regions. 
(Gill, 1990: 143, my emphasis. Citations are to an internal Trilateral 
Commission document of 1973) 
These objectives were conceptualized on the basis of the primacy of politics. 
Gill cites one of his interviewees, Brzezinski an active academic, who directed 
the Trilateral Commission until 1976 and member of the Carter administration 
from 1977:  
It has been often said that this decade is witnessing the surfacing of 
economic issues as the predominant concern of our time. Yet, 
paradoxically, the effect is to reiterate the primacy of politics. Today, 
even apparently strictly economic considerations must increasingly be 
viewed from a political and even philosophical standpoint, for the 
appearance of more intimate global interactions, not to speak of trilateral 
interdependence, has the effect of politicising most issues – be 
soybeans, or raw material, or foreign investments. Accordingly, overt 
political acts and perhaps even the creation of new political structures will 
be needed to cope effectively with what may appear to be now 
essentially technical and economic problems. 
(Gill, 1990: 145, my emphasis) 
This was in 1973. By 1977, however, the message had been reduced to ‘war on 
inflation’. Industrial policy was the singular focus and it was described by a 
trilateral commission report on the OECD to be based on the following 
principles: efficiency, freedom and health of the market system, social aims, 
security and international cooperation. Under social aims, the most important 
factor was to reduce government expenditure (Gill, 1990: 98ff). Within this 
climate of struggle and change, social democracy in Europe also changed and 
impacted on how international migration was understood. 
In Europe, international migration was like a ball in the erratic game of changes 
regarding social democracy. After the split of the European labour movement in 
the wake of World War I into a communist and a democratic-socialist variant, 
the central project of a de-radicalized social democracy has been the ‘just 
society’ (Merkel et al., 2008). The underlying core values of social democracy 
 
58 
were gleaned from the French revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity. The 
logic proposed was that liberty and equality are only possible because fraternity 
(solidarity) unites the actions of individuals and the economy is organized in 
accordance with values of social responsibility. These values are expressed in 
the expectation that the state is to tame market forces and to protect people. 
Thus, on the face of it social democracy was expressed almost exclusively in 
and through economic policy. Yet, it always had a strong underlying current of 
security with a view to the safety of the people as introduced into liberal theory 
already by Locke – the security of the public, the integrity of the state (Locke, 
1988: 373). In the discourse of social democracy migrants were always in the 
position of being marginal as they did not constitute a proper part of society but 
rather an ancillary and usually threatening addition. 
The most problematic challenge for social democracy in the post-1945 era was 
the conflict between an emphasis on full employment and growth while also 
aiming to fight exploitation. This was to be done via re-distribution. The tool with 
which social democracy sought to prevent inequality was technocratic 
regulation. As Weber (1976) and Foucault (1990, 2004, 2008) amongst others 
have shown, technocratic regulation as a means of doing government is not a 
new phenomenon (see also Stammers, 2001). However, what had developed 
as a tendency from the Industrial Revolution to the early 1970s changed 
drastically in scope and pace thereafter.  
Why is this relevant for questions of policy-making on international migration? 
Social democracies’ focus on re-distribution was centred on assumptions of 
relative homogeneity of the social and a boundedness of space within which re-
distribution and state-provision would apply. Who then is ac/counted for, or has 
a legitimate place to claim such provision? The panic around the ‘crisis of 
democracy’ makes clear how instable such claim making and claim granting is. 
As will be shown below in this chapter, this problem was solved by constructing 
economic migrants as ‘guests’ who leave or refugees to be integrated. Yet, by 
the 1970s such considerations became mixed with populist xenophobic 
sentiments rooted in more conservative political perspectives and thus 
constructed a threat. While much of the discourse focussed largely on de-
regulation and liberalization/globalization of the market, the effect of the 
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changes during the 1970s and 1980s for international migration was hyper-
regulation.  
The dual imperative of social justice and economic efficiency find their limit at 
the point where social democratic values and economic globalization merge to 
become free market conservatism, which favours competitiveness and private 
responsibility over fraternity/solidarity. This will be elaborated further below. It is 
also the reason why this thesis emphasises technocracy as a phenomenon, 
especially in chapters four and eight, despite it having been central to social 
democracy in the past two centuries. The scope and pace of governance 
through technocracy has vast and destructive effects which are witnessed by 
international migrants in an unmediated and untamed way. Somewhat 
provocatively Ong writes in the context of international migration “residents [...] 
are valued and protected not because of their citizenship status but for their 
powers of self-management and cutting-edge skills that sustain the 
competitiveness of growth zones” (Ong, 2006: 239). The subject is recognized 
as having juridico-political status when s/he is actively self-enterprising and 
reflexively risk taking, when s/he engages in breeding of intellectual capital and 
self-improvement, in short when the subject is deemed efficient. “Nonbreeding 
subjects are rendered nonworthy subjects” (Ong, 2006: 239). To regulate this is 
the ‘burden of the white man’, the civilized and efficient man. 
 
Transformation of an Ideology 
This marked a significant change to views of social justice and redistribution 
during the ‘golden age of social democracy’ or the so-called Pax Americana 
(Ruggie, 1982). So far, the welfare state had been constructed as a 
comprehensive and accepted way of seeing the world: “This particular 
organization of society combined mass production in assembly-line factories 
with a public social safety net to compensate for the negative workings of the 
free market” (de Goede, 1996: 322). Yet, by the early 1970s, this way of seeing 
the world was replaced by the notion that the “free market must be the sole 
organizer of life because [free market] consequences are either invariably 
beneficial or at least impossible for human agency to alter” (de Goede, 1996: 
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322). This message led to a completely revised logic of welfare provision by the 
state. Gilder argues that “the current poor [...] are refusing to work hard [...] 
[They] choose leisure not because of moral weakness, but because they are 
paid to do so” (Gilder, 1981: 87-88). Van der Pijl explains: “This new [way of 
conceiving the poor] in turn is broadly seen as an almost natural, self-evident 
truth rather than as [an] ideological program” (van der Pijl, 1995: 5). Murray took 
these new truths to heart and wrote:  
The proposed program, our final and most ambitious thought experiment, 
consists of scrapping the entire federal welfare and income-support 
structure for working-aged persons [...] I am hypothesising, with the help 
of powerful collateral evidence, that the lives of large numbers of poor 
people would be radically changed for the better. 
(Murray, 1984: 228-229).  
Nonetheless it was granted that a small scale system of subsistence-level 
unemployment benefits for victims of economic hic-ups should be retained. But 
the emphasis was on efficiency and competitiveness. 
As drastic changes as those cited above have not happened. However, the 
underlying ideas have found forceful incorporation into ‘common sense’ thinking 
where migrants, especially asylum seekers, are concerned. “Consequently”, 
writes de Goede, “welfare recipients are seen [...] as [people] who should be 
pitied and helped in the best case or ignored and feared in the worst” (de 
Goede, 1996: 327). The mobile person, the migrant from Africa for example, is 
constructed as such a poor person and worse it is a potential threat against 
which the social order has to be secured. 
In (continental) Europe, civil society was much more embedded in processes of 
governing. Governments did not attempt to completely restructure the ‘common 
sense’ of civil society24. Market-centred change was promoted so as to 
encompass, according to Trilateral Commission studies, a move towards more 
efficient, high-tech and capital-intensive production and services. Finance 
Ministries in trilateral states were accorded high importance in domestic and 
                                               
24
 An exception to this is Britain where the Thatcher regime (aided by earlier moves of the 
Labour government) did re-shape the political landscape for civil society considerably. (see for 
example Hall, 1988). 
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global governing, based on the idea of transnationalization and 
interdependence in a response to international competition. In this context, Gill 
cites another Trilateral study written in 1978-9 which points to the need to 
devise policies to promote an economy that is more skill-intensive, science-
based, innovative and high in value-added (Gill, 1990: 99). Terms that have 
translated into migration policy making almost without mediation. The language 
of political economy throughout hides the strong narrative of order and stability 
which was implicitly driven by security considerations as promoted, for example, 
by the CIA. Unskilled migrants (and potential asylum seekers) who are not seen 
to be (able to be) enterprising are thus a danger to efficiency and 
competitiveness. 
Linked to the above is a more general problem which the Global North faced:  
The [post-war democratic] system has worked well enough as long as 
societal change was slow, the intervention of public authorities rather 
limited, and the fragmentation and stratification of society strong enough 
to insure a pragmatic acceptance of social order and established 
authority. But once the explosion of communication and social interaction 
has disturbed the necessary barriers that made societies more simple 
and therefore more manageable, [the] basic pattern of rationality 
disintegrates. 
(Crozier, 1975: 41) 
This quote has to be understood as based on an impression of ‘cultural and 
moral breakdown of the late sixties’ (Crozier, 1975: 42). A process which set in 
train the recognition of a vastly multiplied array of recognized social identities, a 
process perceived as threatening. The problem is formulated as how to govern 
the pluralisation of roles and functions proper to the social. A shift begins to 
become apparent from an analytical discourse to an instrumental and technical 
discourse. An important step which underpins what evolved as consensus-
democracy (Rancière, 2001): the management of the social by technocratic 
means. 
I understand the ‘traditional rationality’ Crozier refers to as the simple and linear 
logic of means-ends analysis, where means and ends can be clearly 
demarcated and redefined in order to propose a solution according to the 
preferences of those who govern. The ‘Crisis of Democracy’ (1975) report 
argues that a broader kind of rationality must be found in order to manage the 
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social. It is made clear that the ‘crisis of democracy’ is actually a crisis of 
governance, power and boundaries, not so much of core values.  
What is advocated is that learning needs to take place to overcome the lack of 
congruence between political, economic and security demands and the new 
interferences by civil society so as to avoid chaos and instability in a world that 
is not only characterized by increasing interdependence, but by ‘complex 
interdependence’. Whereas interdependence was marked by military and trade 
alliances, complex interdependence describes a fusion of realpolitik (with its 
authoritarian tendencies) with what Keohane and Nye (1977) describe as the 
world-wide integration of positive-sum interactions (production, exchange and 
communications) which, nevertheless, constrains individual states. This 
complexity – so the logic goes – is best handled through a technocratic and 
instrumental approach. 
While such logic was largely successful in managing the global economy based 
on free-market liberal thinking, trilateral relations were perceived to still face two 
problems by the late 1980s: increasingly disparate perspectives vis-a-vis 
classical security considerations and, more pressingly, the fact that many 
domestic issues were still largely conducted at the level of the nation-state thus 
hampering the new order the Trilateral Commission envisioned to counter 
global chaos and instability. Gill explains: ‘[A] continuing problem for the 
Commission and its interests is how to incorporate and modify the outlook of 
some elements of the security structures and ‘internationalize’ their outlook, and 
help to make [governance] more ‘organic’’ (Gill, 1990: 229, 230). This problem 
was solved in the 1980s and 1990s through the securitization of formerly 
domestic issues at the global level. 
It is in this respect that Bilderberg and the Trilateral Commission are important 
to understanding the evolution of Migration Management. They provide the 
broader discourse within which international migration came to be 
(re)articulated. Much of the migration literature dates grave changes in the 
governance of international migration back to the 1973 oil shock or to the 1989 
break-down of communism. I argue here that these events – although not 
unimportant – are symptoms of an on-going evolution of governance thinking in 
western Europe. They are vastly overstated in a narrow ‘cause-effect analysis’ 
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often prevalent in migration studies and ignorant of changes in the narrative of 
governance more generally. However, in the perception of most people there 
was a distinct turning point. The turning point which made us all perceive the 
world as more complex, more difficult to comprehend, more difficult to govern 
with calculable certainty. This turning point was largely self-induced by 
American policy towards the Bretton-Woods Institutions which were meant to 
facilitate economic stability and social wellbeing. It was the perception of having 
lost stability and order, as well as the narrative of an un-fundable welfare 
system and claims made by groups who were not seen to have the right to do 
so, that led the Trilateral Commission commissioning the report on the ‘Crisis of 
Democracy’ and the notion that a new system needs to be established – by the 
elites of the Global North. 
 
Constituting a new World View 
The reaction of the Trilateral Commission to the ‘Crisis of Democracy’ (Crozier, 
1975) report was to open up space for more inclusion, representation, 
transparency and accountability (Walters, 2004). This is no contradiction to 
what I have recounted above. More inclusion was precisely what the social 
movements of the 1960s had called for. Under the impression of ever more 
diversifying society, consultation with communities and ‘the public’ became the 
new practice. Governance, and by extension policy, was therefore seen to have 
become much more inclusive. It has indeed, but at a cost of neutered 
‘multiculturalism’, rather than agonistic plurality. The development of 
technocratic management channels what is say-able, who can speak and what 
cannot be expressed into tightly prescribed circumscriptions. Technocracies’ 
aim is pragmatism; controversy is not needed anymore because there are no 
existential ideological differences anymore; much like the ‘end of history’25 
argument where liberal politics is seen to have no enemies anymore (Gill, 
1990). The assumption is that the identification of ‘best practices’ on ‘evidence-
based knowledge’ will lead to a solution which facilitates the self-management 
                                               
25
 Fukuyama (1992) However, his argument has been, according to some authors, vastly and 
willingly misread. 
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of individuals in society. However, this assumption come with a problematic 
connotation according to which knowledge based on a particular kind of 
evidence is to be favoured over what is constructed to be ideologically infused 
speculation. Technocratic management is elitist, it imposes decisions which 
have been formulated based on methodological positivism (Stammers, 2001) 
which is reductive and essentializing and therefore necessarily exclusive of 
plurality. It undermines the meaningful participation of demos. 
Such technocratic understanding of governance leads to two other outcomes: a 
change of the role of the academic, as part of the elite of society, and a change 
of the constitution and meaning of the political subject. 
Hartley, a Trilateralist, states:  
the business of the intellectual [is] to provide a remedy [...] by drawing 
the attention of his rulers to the existence of new problems and the need 
for new attitudes of mind in facing them. In 1967 the speed of 
communication and the increasing cosmopolitanism of the intellectual 
community allow this task to be carried out on a level above old national 
oppositions and ideological feuds...contrary to Marx’s celebrated phrase, 
to understand the world is also to change it. 
(in Gill, 1990: 139) 
What this quote indicates is that there is a clear expectation on the part of 
governments for academic involvement in their technocratic endeavour. Hall 
describes this as a ‘passive position’. Academics are to be supportive of 
“[c]hanging the terms of an argument, [which is] exceedingly difficult, since the 
dominant definition of the problem acquires, by repetition, and by weight and 
credibility of those who propose or subscribe it, the warrant of ‘common sense’” 
(Hall, 1982: 81). Such ‘changing the terms’ was the declared goal of the 
Trilateral Commission. New attitudes of mind and a call for ‘relevant’ research 
has paved the way for social science research to be acceptable if it is policy-
relevant, evidence-based, finds and offers solutions. Strange (1982) critically 
observes the consequence of this change in the nature of the academic 
‘business’ in writing that this move “[...] accords to governments far too much of 
the right to define the agenda of academic study and directs the attention of 
scholars mainly to those issues that government officials find significant and 
important” (Strange, 1982: 491). This is particularly the case in ‘migration 
studies’ which is tied closely to the policy-making process. Primary definitions, 
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as Hall shows, set “the limit for all subsequent discussion by framing what the 
problem is. This initial framework then provides the criteria by which all 
subsequent contributions are labelled as ‘relevant’ to the debate, or ‘irrelevant’ – 
beside the point” (Hall et al., 1978: 59 original emphasis). It is the connotations 
and definitions that I am interested in within the context of this thesis. The 
Trilateral Commission defined and gave new connotations to the meaning of old 
and new concepts and ways of thinking. In this way, the stage was set for the 
IGC to securitize and to entrepreneurialize the international migrant. There is no 
conspiracy involved as some may think. Such discursive constructions, rather, 
point to the contingency, historicity and the inherent power-dynamics of 
processes of consultation and identification of what is perceived to be 
meaningful. 
However, what falls by the way-side and establishes antagonism in this 
reconstruction of the scholarly role is the legitimacy to go beyond data-
generation for analysis aiming at solutions, but to highlight and discuss areas in 
which there is controversy, areas where there is exclusion, areas where there is 
a need to debate assumptions, to point to disparate ideas, and to develop a  
general interpretation which is historically aware and politically critical of 
processes of constructions of meaning. Those academics who do not conform 
to such technocratic solution-finding enterprises were referred to as ‘value-
oriented’ in Huntington’s Trilateral Commission report (Gill, 1990: 159). 
“Excluded are scientists [...] who work within the more scholarly traditions of 
international relations” (Gill, 1990: 159). It still seems to be the case that those 
academics who do not engage in the liberal, functionalist business of generating 
data and offering policy recommendations because they are asking a different 
kind of question find themselves marginalized even within the scholarly 
community.  
Controversy may rage as long as it adheres to the presuppositions that 
define the consensus of elites, and it should furthermore be encouraged 
within these bonds, thus helping establish these doctrines as the very 
condition of thinkable thought while reinforcing the belief that freedom 
reigns. 
(Chomsky, 1989: 48) 
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As indicated above, much of ‘migration studies’ portrays a surprising symbiosis 
with policy making26. For Papastergiadis, there are notable limits of explanation 
(2000: 17). ‘Migration studies’ is not only often still firmly rooted in positivist and 
largely linear assumptions, but also, the models and typologies which are used 
are often isolated from the broader thinking and broader explanation in which 
they were historically conceived. Such isolation and lack of theoretical context 
limits explanation even further. Thus, we find case study presentations. These 
focus on individual, economic or social aspects of mobility, but seldom critically 
question conceptions of political subjectivity, or the function of power-relations 
in a global historical context in which policy-decisions take place. 
Most contemporary accounts of migration are now either empirical, or 
present an eclectic theoretical model composed of both voluntarist and 
structuralist concepts. The presentation of a new general theory of 
migration, or even an extension to the previous theoretical debates, is 
lacking. […] Narratives of migration in the social sciences have thus 
repeated the territorial competitiveness and binary oppositions that they 
were meant to critique. 
(Papastergiadis, 2000: 17/18) 
In short, there is hardly any critical engagement with hegemonic discourses 
which provide the background for processes of creation and delineation of 
meaning, boundary drawing and systemic questions of inclusion and exclusion. 
Thus, the literature accepts to varying degrees the key issues as set out by the 
Trilateral Commission: political order and economic efficiency which are globally 
defined through concepts such as possessive individualism, consumerism, 
interdependence, and bounded welfare concerns; as well as particular notions 
of security and urgency vis-a-vis the Other. International migration is accepted 
by most scholars as a technical question to manage rather than a phenomenon 
which is deeply political. Yet because there is the requirement to be policy-
relevant certain probing questions about the very ‘limits which frame what the 
problem is’ are excluded, because they are ‘ideological’ or ‘more scholarly’ – as 
the Trilateral Commission has it. 
It is this background - of technocracy and changes in the function of academia -
which then renders an understanding of the construction of political subjectivity 
                                               
26
 With the same exceptions, as noted earlier. 
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more intelligible. Against the back-drop of changes about what politics is and 
does, the ‘active citizen’ (the norm), the ‘targeted population’ (the deviance to 
the norm) and ‘the suspended’ can be understood. ’Active citizens’ as those 
who will exercise responsibility for themselves, akin to the Trilateral logic of 
possessive individuality and efficiency as being competitive self-managing skill-
breeding persons understood as recognizable and respected individuals. The 
‘active citizen’ need not be naturalized, but needs to be understood as defining 
the norm, as opposed to ‘targeted populations’ who require special measures if 
they are to exercise their capacity to be self-governing and are thus deviant. 
This logic can be followed in the media where those who are deemed poor and 
in need of treatment “are only considered as a group” (de Goede, 1996: 336). 
They are yet to gain the capability of individuality and efficiency. As De Goede 
shows (1996) referring to a group such as ‘welfare mothers’ is illustrative of a 
paternalistic view of the world were women (even today) are portrayed to be 
irresponsible or otherwise victims who have morally straddled away from what 
is ‘good’ for a lack of male guidance. In the case of the international politics of 
migration ‘the victims of trafficking’ are ascribed similar connotations (O'Connell 
Davidson, 2006). Yet, what happens to those who do not fit the bill – those who 
are assumed to be beyond treatment, rehabilitation and redemption? For the 
Trilateral Commission these problems did not arise, since everyone was 
assumed to fit into a place, a role and a function within consensus-democracy. 
Thus, the discourse which evolved out of the Trilateral Commission sets the 
boundaries for what are acceptable areas of contemplation and learning as well 
as those actors who are defined such that they can speak, can be heard and 
are respected – everyone else has to adapt and do the learning. Consensus-
democracy claims to be all-inclusive and totalizing. How did we get there? How 
did we get to understand human beings as functional-efficiency-machines or 
‘active citizens’ who can be differentiated from ‘targeted populations’ for which 
some treatment is available if there is the promise to turn them into active 
citizens? And what happens to those who do not fit the prescription?  
What does all this mean for this study? In the early years the Trilateral 
Commission promoted free market conservatism, as a reaction to changes 
perceived as being caused by the increasing interdependence of states – the 
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opening of global markets, a move to monetarist policy, an emphasis on self–
regulated markets and a notion of welfare dependency as to be countered. The 
notion of interdependence is significant in this regard. As Susan Strange points 
out interdependence was brought into use by scholars close to the Trilateral 
Commission “when what they were describing was actually highly asymmetrical 
and uneven dependence or vulnerability” (Strange, 1982: 485). Governance 
now – because it is done under the premise of global interdependence - is 
generally portrayed as networking, coordination and management to force 
consensus and bring about solutions. The state now emphasises the 
technocratic nature ‘of the job’ – something that Walters calls ‘the antipolitics of 
governance’ (Walters, 2004: 33). It is what I term, with Rancière (2001), 
consensus-democracy. 
The Trilateral Commission was, it seems, not successful in reacting to and 
changing the course of American unilateralism. Neither was it successful, 
according to Gill (1990), in promoting and sustaining a multilateralism that was 
more than a very schematic dance of polished position statements in 
international organisations, such as the United Nations. The Trilateral 
Commission was, however, very successful in spreading ideas, turning them in 
to new ‘truths’ through reiteration and changing approaches to doing 
governance both domestically and internationally, not least because it sought to 
strengthen the establishment and consolidation of the European Union and 
spreading regionalism and facilitated the rise in bilateralism after the 1970s. 
This had a profound effect on making sense of international migration from the 
point of view of European policy-makers – I will turn to elaborate this now. 
 
The Global Political Economy of Migration  
Within the scope of this thesis the particular geopolitical circumstances 
associated with the rise and fall of Bretton Woods, mediated by the Trilateral 
Commission are relevant. They are relevant not only in respect of the 
transformation of ideology but also, more practically, with regard to a particular 
form of international migration – what was then termed voluntary or economic 
migration. 
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Economic theory of the time together with the Bretton-Woods-System with its 
formal institutions; i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, now World 
Bank); set the structures and rules for economic interaction to be brought in 
after the war had ended.  It is generally known, that from 1947 it became clear 
that Europe’s economic crisis was far greater than could be dealt with on the 
basis of loans by the US through Bretton Woods. George Marshall stated in a 
speech at Harvard University in 1947:  
The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was 
complete. […] Europe’s requirements for the next three or four years of 
foreign food and other essential products […] principally from the United 
States […] are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she 
must have substantial help or face economic, social and political 
deterioration of a very grave character. 
(USA, The Department of State, 1947: 1159-1160) 
The more relaxed Marshall Plan was thus instated, giving financial aid in the 
form of grants to European countries (Weber 2002). The Pax Americana, of 
which the Marshall Plan was an important part, maintained by the Bretton-
Woods-System, was not solely marked through fixed exchange rates and 
allowing institutions international free trade (Andersen, in Woyke, 2000: 216). 
Its linking to (mainly) Keynesian economic theory, which provided the basis for 
what is now called ‘the welfare state’ allowed also for domestic intervention into 
the market for stability via social security provisions and redistributive 
measures. It is this system of societal order which set the standard for 
‘improvements’ sought for developing countries marking the shift from 
colonialism to development. It is also in this context, that guestworkers were 
recruited to re-build the destroyed Europe. 
The theoretical context in which workers were recruited is important to shed 
light on the struggle inherent in social democratic thinking within economic 
theory as far as international migration is concerned – a tension that is still at 
work today. On the one hand, there are ‘dual economy’ models which draw 
mainly from the rational choice tradition in economics. On the other hand, there 
is theorizing from within the more explicit Marxist tradition which proposes that 
migration is a response to, or consequence of, uneven capitalist development 
(Gidwani, 2003: 188). Rational choice approaches are to this day used to 
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legitimize ‘labour importing’ policies whereas Marxist approaches have been 
and still are employed to critically interpret and also advocate against labour 
migration arguing that it is exploitative (Gidwani, 2003: 188). 
The labour recruitment of the 1950s to 1970s, which has come to be known as 
‘Gastarbeiter schemes’27 still set the standard either explicitly or implicitly for 
thinking about labour migration today. Goektuerk et al. (2007) explain that the 
recruitment from the 1950s to western European countries, in particular to 
Germany, was heralded in the spirit of European solidarity. It “evoked a 
progressive vision of pan-European mobility [... and] idealized a flexible, 
multifunctional labourer who [...] could be transplanted to new sites and milieus 
with ease” (Goektuerk, 2007: 23). This should be understood in the context of 
the Marshall Plan which had as one of its goals the economic ‘scrambling’28 or 
interdependency of European countries to ensure and stabilize peaceful 
relations (Hogan, 2007; Miller, 2000; Hollifield et al., 2000). Two assumptions 
are inherent in this thinking: (1) that the labourer, the host country and the 
labourer’s family back home would benefit29; and (2) that the ‘recruit’ would 
neither necessitate nor want a more stable membership in the host country 
(Declaration of Accord, Federal Republic of Germany, 1956) because he30  was 
rooted in his country of origin.  
The enthusiasm of governments which led to the expansion of the Gastarbeiter 
schemes was not universal. However questioning voices were not heard until 
                                               
27
 I am aware that a considerable quantity of migration literature awards a specialized, time bound 
meaning to the concept of ‘Gastarbeiter’; however, I think it justified to use this term in a more general 
sense as the underlying logic of pragmatic functionality of a migrant worker is captured by the concept 
which is equally applicable for other schemes of labour recruitment European governments have been and 
are engaged in. Thus, I am building on the particular understanding of the idea from the economic boom 
period to use its underlying logic for programs henceforth. 
28
 The idea of the scrambled egg is sometimes used as a visual aid to emphasise the need for deep 
interdependence to avoid war. 
29
 Akin to language of ‘win-win-win’ used today in much of the policy and academic literature. Betts (2009), 
Skeldon (2008), or Ozden and Schiff (2006) are examples of this. 
30
 The documents reviewed here and the majority of the academic literature at the time assumed the 
migrant to be the male worker. 
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the wider system which had provided the ‘Golden Age’31 broke down at the end 
of the 1960s. 
The steering of the domestic economy through different forms of welfare 
governance which had been established throughout Europe was impacted by 
the 1970’s economic crisis leading to the subsequent abandoning of the 
Bretton-Woods-System (Hunt, 1986: 154). This move was explained to be due 
to a lack of willingness by member states to enter into monetary-political 
compromises, especially with regard to a giving up of national freedoms to 
intervene and thus react to the gap between the value of free market gold and 
central bank gold. As I have shown, the discussions within Bilderberg and the 
Trilateral Commission provided the backdrop for a debate going beyond 
economic policy covering a much wider realm addressing broader questions 
associated to good practice of government and of the particular form of 
democracy that should be at its centre.  
The late 1960s and 1970s saw, what Gill (1990) terms ‘cumulative 
transnationalization of the world political economy’. He argues that the rising 
number of formally sovereign states presented the precondition for the 
increasingly vigorous pursuit of competitive policies. Again, in more concrete 
terms, policies now encouraged competition to attract foreign capital 
investment, low and stable inflation, provision of suitable infrastructure and the 
weakening of organized labour. All these were seen as the ingredients for a 
suitable business climate. The outcome of this thinking was that transnational 
corporations were gaining in influence in the wake of this ideological shift. By 
way of transnationalizing transactions, these players profited from reduced 
costs and loopholes in the taxation system. The idea was to have a world 
market for commodities, finished products and finance (Gill, 1990: 91). In short, 
free movement of goods but not of persons. Aided by new developments in 
technology the process of transnationalizing markets was accelerated and 
made more sustainable for growing global businesses.  
                                               
31
 The Bretton Woods institutions in their ideal form. Yet, Gill (1990) shows how the embodiment of the 
ideal form of Bretton-Woods was never actually reached, as noted earlier. 
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In conjunction with the liberalizing and transnationalizing of the markets, the 
discourse stating that welfare creates dependency and is too expensive was 
emerging, as shown above. When guestworker recruitment programmes were 
brought to a halt the focus and interest of nation-states and international fora 
turned to questions of integration; and more importantly for the task at hand 
towards those migrants who did not fit established categories: one of them 
being the invention of the early 1970s: ‘undocumented migrants’. Thus the IOM 
held a conference in 1983, drawing on earlier publications on the question of 
undocumented migrants and framing this category of people largely in terms of 
social security provision for those without legal documentation residing within 
the country they had been recruited to32. Previously undocumentedness had 
largely been linked to the vagabonds of historic times (Groebner, 2004). 
Undocumented persons from the 1970s onwards were cast as migrants who 
had lost their legal status due to the termination of work programs but who were 
still resident in the host country or came without a government prescribed frame 
for entry (IOM, 1983). The problem was largely phrased with regard to social 
service provision – lack of legal status meant restricted or no access to social 
security (IOM, 1983). Such a discourse set the condition which enabled an 
understanding of movement for economic purposes to be constructed as 
burdening European welfare systems and therefore cheating citizens out of their 
scarce resources. In the context of a changing world economy and under the 
impression of recession, within a very short timeframe European governments 
abandoned all their guest worker programmes. International migration for 
economic purposes became illegitimate. The assumption that migrants just 
came to Europe to benefit from generous social security systems became seen 
as the predominant truth about economic migration.  
This discourse is not surprising given the above brief overview of the wider 
politico-economic discourse at the time. Most labour migrants at the time were, 
indeed, low or unskilled workers needed in Europe’s (heavy) production 
                                               
32
 See for example journals like Migration Today issued by the Centre for Migration Studies (New York) or 
Migration News issued by the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), but also monographs 
such as Testa Alvarez ‘La Emigracion clandestina’ Madrid, 1974 or working papers like ILO’s Evolution of 
Illegal Migration in Western Europe and the United States, Geneva 1976 
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industry. With a shift away from a Fordist system towards a post-fordist system 
focussing on services, skills and knowledge within a monetarist logic these 
workers not only became redundant but formed a special kind of knowledge that 
prevailed for decades to come: Migrant workers come from poor, 
underdeveloped regions; they are uneducated and therefore not skilled; 
because they are not skilled they do not have the capacity to be 
entrepreneurial, hence they cannot be ‘winners’ (in Gill’s terms) and will 
therefore illegitimately extract scarce resources which we (the Europeans) need 
for ourselves. Additionally, such movement was interpreted as a sign for failed 
development attempts (Taylor et al., 1996).  
Students of migration learn – as mentioned above - that with the oil crisis in 
1973 all ‘Gastarbeiter’ Programmes were stopped and that international 
migration - framed as a problem – started (Castles et al., 2009: 96ff). The 
lesson learned was that, if a country recruits migrants for labour purposes, the 
people do not go home if they are not needed anymore and that brings – so the 
narrative goes –problems for social cohesion. The conclusion on the part of 
governments was: don’t recruit migrant workers33. Accordingly, public and 
academic discourses in the 1980s started focussing on questions of integration 
and associated phenomena like family-reunification or racism (Favell, 1995). 
However, this is only part of the story and it is a limited story.  
On the basis of these politico-economic changes, the 1980s - the Thatcher and 
Reagan years - were dominated by a discourse of ‘no-alternative claim’ (Gill, 
1990: 95). The ‘no alternative claim’ would stay influential until very recently if 
not until today. (Investment) banking and its securitization as well as the high-
tech sector were promoted. This led to the need for services and a particular 
kind of knowledge (today often referred to as evidence-based knowledge) which 
                                               
33
 A strand within migration studies shows that work migration into European countries has never so 
completely stopped, despite all the policy rhetoric ,to the contrary. The ILO estimated 7.5 million foreign 
workers in European countries in 1973. Following the stop of recruitment it is thought that about 1/3 of 
those work migrants returned (Salt and Clarke 2002). However, since the late 1980s the number of work 
migrants is steadily rising again, not least because all European countries are engaged in various forms of 
short-and long-term recruitment. The agricultural sectors in European countries, for example, have never 
stopped recruiting for work. (Stalker 1994) 
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the Trilateral Commission started to advocate during the 1970s and which most 
European governments have adopted today. In particular the World Bank 
espoused this trend, taking on the mandate to be the ‘knowledge bank’ (Cohen, 
2004) – the kind of knowledge that is assumed to accurately predict the future 
based on hard and fast data used to calculate probabilities and statistical 
significances and to formulate policy solutions. This narrative is based on the 
assumption that the market is rational. Steered through competition, so the 
rationale, growth will occur in spite of finite resources (conversation, Ratha, 29 
July 2009). Such a rational market would create an economy that is more skill-
intensive, science-based, innovative with enterprises being the prime movers 
(Pinder et al., 1979: 67). The state has to withdraw by not bailing out ‘lame 
ducks’, in order for the market to concentrate on the ‘winners’ (Gill, 1990). 
Winners are those capable of rational, self-interested competing and innovating. 
Because migrants come from poor areas in countries with underdeveloped 
infrastructure the migrant is not seen to be homo economicus. 
This is important, as this understanding is the underlying theorization of 
governmental rhetoric in Europe which holds there is not to be economic 
migration. It is further important in order to appreciate the slow U-turn which 
started to take shape in the late 1980s – a fusing of the development narrative 
with the migration narrative – which would make thinking about legal migration 
permissible again. 
 
The Securitization of Migration  
Migration and refugee issues, no longer the sole concern of ministries of labor 
or of immigration, are now matters of high international politics, engaging the 
attention of head of states, cabinets and key ministries involved in defense, 
internal security, and external relations 
Myron Weiner (1992: 91) 
 
Migration was a topic for the Trilateral Commission in 1993, suggesting that 
“growing migration pressure occurring at a time of increasing interdependence 
makes international migration a critical concern for peace and stability in the 
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post-cold war era” (Doty,1998: 71). It is not very surprising that migration at 
some point started to feature in the Trilateral Commission. Migration had been 
discussed in other European policy-circles as an issue for security well before 
1993. The Trilateral Commission had started conceptualizing issues of domestic 
governance as dangerous globally which were not classically regarded as such 
in the 1970s. Both, Human Rights and energy had featured, for example, as 
concerns in the context of relations with the Soviet Union but the Middle East 
(Gill: 1990: 179 ff). It is this securitization of issues of domestic politics that the 
Trilateral Commission sought when problems of ‘outlook’ with regard to security 
structures and their internationalization were discussed.  
What does this mean? The narrative of interdependence had changed the 
meaning of the boundary, the already present immigrant would pose a danger 
internally by failing to be efficient and enterprising. Yet, the greater threat is 
posed by those potentially mobile (unskilled and poor) people who might 
(attempt to) cross the boundaries of the sovereign territory. To emphasise the 
point that international migration is ‘worthy’ of being constructed as a security 
issue, Weiner explains:  
States that are capable of defending themselves against missile, tank 
and infantry attacks are often unable to defend themselves against the 
intrusion of thousands of illegals infiltrating across a border in search of 
employment or safety. 
(Weiner, 1992: 97) 
Such a construction of ‘illegals’ as objects is relevant in so far as the rule of law 
based on assumptions of individuality and political subjectivity does not apply. A 
mass such as those objectified as ‘illegals’ does not have rights that would be 
claimable (Schotel, 2010). Only individuals who are accepted as political 
subjects can claim and fall under the remit of the rule of law. What Weiner and 
others do in this case is to develop a particular kind of security knowledge 
(Huysmans, 2006). It is the political and normative practice of representing 
something as an existential threat to stability and security. Huysmans explains:  
Security questions […] result from a work of mobilization in which 
practices work upon each other and thus create an effect that we call a 
security problem. [...]. Immigration as a security problem is thus not a 
natural given; it does not just pop up as a new threat manifesting itself 
and triggering a security policy trying to curtail the danger.  
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Turning immigration issues into a security question involves a 
mobilization of certain institutions (e.g., the police), a particular kind of 
knowledge (security knowledge), and specific expectations concerning 
the social exchanges between various social groups. It is an 
intersubjective understanding of security, rather than a subjective one. 
The central level is […] the interaction between different actions 
articulating a security knowledge and mobilizing security expectations in 
an already institutionalized context.  
In this interpretation, speaking and writing about security is never 
innocent. 
(Huysmans, 2002: 42) 
How does such framing come about and what does it do? According to Didier 
Bigo (2000) experts “all agree that the threats come from the social world and 
that a government has the responsibility to answer them. [...] Security needs to 
be ‘global’” (Bigo, 2000: 324). He explains that diverse notions circulate as 
labels between politicians, bureaucracies and academics. The latter, as part of 
their profession define and propose solutions, “but often they begin with 
statistics coming from political labels or registrations of bureaucracies and they 
forget this point” (Bigo, 2000: 325). It is thus, that academia frames its answers 
– in short, it essentializes. 
Campbell describes what securitization does as the construction of formerly 
domestic policy issues as threat discourses which have notions of insecurity in 
the form of systemic instability and vulnerability at their heart (Campbell, 1998). 
It is at this point where critical security studies probe the implications and 
dangers of expanding the security agenda to include what was formerly 
regarded as non-security issues (Weaver, 1995). This works, as Elias (1993) 
holds, because the fear of losing one’s life and soul has been replaced by the 
multiplication of trivial fears concerning one’s property. In other words, 
securitization is the profound move by which military and police agencies start 
overlapping in their mandate, both stripped of the clarity of purpose that was 
constructed through historical discourses. Thus, the difference between 
orthodox security – which is understood as the absence of armed conflict (Elbe, 
2006) – and securitization (Buzan et al., 1998) is a question of the referent 
object of security and the consequences of such construction.  
[S]ecurity will include undertaking activities such as surveillance of 
clandestine immigration, surveillance of cultural and social influences 
from the country of origin of migrants and even their offspring, 
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surveillance and maintenance of order in so called problem districts, and 
control of transborder flows. 
(Bigo, 2000: 322) 
Securitization is thus the capacity to create and manage insecurity, in particular 
related to transnational flows and surveillance of boundaries. This articulation is, 
thus, “not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of 
possibility” (Campbell, 1998: 13) It is a discursive construction which fulfils the 
function of changing the ‘outlook’ as called for by the Trilateral Commission. 
The military starts to look inside the territory and the police force looks outside 
the territory and both look for the enemy from the outside as much as from the 
inside. 
It is in this context that there was an analytic differentiation over the past 20 
years of security questions into national, societal, human and international 
security. Within these security frameworks different emphasis is set on how they 
analyse international migration. However, all frameworks convey the notion of 
international migration being out of control along Foucaultian lines that 
‘everything is dangerous’ and therefore needs to be pro-actively addressed 
(Foucault, 1997: 256). Below I will discuss the frameworks in turn in order to set 
out their relevance for international migration and to show how migration is 
securitized. 
National security (Elbe, 2006) focuses most classically on the integrity of the 
nation state. It is an argument used often by policy-makers, as I will show 
throughout the thesis, in the context of international migration. Migrants in this 
framework are constructed as posing a threat to sovereignty by entering the 
territory without permission, and by undermining the integrity of national 
institutions such as the courts of law and the capacity of immigration 
administration. As a response governments feel legitimized to invest in new 
technology of surveillance to strengthen border control systems – often drawing 
on the support of the military. FRONTEX is a major actor in this context. 
National security overlaps to a certain degree with societal security, which 
focuses on the wellbeing of an imagined community. Here the focus is more 
clearly on social cohesion, but also on redistribution of resources. Thus, 
migrants are problematized in terms of their cost – financially, in-kind and 
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culturally - to the functioning of the social. In other words the ‘foreignness’ of 
habits and behaviours that migrants introduce into a seemingly coherent 
community, as well as their assumed ‘abuse’ of the welfare system is made an 
issue of fear. 
The human security (Elbe, 2006) narrative offers a markedly different 
perspective, which is directed at the situation in a migrant’s country of origin and 
at the person of the migrant him/herself. Here the argument is that migrants 
have no choice but to move because their personal security is undermined by 
internal conflict and/or under-development. As such it is the responsibility of the 
country of origin to develop; and failing that, it is the responsibility of the 
international community to engage in development activities, in order that the 
national of such country can invest in a livelihood ‘at home’. 
Finally, international security (Elbe, 2006) focuses on the safeguarding of the 
international system as a whole. Here the narrative constructs populations 
which are mobile as a threat to the stability of states by moving and to inter-
state relations more generally – thus, they become a focus of foreign policy-
making. This may be because too many displaced persons move into a 
neighbouring state. An example may be the number of displaced people who 
move into Pakistan and Iran. However, European governments have engaged 
in this narrative, by constructing the concept of ‘irregular secondary movement’ 
whereby migrants have been assumed to have found a country able to protect 
them close to ‘home’, but then move on and cross into the European Union 
without a legitimate reason. 
All of the above mentioned security considerations play a role in the 
construction of Migration Management. As a consequence European countries 
are now regularly assuming the international migrant as a threat to their 
security, stability and order and the underlying logic is that left to its own 
devices and unchecked the phenomenon of international migration will spiral 
out of control and therefore must be managed as an international issue and not 
only one to be considered as a domestic problematic.  
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Conclusion 
The effects of the transformation of ideology which evolved through the 
Trilateral Commission and which have advanced in the context of managing 
international migration as both an economic and a security issue are dramatic. 
Bilderberg and the Trilateral Commission have achieved several things that are 
relevant in this thesis: (1) the particular way of ‘private citizens’ meeting to 
discuss issues constructed as problematic is important as it provides a blue-
print for the IGC of engaging in informal plurilateralism; (2) the ideational 
changes introduced by the Trilateral Commission introduce a technocratic 
approach to policy-making which neutralizes politics into an exercise of problem 
formulation/solution finding; (3) the parameters of establishing political 
subjectivity have been narrowed which in effect means the measure is 
efficiency expressed in either socio-economic terms or framed within an 
analysis of danger to order and stability. In short, by way of representing a very 
narrow version of democracy, the Trilateral Commission has silenced the 
political that is thrown up by the very question of democracy. 
Thus, in articulating free market conservatism the crisis of democracy as it was 
elaborated by the Trilateral Commission has brought about what Rancière came 
to call consensus-democracy (Rancière, 1998) Consensus-democracy is the 
policing of the social by oligarchy.  
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the 
aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, [that is to say] the 
organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the 
system for legitimizing this distribution. 
(Rancière, 1998: 28) 
The Trilateral Commission was thus successful in establishing a transformed 
ideology by formulating new connotations and instruments through informal 
plurilateralism. This above recount of the historical development not only of a 
particular form of governance, but more importantly with a view to how the 
hegemonic discourse of consensus-democracy came into being is thus 
important as a frame for the discussions to follow, in particular for an 
understanding of what the IGC is and how it was able to spread so very 
forcefully a new narrative about the international politics of migration. The 
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subsequent chapters to follow now will then proceed to set out the internal logic 
of Migration Management as read through the archives of the IGC. 
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Chapter 3 
The IGC’s Informal Plurilateralism 
 
 
Figure 2: IGC website portal (source: www.igc.ch) 
 
This chapter introduces the IGC in more detail and conceptualizes the IGC as 
an example of informal plurilateralism. Informal plurilateralism has crept into 
policy making, pushing aside more transparent and democratic processes. The 
IGC is situated in the historically specific and socially constructed discourse 
outlined in the last chapter and influences the international politics of migration. 
I argue that ideas about the international migrant and about the steering of 
international migration are molded by civil servants of mainly European 
governments in these informal processes. These ideas filter subtly through into 
technocratic systems of governance at the national and, more importantly, the 
European and, increasingly, the international level. Ideas, in this case about 
how to manage migration efficiently, are introduced informally and normalized 
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into the formal, public discourse.  In the few publications in this area, informal 
plurilateralism tends to be portrayed as a welcome addition to formal 
multilateralism (Channac 2002; Channac 2006) suggesting that, on the basis of 
ideational affiliation, policy makers move to extra-institutional and opaque fora 
to consult on problems they identify as shared. Such a benign presentation 
obscures the closed, non-transparent and excluding nature of these non-
decision-making conversations.  
The term multilateralism “implies joint consideration of international issues of 
mutual interest, by many or several states, with the purpose of finding mutually 
acceptable solutions” (Sewell 2000: 49). Diplomacy between groups, with the 
nation-state as the principal organizing unit, is the form of multilateralism that 
has broadly been implemented, for instance, in the form of the United Nations 
after the Second World War. The UNHCR is one such body relevant for 
internationally governing one particular category of international migrant. The 
IOM is another example of an intergovernmental body in international 
cooperation. Thus, multilateralism can range from preparing and convening 
meetings and conferences to setting up permanent institutions with a written 
mandate guided by legal provisions and institutional procedures that are widely 
ratified. Within the UNHCR, for example, governments are bound by 
international law; whereas within the IOM government’s interactions are based 
merely on a Memorandum of Understanding.  
Such organizations (also found in areas such as trade or the environment) have 
the main purpose to facilitate what is generally considered as a positive 
outcome: increasing interdependence between nation-states, as this is seen to 
facilitate peaceful coexistence (Gelpi et al., 2008). The processes of 
globalization have facilitated such interdependence and have, in consequence, 
undoubtedly considerably altered how we perceive the nature of the nation state 
(Stohl 2005: 447; Sassen, 2006; Strange, 1988). Paradoxically, what is 
generally regarded as positive, namely transnationalism and cooperation in the 
context of rising complexity and interdependence, is not seen as such in the 
case of international migration. Here the notion of interdependence is used on 
the one hand in terms of expressions of anxiety of ‘floods’ of migrants coming 
into the European Union, or America or Australia. That is to say, other nation-
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states are too close for comfort. On the other hand interdependence (selectively 
understood) is used to emphasize the need to pull together to (re)-gain control 
over immigration into the European Union or America or Australia.  
Wilkinson (2005) perceives contemporary global and supranational governance 
mainly as a response to an ever greater sense of uncertainty and a perceived 
inability to control. He writes that global governance has evolved in times when:  
uncertainties reign; when state power is changing; when greater 
interdependence is occurring; when conflict, poverty, environmental 
degradation, ill health and human insecurity are rife; when existing 
mechanisms for dealing with catastrophe are in crisis; when new sources 
of authority and novel patterns of governance are emerging; and when 
calls for transparency and democratic accountability grow louder 
(Wilkinson  2005: 1) 
Thus, formal multilateralism today “focuses on the dynamics of change and 
flexibility in which established intergovernmental organizations are challenged 
to meet new demands and requirements while accommodating new mandates 
and members as well as non-state actors with global reach” (Forman 2006: 
205). Whereas formal multilateralism has placed emphasis on formal legislation 
and procedures in the shape of covenants and laws and formally established 
institutions to deal with collective issues, it has, however, also always made use 
of more informal ways of dealing with issues through guidelines, or temporary 
arrangements such as in-house working groups.  
This distinction is important: formal multilateralism happens in the United 
Nations or in the European Union when meetings are called, ministers 
assemble and law of one kind or another is decided. An example of formal 
multilateralism is the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the UNHCR, where 
resolutions are discussed by way of governments offering their views in short 
speeches, with a right to reply granted and a resolution past. Informal 
multilateralism happens, equally in the UN or the EU for example when formal 
meetings or decisions are prepared or a new issue area is explored in working 
or task groups. An example of informal multilateralism was UNHCR’s working 
group on asylum and migration, which was tasked in the beginning of the 1980s 
to understand a phenomenon experienced as new at that time: mixed flows. 
Mixed flows describing the perception of national governments in western 
Europe that it is not possible anymore to distinguish clearly between those 
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migrants who move because they are forced to or displaced and those who 
move voluntarily, out of economic motivation. The impression on the part of 
governments was, by the early 1980s, that many people who said they were 
refugees claiming asylum in Europe did so illegitimately. This particular informal 
working group would later evolve into the IGC. 
What happened then to motivate governments to supplement formal and 
informal multilateralism? And what is the consequence? Policy making in 
international migration now tends to be framed as a technocratic matter, and 
has become an issue of almost exclusive bureaucratic consideration, especially 
since it is so strongly focused on cross-border mobility. This requires an 
explanation. Why is it that the international formal, multilateral fora established 
to debate and steer migration are not deemed sufficient anymore, so that 
governments, from the early 1980s onwards, have begun to take recourse in 
what has now come to be called ‘informal, controlled multilateralism’ (Channac 
2002, 2006) - what I call 'informal plurilateralism'? And why is it seemingly 
necessary to set up informal plurilateralism as a setting in which only ‘like-
minded’ governments – governments of the Global North – meet?  
The IGC’s single objective is to pragmatically address issues of international 
migration as they arise. The IGC documents offer a historical perspective on 
how governments have perceived their predicament and argued their particular 
‘truth constructions’. In the following I will define what I mean by informal 
plurilateralism. I will first briefly outline the history of informal plurilateralism. I 
will then discuss the IGC as particular example of informal plurilateralism used 
as a forum to discuss international migration, their impact being hegemonic 
doctrine formation. I shall finally discuss the consequences of this form of 
steering.  
 
Informal Plurilateralism 
The shift in ontology from the largely ideologically charged thinking during the 
Cold War towards a free market conservatism and technocratic mind set has 
prompted a transformation in the institutional make-up of the international 
community. In what follows, I will offer a discussion which has at its heart to 
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clarify what I mean by informal plurilateralism. Illustrations are drawn from the 
IGC and the wider migration field and will already anticipate what follows in the 
remainder of the chapter.  
Multilateralism denotes a formal, multi-participant process that involves 
organizing internationally with regard to political questions through legal 
institutions. The purpose or rationale of multilateralism is broadly good 
governance, underlying the assumption that nation-states must attempt to 
cohabit or ‘get along’ (see for example Rosenau, 1995). It is in short, 
international inter-governmental cooperation. The refugee-regime, for example, 
created through the UNHCR and the 1951 Convention alongside 
intergovernmental organizations like the ILO are good examples. Their mandate 
was to find mutually acceptable solutions for steering through regulations to 
formulate rights and standards for limited control of human mobility. 
Governments came together to discuss, debate, and negotiate common 
resolutions on the basis of often diverging perspectives, largely divided into 
sending and receiving country views. Thus, multilateralism denoted international 
inter-governmental cooperation in such a way that broad formal agreements 
could be decided upon, which were open enough for specific and contextual 
implementation by individual nation-states. 
However, as previously discussed, by the 1970s nation-states established the 
Trilateral Commission as they became disillusioned with social democracy. The 
perception at that time was of having lost stability and order. This perception led 
to a new hegemonic discourse that would guide thinking and governing in the 
1980s and 1990s. A hegemonic discourse which led to the ‘no-alternative claim’ 
during the Regan and Thatcher era. More importantly though for the present 
chapter is the particular approach to working that the IGC established. Meetings 
were held without many formalized procedures, in which it was more important 
to have the possibility to exchange views in a private atmosphere than to have 
governments present inflexible standpoints. It was also important to ‘try out’ new 
ways of making sense of international migration. 
Plurilateralism, according to Cerny (1993), denotes differentiation from a total 
global multilateralism occurring across various crosscutting areas so that the 
different levels and structures of a system are separated from each other and, 
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as a consequence, various functional dimensions become more distinct (Cerny, 
1993). In its Latin derivation plurilateralism carries the connotation of a more 
homogenous ‘we’ – the belonging to an agreed majority - as opposed to an 
uncomfortable multilateralism of vastly different perspectives. Examples for 
such plurilateralism could lie anywhere on the spectrum between security 
issues and the cultural. Informal plurilateralism, as I define it, is an opaque 
process in which a shared interest brings a limited number of governments 
together for consultation. Keohane et al. (2009) argue that it is unlikely that 
nation-states make use of multilateralism in the area of international migration 
as this is deemed too controversial. The IGC is a forum which provides space to 
voice ideas without formal restrictions, associated with fixed institutional 
structures and international law (conversation, Penninx, 08 September 2007). It 
is also a forum where there is no legal or public scrutiny as to what is 
discussed, how, and which consequences would follow from ideas produced. In 
fact, the most recent coordinator of the IGC emphasized in a conversation held 
on the 30th of March 2011 that the meetings of the IGC are private not only in 
the sense of a tightly controlled membership but also that the participants attend 
in their private capacity – though they do hold the brief for international 
migration within the government and attend European and international 
meetings in their professional (diplomatic or technical) capacity (conversation, 
Loeper, 30 March 2011). 
Informal plurilateral processes leave the formal institutional base and form an 
autonomous process of ‘structural differentiation’. As a consequence, the 
functional structure of regulating migration not only becomes more prominent 
but, more importantly, the informal extra-institutional space leads to concepts 
used to steer migration becoming more differentiated and distinct as well. The 
two most prominent examples of this will be discussed in the following two 
chapters separately, as they are representations of what evolved out of the 
‘mixed flows’ problem – the asylum-migration nexus and the migration-
development nexus respectively. However, the formulation of what is now 
known as ‘illegal secondary onward movement’ provides a brief illustration at 
this point. It describes the movement of people who have been awarded 
refugee status in the region of origin, but who, nonetheless, move on to seek 
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asylum in the European Union. ‘Illegal secondary onward movement’ thus 
renders the mobility of a person illegitimate since it is assumed that a person 
has found protection. Yet, it ignores the circumstances – human rights abuses, 
undignified living circumstances, de facto detention – in which these refugees 
exist (conversation, Crisp, 12 November 2005). It is an abstraction of the 
problem of a person seeking protection from persecution, arguing that this was 
found in the region of origin, ignoring the dysfunctional actuality and therefore 
undermining the idea of granting asylum via spatial distance and a de-
personification of the process, making it open to managerial control. Further, 
since participation within the IGC is a matter of private capacity, there is no 
accountability at the point of doctrine formation.  
Informal plurilateralism is not without historical precedent as Jervis (1986) and 
Elrod (1976) have demonstrated.  
The plurilateral model of political order (here defined in a rather state-
centric way) has already been tested in the 19th century system of power 
balance called the European Concert. The concert arrangement was 
based on consultations among the great powers which acknowledged 
their equal status and agreed to protect established members of the 
states-system and, consequently, prevent territorial change. The system 
was essentially conservative, […]. 
(Hettne 2002: 19) 
Through a Foucaultian lens, in today's context this could be interpreted as 
preventing changes in population composition within neat territorial boundaries 
despite a globalized world order where everything else, including capital, is 
highly mobile, and thus giving rise to a sharp distinction between irregular 
migration, and regular migration which is defined as the ‘other’ of irregular 
migration. In the 1980s regular migration/admissions policies were excluded 
from these informal settings. For example, the skilled migration of health or IT 
professionals is not regarded as so contentious as to warrant discussing in such 
a forum as the IGC, which is regulated abstractly through the GATS agreement 
and then as part of domestic steering. 
Distinguishing characteristics of informal plurilateralism are precisely its 
informality and its technocratic approach. The informality of this form of 
consultation is said to be conducive to trust-building, that is strengthening the 
‘we’-impression of the group, and open to finding new practices. Yet, they tend 
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to be coteries of the like-minded. For example, civil society is excluded from 
deliberations within the IGC (conversation, Bartsch, 10 November 2005). The 
prolific participation of civil society involvement in multilateral fora is regarded as 
a threat to the workings of policy-making. Thus the director of the Global Policy 
Forum points out that ‘governments and international organizations at times find 
NGOs a nuisance or even threatening to their interests’ (Stohl 2005: 453). 
Formal multilateralism finds civil society a threat, undermining its authority or 
not playing to its tune. However, plurilateralism has no such pretenses. A 
‘restricted format, the confidentiality of the discussions and the focus on 
substantial and technical issues are the main characteristics’ (Puetter 2004: 
861) of informal plurilateralism. It is argued that it is conducive to policy 
deliberation and a trigger to consensus-oriented discussion in that the 
organization is focused around a clearly defined and shared problem while 
maintaining a flexible agenda. The 20 year review of the IGC clarifies the view 
of participating governments:  
For senior level participants the benefit has been the extent to which the 
IGC process offers an opportunity for reflection on issues facing national 
administrations in a setting where participants are not held to account for 
a national position and are not in negotiating mode but are there simply 
to hear from and learn from others. […] For the technical level 
participants the benefit is being able to exchange information about 
current procedures and practices and to bring back to their home base a 
wider awareness of the situation in other states and of the ‘best 
practices’ that are being developed in a rapidly changing environment. 
There appears to be no other forum that allows this to happen in a 
sustained way. 
(Johnston, 2005: 15)  
Formal multilateralism, on the other hand, does not provide for the privacy 
needed to share data and intelligence on certain pertinent matters with ‘groups 
of friends’ or like-minded governments. Hence, formal multilateral fora are 
considered to be too inflexible, restrictive and slow as to react to complex, 
contentious and urgent matters such as international migration (Channac, 
2002). Thus, a participant to the IGC, for instance, writes on 30 April 1991 to 
delegations and participants that the nature of the informal consultations within 
the IGC should:  
[b]asically […] have a strictly informal character, so as to facilitate an 
open dialogue between participants, who are considered to reflect for the 
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purpose of the discussion their own ideas not necessarily being their 
governments’ views. This […] cannot but function properly if its 
intellectual products keep their informal character. Consequently, the 
only documents being circulated are contributions prepared by its 
participants. 
(anonymous author, 30 April 1991) 
The informal character has yet another purpose. It tries to prevent the 
participating countries from being seen as a group of now 16 western nations34, 
which takes “common policy measures against refugees, asylum seekers and 
migrants” (Dutch participant, notes circulated for meeting 13 May 1991 in 
Switzerland) in focusing exclusively on preventative measures in respect of 
movement. However, IGC consultations in the 1980s did precisely this and in 
taking measures to control movement they created (though without intention) 
what is today discussed as irregular migration. Previously mobile people fell into 
two distinct legal categories: most were work migrants and some were forced 
migrants who were awarded refugee status and the focus was on questions of 
integration. In the 1980s governments started discussing the phenomenon of 
what came to be called ‘mixed flows’: analytically and practically the distinction 
between economic (legal) migration and forced migration was seen to be 
increasingly untenable as it was argued that many migrants who were in actual 
fact economic migrants were posing as refugees to gain access to European 
countries (Ghosh, 1998). This narrative was possible because European 
governments had abandoned their labor migration policies in the mid-1970s, 
and therefore there were hardly any legal ways to enter Europe other than as 
an asylum seeker hoping to gain refugee status. 
The perceived need to keep ideas within the small group, especially when those 
ideas have the purpose of informing new knowledge and practices upon which 
decision-making is based is intriguing. It shows the internal tension between 
being obliged to adhere to international norms based on a ‘European value 
system‘ and an urgency felt to respond to the ‘threat of mobility’. While at the 
same time discussing substantial issues with regard to Migration Management, 
IGC participants tried to define how they organizationally go about identifying 
                                               
34
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 
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their position in what was perceived as a new political reality. This - so the 
argument goes - can only be discussed in a small like-minded group, within the 
safety of informality and without the media distorting what was discussed 
(conversation, Apave35, 30 March 2011). 
Beyond secrecy, dealing with irregular movement is the perceived urgent goal 
and a technocratic approach is promoted as more promising than old ways of 
finding solutions. Thus, the larger ontological shift from an ideology-infused 
conflict between East and West to an apparently consensual, hegemonic order 
built on liberal market principles, introduced the notion of management. This 
reformulates issue areas as challenges which need information gathering in 
order to establish evidence-based knowledge upon which governments can 
then implement pro-active (administrative) mechanisms and practices36. 
Examples here would be the gamut of border control strategies introduced 
during the past 10 to 15 years (and ongoing)37.  
This organizational change in idea-production and policy-making is interesting 
in so far as the issue of governance is, at least in public discourse and in 
academia, still largely looked at exclusively with regard to formal multilateralism. 
Hardly any theory of international relations from realism, via neo-liberalism to 
constructivism or other critical approaches, offers a grid to understand the move 
to informal plurilateralism. This literature writes about democratization, 
transparency and adherence to the rule of law or distributive justice in its widest 
sense at a time when there is a very distinct move towards anti-democratic 
practices, secrecy and the side-lining of law, through administrative measures 
and agenda development in the guise of informal plurilateralism. More recent 
examples are the so called Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs), which are 
functioning along the same principles as the IGC, though they are regionally 
organized and are marginally more transparent. The first of these was the 
Budapest Process, which came into being in 1992. Its purpose was to prepare 
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 Gervais Apave was IGC coordinator from 1997 to 2001  
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 Primarily the collection of data on ‘flows’ and ‘stocks’ of (im)migrants 
37
 Such as: the use of new technology; professionalization of visa requirements and control; internal 
checks and controls maintained by ever growing data-bases such as the Schengen Information System 
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accession countries in terms of their capacity for border control and Migration 
Management as most of these countries would constitute the outer border 
region between the European Union and other countries. A form of policy 
export, which placed the onus of policing the outer European borders with 
regards to migration, on those joining and ‘reliving’ those old countries from 
their responsibility. Thus, technocracy merges policy-making and policing into 
polic(y)ing, as will be discussed in chapter seven. 
Drawing on the field of peace and security studies/practice, Forman (2006) 
suggests that the retreat of governments into informal arrangements. Due to 
asymmetrical power relations and a perceived lack of effectiveness/efficiency of 
formal multilateral fora, it increasingly becomes the rule rather than the 
exception to revert to extra-institutional arrangements (Forman 2006: 208). 
These asymmetrical power relations are perceived on two different levels. First, 
attempts by developed-country-led intergovernmental motions with regard to 
agenda setting and action tend to be rejected by countries less heavy-weight, 
simply by virtue of the proposal coming from the Global North. The Global 
South accuses developed countries of disregarding their position and hence 
undermining the original idea of mutuality38.  
Another strong reason for retreat is the perceived lack of effectiveness or 
efficiency of formal multilateral institutions. Under globalization and ever more 
increasing interdependencies, formal multilateralism is regarded as less and 
less capable of addressing pressing global problems due to long and tightly 
rule-bound intra-organizational decision-making processes (Forman 2006: 212, 
see also Channac, 2002, 2006; Samers, 2004; Zylinska, 2004; Lippert, 1999; 
von Koppenfels, 2001). Decentralization of governance on the one hand and a 
general cross-over between various governance areas on the other may 
provoke institutional conflict. This is thought to be un-conducive to policy 
deliberation (Puetter, 2004). Authors such as Samers (2004; see also 
Koslowski, 1998; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Geddes, 2000; Guild, 2003; T. 
Kostakopoulou, 2000; D. Kostakopoulou, 2005; Lavenex, 2001a and b and 
Stanton-Russell and Keely, 2000) have referred to what has come to be termed 
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 Participant observation during the years 2001 to 2003 at the UNHCR and UNHCHR in Geneva 
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‘intensive trans-governmentalism’, meaning activities of governmental 
(particularly interior ministries) actors  
below the levels of chiefs of government such as ministerial officials, law 
enforcement agencies and other bureaucratic actors. These officials act 
with a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis their chief executives and are 
free to develop their own policy agenda. 
(Samers 2004: 30) 
He goes on to state that processes “are secretive and for the most part do not 
have to answer to juridical control […]” (Samers 2004: 30).  
Interestingly, these are also characteristics of the working of the IGC. Yet the 
important difference is that Samers refers in the same breath to what I would 
term in-house working groups embedded in formal multilateralism. Thus 
examples for informal multilateralism would be the Ad Hoc Immigration Group 
within European institutions which was active since 1975 or the Schengen 
Group which has ceased to exist as the Schengen agreement is now 
incorporated in to EU legislation. I argue that, even though these groups are 
outside the ‘community-method’, they are still firmly within the broader informal 
mechanisms of a formal universal multilateralism. The IGC, on the other hand, 
is contractually autonomous and thus has no links to any formal multilateralism, 
except for inviting UNHCR and IOM staff to certain meetings in an observing 
role. I will offer a more concrete description of the IGC’s evolution below. 
 
The IGC: Historical Development of a Conceptual Machinery 
In 1983, UNHCR hosted an informal seminar on the ‘Integration of Refugees in 
Europe’. It was noted that irregular arrivals, procedures of refugee status 
determination and issues around manifestly unfounded claims of asylum were 
of urgency to participants. Irregular movements with regard to asylum seekers 
and refugees were also an issue during the 35th ExCom session in October 
1984 (Minutes of the Task Force on the European Protection Seminar 1985 – 
meetings held on 2 and 5 November 1984). Reactions of participating states to 
the IGC are summarized by the coordinator of the IGC, Jonas Widgren, in a 
background paper prepared for the full round of consultations in Stockholm over 
25-26 June 1991. This gave a brief overview of the history of, and rationale of 
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establishing, the IGC and passages of this document merit quoting since they 
show the perceptions underlying the assessment of those delegations of the 
particular situation since the inception of the IGC:  
In 1984, when the irregular movements of asylum-seekers to Western 
Europe and Canada had started to increase, contacts were taken 
between States in the region with a view to discuss this new situation. 
[…] These contacts led, at the suggestion of States in the region, to the 
establishment by UNHCR of a working group on Irregular Movements 
[…]. 
However, the appreciation of States concerned at this juncture was that 
neither of these [formal] institutions was offering a fully appropriate 
framework for inter-State discussions on multilateral cooperation related 
to the new situation, taking into account the large number of member 
States in each of these bodies and the scope and modalities of their 
activities in the asylum areas39. […] As regard UNHCR, there was the 
impression among States that the qualitative changes under way as 
regards the new flows of asylum-seekers were not taken seriously 
enough by UNHCR. […] 
In an effort to establish dialogue, a major meeting was convened by 
UNHCR […] attended by 35 member States, […] as well as by NGOs 
and by inter-governmental organizations […].  
However, many of the States in the region felt that meetings of this scope 
and nature, valuable as they may be as fora for general stock-taking, 
would not allow for the new pragmatic approaches needed to reinforce 
inter-governmental co-operation aimed at better solving acute problems 
emanating from the new asylum situation. […] Among issues [identified 
to be] discussed between delegations was information exchange, orderly 
arrangements […] to avoid irregular movements and the intensification of 
the work on a convention on country of first asylum. 
(IGC, Stockholm 25-26 June 1991, Background Document, pages 1 and 
2)  
Substantially, this quote is interesting as it already outlines the IGC’s program of 
pragmatically reacting to the urgency and qualitative changes of a ‘new asylum 
situation’ constructed as irregular movement. The person seeking protection 
from persecution is re-constructed and represented as threat which needs 
urgent, pragmatic action – a new expression of political subjectivity. At this point 
however, I want to focus on the rationale of institutional change necessary in 
                                               
39
 This refers to a convention on country of first asylum, which the CoE had worked on since 1978 and 
which would eventually enter into the Dublin Convention (1990). The Convention was signed in Dublin, 
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this ‘new situation’; explicitly: UNHCR is not regarded ‘fit-for-purpose’. The gap 
between participants and UNHCR seems to have persisted and widened as the 
report shows when it states that:  
[…] two short notes had been prepared […]. The Dutch note suggested a 
scheme for dealing with irregular movements, whereas the note 
submitted by UNHCR stressed basic principles, urging increased and 
concerted international cooperation. A decision was taken to set up two 
joint Working Groups, one on Iranians and one on Tamils. […] The 
Working Groups on Iranians and Tamils, having been convened by 
UNHCR for a total of four meetings during the summer, had not 
corresponded to Government expectations of pragmatic and quick 
collaborative action. 
(IGC, Stockholm 25-26 June 1991, Background Document page 3) 
It is note-worthy how a qualitative difference is established between an 
efficiency-focused Dutch proposal and a tedious UNHCR call for adherence to 
basic principles, noting how this latter approach fails and disappoints 
governments looking for flexible and ‘pragmatic’ solutions. Looking back at the 
‘Consultations on the Arrival of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in Europe’ held 
in May 1985 Cabinet Minister of Labor for Sweden, Ms. Anita Gradin makes two 
important remarks:  
It is obvious, that developments like [large-scale influx of asylum-
seekers, restrain on resources etc.] taking place simultaneously in a 
number of European countries, must be met by new international 
solutions. […] These consultations showed that there is a great interest 
among countries concerned to explore the possibilities of a closer co-
operation in the search for new policy avenues. […] 
The aim of our meeting today is thus to informally discuss how to 
continue on the basis laid at the meeting in May. But the holding of our 
meeting today is an event in itself, since it might develop, if it works well, 
into such a flexible, consultative ad hoc mechanism which many 
delegations asked for at the May meeting. 
(Gradin, Ministry of Labour, Sweden, Opening Statement, 25.11.85) 
It is remarkable (though maybe not surprising) that states had met a deadlock in 
a formal multilateral setting, but seem to be content in this new informal 
plurilateral setting. There arises then the question of what conditions had made 
a conducive environment possible and what conditions were eliminated that had 
led to a deadlock in the formal multilateral environment? The arrangements for 
consultations Ms. Gradin referred to in her opening statement are outlined in a 
UNHCR document of 13 May 1985 as follows:  
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[…] The first purpose may be obtained by the creation of a contact group 
consisting of officials from a few European (or Western) states similar to 
that established following the seminar on integration in Europe. Due to 
the far-reaching implications of the questions to be discussed, the 
members of the contact group should be selected among policy makers. 
In view of the difficulties which the participation of agencies in the May 
meeting seems to have created for certain European governments, it 
might be preferable not to include agencies in the contact group. 
As for arrangements to discuss solutions to specific refugee situations, it 
does not appear appropriate to establish an organ with permanent 
members which holds regular meetings. Meetings could more 
appropriately be called and participants chosen in view of the specific 
refugee situation to be discussed. 
It may however also be considered to establish an organ with a few 
permanent participants representing European states. Ad hoc 
participants could then be called if the topic to be discussed requires it. 
[…] 
In order to enable UNHCR to have sufficient influence on the 
consultations, they should take place in the framework of UNHCR. 
Meetings should therefore be called by UNHCR (eventually at the 
request of one or more states). The meeting place does not necessarily 
have to be Geneva. 
(UNHCR, MP/dm – 13.5.85 Draft, Annex IX) 
The IGC40 is thus a consequence of both internal discussions specific to 
international migration, but also of larger geopolitical changes. As indicated 
above, not only diplomats but also governments and thematic experts 
(conversation, Penninx, 08 September 2007) came together and formed a 
forum with the goal of informally consulting about fundamental challenges they 
felt were common to each other, but could not be discussed within the formal, 
universalist multilateral meetings of the ExCom (conversation, Paiva, 10 
November 2005). Thus far, issues occurring around asylum-seeking and 
refugees in Europe had been discussed in an in-house working group of the 
UNHCR. With the consultations in 1985 the IGC was established as an 
independent group but working within the UNHCR in order to function as a 
clearing-house for statistics and information and as an informal network of key 
persons to study the exchange of data relating to individuals, border-control and 
transportation issues as well as case-studies on particular groups. However, 
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 Since it is composed of UNHCR’s major donor countries, it is often related to as the donor club. 
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from the latter part of the 1980s UNHCR leadership and participants within the 
IGC struggled increasingly with differences in judgment about the effects of 
events in the former USSR on international migration, but especially on the 
quantity of asylum seeking to be expected (conversation, Penninx, 08 
September 2007). As a result the IGC was included into UNHCR’s Executive 
Office in 1989 according to a letter from Jonas Widgren dated 19 May 1989 
addressed to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria. Jonas Widgren 
was formally appointed as coordinator in 1990 (he had held this position 
informally since 1987) as a consequence of the disputes noted earlier on41. 
Finally, in 1991 the IGC left UNHCR to become an autonomous body. Thus, in 
a letter of the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations Office in 
Geneva in 1991 informs that 
[…] a group headed by H.E. Mr. M. R. Morland, Ambassador and 
permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations 
in Geneva, has, on behalf of participating States, entered into 
discussions with Ms. S. Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, with a view to seek to establish a suitable arrangement.  
The Permanent Mission of Denmark has the honor to inform that these 
discussions have resulted in a draft agreement between the High 
Commissioner and the representatives of participating States, as will be 
seen from the attached copy of letter with enclosure, dated 19 June 
1991, from the High Commissioner to Ambassador Morland. 
(Permanent Mission of Denmark (20 June 1991) letter to the United 
Nations Office at Geneva, with official seal ) 
This letter is labeled ‘confidential’ at the time and includes an outline of the 
suggested relationship between UNHCR and the IGC. UNHCR promises 
administrative support where contracts and budget are concerned, that is 
UNHCR holds a trust fund from which expenses of the IGC are paid – this 
includes staff costs, accommodation fees, travel and subsistence and audit. 
Crucially, Ogata assures in this letter that UNHCR’s involvement in the IGC 
ends there, and accepts a position as observer with restricted access – bringing 
them on the same footing as IOM or the Council of Europe (Ogata, (June 1991) 
letter to Ambassador Morland).  
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Participating states had outlined in various versions why they deemed the IGC 
to be important, why it was essential to become independent, and what tasks 
the IGC would have to fulfill. For instance, the Swedish MP, Ibanez Lopez-
Pozas of the Arbetsmarknads-Departementet in Stockholm writes on 7 May 
1991 that the main objectives and functions of the IGC are to:  
a) develop and maintain, ‘nurse’ the totality; i.e. to develop a coherent 
and to a certain extent harmonized view and policy among participating 
states on asylum, refugees and migration 
b) based on this totality, take initiative in various cases, without 
necessarily taking executive action 
c) coordinate actions and policies among participating states in various 
international fora, as the need arises. 
(Lopez-Pozas, (19 June 1991) letter to Ambassador Morland) 
The IGC is thus a conceptual machinery engaging in doctrine formation. It 
strives to make sense out of geopolitical chances and adjust the migration 
regime accordingly. Participants are being led much more by perceptions of 
threat and urgency rather than by a broader understanding of historical 
developments, contextual circumstances and legal requirements42. Thus, the 
IGC molds new concepts and recycles old ideas.  
Johnston states in his 20 year review of the IGC, that 
[it] is difficult to find hard evidence for the impact of the IGC in the 
development and harmonization of policies and procedures within the 
European Union. Nonetheless, there is considerable anecdotal 
evidence that the IGC process has indeed influenced developments in 
Europe by facilitating the discussion and resolution of problems and 
issues in EU committees. It was Jonas Widgren’s assessment in 1993 
that the “nearly one hundred meetings held in the consultations with a 
total of three hundred officials involved, have allowed for the creation 
of an informal network between national administrations, and hence 
for a subtle and efficient harmonization process”. There is indeed a 
widespread view that the subsequent ongoing, informal confidential 
exchange of views within the IGC framework may well have resulted in 
what might be called a ‘soft policy convergence’ that came about 
through learning what other states were doing and why they were 
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doing it. Others have noted that this type of informal, non-binding 
process encourages the development of a common and conceptual 
linguistic field. This certainly appears to have been the case with IGC.  
(Johnston, 2005: 1643) 
The ideas,  the common and conceptual linguistic field, so the final part of 
the argument, are normalized and thus find their way into official policy 
without though passing through democratic processes of scrutiny. 
 
From Doctrine Formation to Policy Implementation 
The IGC was, thus, instrumental in informing new concepts, data gathering44 
and harmonization of views on the handling of cross-border movements into 
European countries. It was instrumental in that these hegemonic ideas informed 
the drafting of, for example, the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin 
Convention, both now part of the acquis communautaire (Lavenex 2004b; 
Koslowski 1999). 
What is interesting, as well as problematic, in my view, is the use of informal 
plurilateralism as an indirect means of adopting policies that might not win 
straightforward approval through formal political processes. This approach 
resonated with what Weber already described in Economics and Society as 
'bureaucratization' and 'professionalization', which are complementary 
processes involved in rationalization: "the bureaucratization of all domination 
very strongly furthers the development of 'rational-matter-of-factness'" (Weber 
1968: 998; in Ritzer 1975: 631-633). Weber predicted this would produce a 
perfectly functioning machine. More importantly though, this machinery 
normalizes the emergence and formalization of ideas over time as common 
sense (sedimentation), so that in effect their legitimacy is never questioned. As 
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 Johnston quotes from Jonas Widgren Informal Consultations: An overview, p 30 – no other bibliographic 
information available and he refers to Hansen, Randall (2004) Inter-State Cooperation: Europe and Asia 
Paper prepared under the auspices of the Bern Initiative, p.18  
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 According to Johnston the data-bases used within the EU to observe and control migrant movements 
have been developed within the IGC and only recently handed over to the more formal EU organizations 
once the EU had more capacity. In particular he speaks of TIES (Trafficking Information Exchange 
System) going to Europol and an asylum data base going to Eurostat. Johnston, 2005: 12) 
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such, this is not new, as I have pointed out above – the making of politique; that 
is the drawing up of proposals and the debating of such proposals until a 
consensus is negotiated is the fundamental practice in the steering of 
communities.  
What is new is the sole emphasis on technocratic practices – evidence-based 
policy-making directly translated into policing. What is new – and what I claim to 
be illegitimate practice – is that the IGC or rather informal plurilateral 
approaches undermine the element of public/political agonism. A struggle 
between adversaries which remains open to questioning outside of the 
boundaries as set by a particular discourse. Furthermore, due process of law is 
weakened too as new policies can only be challenged after they see the light of 
day once they are formalized and ratified in a bureaucratic environment, making 
any challenge tedious, lengthy and costly, if at all possible. The main argument 
here then is that this approach to policy-making normalizes new ideas that 
would otherwise be contested and thus creates a new common sense - newly 
proposed ideas are not perceived as such and hence policies are not 
scrutinized but accepted as matter-of-fact truth, in line with the Weberian logic 
outlined above.  
An example is the attempt to negotiate an agreement between certain 
European governments on who would be held responsible for examining 
asylum claims in the late 1970s in the Council of Europe (CoE). A UNHCR 
document of 22.05.1985 recalls:  
Whereas the CAHAR [Ad hoc Committee of Experts on the legal aspects 
of territorial asylum, refugees and stateless persons of the CoE] has 
produced a certain number of useful instruments with regard to refugees 
and asylum-seekers it appears to be more and more difficult for it to 
agree on solutions which go beyond the lowest common denominator. It 
is therefore suggested to examine the possibilities of refugee matters 
being treated […] in a forum which would adopt a more liberal approach. 
(UNHCR, MP/dm – 22.5.85, Back up action) 
Answers to challenges within the framework of the UNHCR or other formal 
multilateral fora are not provided in a timely enough manner because of tedious 
and time consuming administrative and legal processes. Additionally, the 
political environment was perceived to have changed to the degree of needing 
new knowledges (Lemke, 2002) and more flexibility with regard to how to 
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address these issues. With the 30th ExCom meeting in 1980 the problem of 
people without a country of asylum coming to Europe (and related: venue 
shopping45) thus moved from the European up to the international agenda. 
ExCom conclusion 19 (d)  
[stresses] the fundamental importance of the provisions of the 1951 
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol; and of the 1967 United Nations Declaration on Territorial 
Asylum and the need for constant advice by UNHCR on the practical 
application of these provisions by countries exposed to a large-scale 
influx of refugees; 
and further (f): “[recognizes] the need to define the nature, function and 
implications of the grant of temporary refuge;” (ExCom, 1980). So, here it can 
be seen that, at least within UNHCR, a certain transparency and the rule of law 
as principle is pushed through while drawing up new policies. However, the 
conclusion cited above portrays the notion of there being a gap or an 
unsatisfactory moment within the process which is to do with the need to find a 
new language and practices to deal with the perceived crisis on the part of 
European governments. The unsatisfactory moment is between UNHCR and 
European governments; the latter pushing for more flexible space to think of 
solutions where procedural control is structured against democratic standards of 
control of power and arbitrariness. In effect, governments were adamant that 
both the informal and the formal multilateralism were not providing output and 
hence, moved the discussion and, crucially, solution deliberation into the IGC.  
The unfolding narrative is the one alluded to earlier: the turning of legitimate 
refugees into bogus asylum seekers into irregular migrants who need to be 
eliminated. The director of UNHCR’s International Protection P.M. Moussalli 
notes in the context of the IGC that “[…] present-day refugee problems 
constitute a special burden […]” (UNHCR, Documents for consultation May 85, 
Annex IV), especially since the application of the principle of non-refoulement is 
obligatory. Hence people cannot be rejected at the border and need to be dealt 
with; but there is the impression of new arrivals and the new ‘quality’ of those 
arrivals posing problems which the region of origin should deal with. He then 
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goes on to acknowledge “the close link existing between our present 
deliberations and the question of irregular movements […]” (UNHCR, 
A/AC.96/INF.174, 4 July 1985). These comments point to the already accepted 
version of telling the not-anymore-refugee story. Irregular movements with 
regard to asylum seekers and refugees were also an issue during the 35th 
ExCom session in October 198446. However, official documents do not mention 
at this point any of the contentious issues which are under active discussion 
within the IGC. These contentious issues were to become one of the major 
building blocks of Migration Management: the linking of asylum and migration, 
expressed as ‘mixed flows’ and then ’illegal movement’ which triggered more 
and more policy responses geared towards containment of these flows in the 
region of origin – equivalences formed for a new ‘truth’. The Conclusions 
adopted in 1984 simply mention in (d) “[n]oted with deep regret that restrictive 
practices were being followed with respect to the granting of asylum, the 
determination of refugee status and the treatment of asylum-seekers and 
refugees;” (ExCom Conclusion No 33).  
The above discourse was hardly questioned after the mid-1980s and the notion 
of Europe facing a burden of illegal migrants entering the territory was 
normalized to the degree that doctrine was formulated within the IGC which 
ultimately led to the notion of ‘Fortress Europe’.  ‘Fortress Europe’ (Geddes, 
2000) thus, came into existence – at least as an idea - from the late 1970s and 
is not a phenomenon originating from the late 1990s; meaning, that entry 
conditions of a formerly relatively liberal Europe changed quite drastically in 
only a few years. However, this process of leakage into official discourse also 
shows that some of the more far-reaching doctrine developed within the IGC 
took about two decades to enter into the public realm of knowledge as ‘common 
sense’. New knowledges and truths then made their way into formal (legal) 
instruments of the EU and of participating countries. It is crucial here to be clear 
that this is not a causal, linear development but a process, and a very anti-
democratic process at that. A senior level official and bureaucrats tasked with 
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technical application are given a brief to deal with migration for a government. 
These persons are then invited in their personal capacity to participate in IGC 
meetings discussing in a frank and confidential manner their views on 
international migration and its steering. Such forming of views is then filtered 
into national and EU processes via their professional capacity, though without 
being discussed publically. Instead those views are presented as conceptual 
‘common sense’ (conversations, Apave, Loeper, 30 March 2011). In defining 
and gathering data on the self-defined and un-scrutinized doctrine formations 
the IGC can maintain a narrative of “contribut[ing] to the effectiveness of the 
process [in] that discussions are supported by a disciplined approach to 
developing accurate and timely information and data bases” (Johnston, 2005: 
17). The document goes on to state that there is an “awareness that the data 
‘stays in the family’ […]” (Johnston, 2005: 18). 
Secondly, and as noted above, the CoE’s CAHAR had debated a draft 
agreement on ‘country of first asylum’ regulations since 1978. In 1984 the CoE 
Committee of Ministers instructed the group to defer any further deliberations on 
the text as states seemed not to be able to find consensus and had got lost. 
The IGC took up the task of clarifying, recycling and defining doctrine that was 
needed to eventually be able to draft a consensus document which would deal 
with questions of entry into European countries' territories, dealing with asylum 
claims, cooperation and exchange of information and data between 
governments agreeing to participate, yet, without the pressure to formulate such 
a consensus document for all participants within the IGC. The trajectory can 
then be traced from the informal documents coming out of the IGC to the 
Schengen Agreement drafted in 1986 and documents issued by the European 
Commission on how the Union should deal with irregular movement. The 
Schengen agreement was first signed by West Germany, France and the 
Benelux. Giuseppe Callovi states other European governments “regarded their 
initiative as a kind of test bed that can point a way to technical solutions […]” 
(Callovi, 1992: 359). Technical solutions mainly with regard to cross-border 
mobility from so called ‘third country nationals’, but also with an eye on issues 
identified earlier pertaining to welfare provision and labor market needs. Thus, 
he goes on: “From this exercise it emerges that there is no alternative policy but 
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integration, and that a common control of migration flows is itself a prerequisite 
for integration” (Callovi 1992: 363). This being the rational justification aiding the 
normalization of concepts that would otherwise have been contentious for a 
much broader audience than just those lawyers, researchers and pressure 
groups with direct experiential, political and juridical knowledge of this specific 
area. The Dublin Convention (Convention determining the State responsible for 
examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the 
European Communities) of 1990 was then the step to render legally legitimate 
those doctrines formed in the IGC 15 years earlier. This approach to making 
policy as well as the content sets a precedent for other regions of the world to 
copy such restrictive approaches. Today, close cooperation between informal 
plurilateral fora such as the IGC and various RCPs across geographical 
regions, examples here are the Budapest Process47 and the Bali Process, 
already facilitate the export of such policies. 
 
Conclusion 
The IGC came about through historically specific changes and a 
socially/politically constructed deadlock in informal and formal multilateralism. 
The IGC was possible because firstly, the Trilateral Commission had not only 
set the precedent for organizing in the form of informal plurilateralism. Informal 
plurilateralism is theorized to distinguish the need for a ‘we’ as opposed to the 
acceptance of plurality ensuring politique, that is, political debate – at least in a 
very formalized way. The informality of the IGC ensures that participants are 
‘like-minded’, which in turn ensures little dispute over the understanding and 
conceptualization of the issues at hand. Thus the notion that asylum seekers 
pose a threat and are illegal is arrived at consensually and elevated to the 
status of common sense. By way of repetition within the IGC, in the home 
ministries and then at the level of the European Union such truth is sedimented 
without having received any democratic scrutiny along the way. UNHCR, as the 
institution seen to be hampering the flexible and pragmatic approach is side-
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lined to the point of being effectively silenced. Other possible parties to such 
discussions are not invited. 
The Trilateral Commission, secondly, had also ideologically set the ground for 
the production of the particular kind of ‘evidence-based’ knowledge within the 
framework of a rather technocratic mind set. The IGC is composed of 
governments from the Global North to react to what they perceive as sudden 
irregular mass influx of people to be dealt with in an urgent and more concerted 
way without making prescriptions or producing binding legislation on the 
individual participant. Thus discussions about who is responsible for asylum 
seekers once they arrive in Europe are paused, while the issue is moved to the 
border and beyond: if people are dis-enabled from access the problem does not 
arise. In this process re-constructing the political subjectivity of such a person 
from needing protection to being a threat is a first step. This is then followed by 
implementation of measures such as today taken on by FRONTEX. The policy-
making results in direct policing without (much) democratic scrutiny, as the 
knowledge is already naturalized and common-sense and therefore not 
problematic. 
It is important to understand informal plurilateralism as a policy laboratory which 
frames ideas, sets agenda, serves as a resource and generates tests and 
promotes practical policy in an opaque way. The currents within the IGC have 
gained momentum and – in the past decades – they have evolved into the 
hegemonic narrative unquestioned and unchallenged. Discourse theoretically 
this can be explained through the specific logic which the Trilateral Commission 
offered with regards to what democracy is for us and the place free market 
conservatism takes in this explanation and which then was ‘translated’ into 
Migration Management. The problem identified is the illegal migrant who may 
encompass any form of international migrant attempting to enter illegitimately. 
This is the foundational idea which evolved from the IGC. Migration 
Management is built and further elaborated from this vantage point as will be 
shown in the following two chapters.  
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Chapter 4 
The Asylum-migration nexus:  
or how to securitize international migration  
 
In the previous chapter I have begun to give brief examples of how the IGC 
constructed the illegal migrant as one of the founding building blocks of 
Migration Management. In this chapter I want to look at this process of 
constructing a new political subjectivity in more detail. I follow the chronological 
narratives established by the IGC. Thus before discussing norm and deviance, 
the IGC constructed deviance and suspension. A geographical and a juridico-
political move on the part of the IGC were necessary to render the 
contemporary notion of ‘illegal migrant’ intelligible. The geographical move was 
to go outside of the European Union to create the ‘transit country’ as a tool 
supporting the chain of equivalence which would lead to ‘illegal migration’ 
without which illegal migration would not make sense in the way it does today. 
However, since this conceptual constructing is not coherent one consequence 
of this move is ‘suspension’ of a few imagined migrants who were (and are) 
surplus to an otherwise stable definition of the migrant. 
At the heart of these consultations was the question of how to deal with what 
came to be termed ‘illegal cross-border movement’ of assumed to be (bogus) 
asylum seekers. As already indicated, the IGC is the place where doctrine was 
originally (re-)formulated and subsequently translated into many of those 
categories which we commonly use today to make sense of international 
mobility. The IGC’s concern was constructed around the issue of asylum 
seeking which soon was framed as illegal movement:  
When the irregular movements of asylum-seekers had started to 
increase, contacts were taken between States in the region to discuss 
this new situation, [in 1982/3]. These contacts led, at the suggestion of 
states in the region, to the establishment by UNHCR of a working group 
on Irregular Movements [...]. However, the appreciation of States 
concerned at this juncture was that neither of the formal institutions [i.e. 
UNHCR] was offering a fully appropriate framework for interstate 
discussions on multilateral cooperation related to the new situation [...]. 
As regard UNHCR, there was the impression among states that the 
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qualitative changes under way as regards the new flows of asylum 
seekers were not taken seriously enough by UNHCR. 
(IGC, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/1, page 4) 
Governments at that time sought to develop pragmatic approaches to an 
asylum situation that was understood to be ‘acute’. The representatives of 
Western governments, right from the start, used the IGC to talk about illegal 
migration, rather than about refugees or asylum seekers. Their discussions 
focused on measurement and control, rather than protection. This is 
problematic, not only because it is a one-sided approach, but also, because the 
consequences of moulding new ideas and implementing them administratively 
conceals the political nature of defining.  
The asylum-migration nexus establishes the problem of seemingly being unable 
to differentiate between those who flee persecution and claim to be in need of 
protection and those who move for rather voluntary reasons. One phenomenon 
resulting from the IGC’s perception of having lost control over the regulation of 
international migration is that European governments have started to impose 
‘premature labelling’ on people who may or may not be migrants of whatever 
kind. It is at this point where the geographical and the juridico-political effects of 
the IGC’s constructions become visible. Premature labelling - the imposition of a 
juridico-political status from one sovereign state into the realm of another 
sovereign state - involves assuming people are illegal migrants before they 
have entered the territory of the state passing judgement. Before they have 
even migrated between jurisdictions for which migration is a legally meaningful 
category. For this to be possible a person needs to be identifiable as a juridico-
political unit with a passport or another method of identification. Assuming for a 
moment, with European governments, that some of these persons indeed 
intend to engage in cross-border movement, there are, however, no reliable 
indicators to understand how and, with which past, present or future status, 
these people might go about such movement prior to them engaging in mobility. 
Thus, prematurely labelling individuals who cannot even be identified as 
international migrants leads to the construction of identities based on no 
evidence whatsoever.  
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The unquestioned assumption is that migrants in ‘transit’ countries are ’would-
be asylum-seekers’. They are automatically understood as illegal (Duvell, 
2006). This perception is even up-held by UNHCR assuring European 
governments that the agency does not regard ‘stranded migrants’ (those people 
who have not yet moved into the territory of the European Union but are also 
unable to move elsewhere) as refugees, thus invalidating the possibility for 
them to claim protection needs on a rights-basis (Dowd, 2008). This means that 
governments can claim not to be in breach of their international legal obligations 
at the same time as it becomes effectively impossible for someone to claim 
asylum and thus be recognized as a legitimate political subject. The 
‘impossibility’ in this context arises out of the particular perspective taken: on 
the one hand, European governments are those who establish a hegemonic 
definition (which has juridico-political consequences) and on the other hand, a 
country labelled as transit possibly not having any institutional or legal 
mechanisms – or interest in applying those – to identify migrants as such 
whether they are legal or not. Thus, the threshold for inclusion into an order 
which acknowledges the possibility of claiming asylum is deferred and so are 
the people who fall below this threshold. 
This construction is not open to discussion. What is discussed instead are 
technical questions of definition and enforcement such as length of stay in a 
transit country, possible indicators of potential intent to move on, and ways to 
reach such a population in order to conduct (ethnographic) research or 
information campaigns to convince people to stay in their region of origin rather 
than undertake a dangerous journey. Conceptualizing ‘transit country’ as a 
political tool for European governments raises questions about the legitimacy of 
Europe’s reach in imposing policy onto other countries, or Europe’s interest in 
avoiding such people being understood as potential asylum seekers. 
Academics in the field of migration studies are guided by questions formulated 
by policy makers – explicitly or otherwise – and try to offer solutions via 
empirical research structured in a way which often ignores deeply political 
connotations (Bakewell, 2008, Black 2001) - in this case the use of the idea of 
‘transit’. 
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The concept of ‘transit country’ has a vital political function situated in an ‘us v. 
them’ binary which is conceptually still undecided about whether to formulate 
itself as a security/threat or a development/humanitarian discourse, or both. As 
Collyer (2007) points out, many geographers have, for a long time, emphasised 
that imposing a linear logic on human mobility between country of origin and 
destination is insufficient and hence including the transit space is common 
practice48. However, the meaning and connotations attached to the idea of the 
‘transit country’ have changed in recent times. But these changes have gone 
unnoticed by those using the concept in their research. Accordingly, I propose a 
set of questions: How was ‘transit country’ constructed?  What role does the 
concept play? Also, how can we overcome the criminalizing/victimizing of 
premature labelling and its destructive effects for those labelled?  
This chapter argues that the particular historical construction of ‘transit country’ 
gives rise to the need for a new analytical lens. Current thinking constructs 
migrants as either invisible, illegitimate or in need of humanitarian aid. This 
leads to the assumption that they can be found, enumerated and categorized. I 
apply a notion of enacting ‘suspension’ as a first step for understanding the role 
of the ‘transit country’. This notion is largely understood as describing exclusion 
from society with the ultimate outcome of death (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 
2004). However, I use it as a vehicle to describe the temporary juridico-political 
debarment of a person (in the sense of deferment). My perspective 
conceptualizes such potential-but-not-(yet)-migrants as people inhabiting a 
space in which there is opportunity for reinvention. It moves away both from the 
criminalizing and victimizing notion of people in transit countries and from the 
fatalistic implications of ‘death’. 
To illustrate what I will argue below: The IGC participants construct the transit 
country in which they imagine those who may or may not be potential migrants. 
Such would-be-migrants waiting to enter the European Union illegitimately are 
assumed to be physically present. Yet, at that point this is an assumption before 
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the fact and hence cannot be argued, logically or legally. In the course of policy 
thinking instruments are developed that are indeed productive of the suspended 
person. The policies are enacted. The suspended as a material phenomenon 
comes into being.  
 
The Emergence of the ‘Transit Country’ 
Historical Trajectory 
The changes which led to the perception in European countries of having lost 
control over the governance of international migration started in the late 1960s. 
These were not only sparked by the slow dismantling of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions and the coming together of what now is the European Union; but 
also by the ensuing war between Iran and Iraq and conflicts further afield which 
brought about refugees from Indo-China, Africa and the Middle East. When 
Collinson wrote in 1993 that “the pressures which could give rise to large-scale 
migration into Western Europe in the years to come are intensifying” (Collinson 
1993: 2), she expressed what government officials had already thought by the 
late 1970s (Huysmans 2000: 755). Academic publications from 1993 speak of 
‘mass migration in Europe’ and draw mainly on figures provided by government 
statistical sources since the 1950s, but largely looking at the 1970s and 1980s 
(e.g. see King, 1993). However, these immediate indicators are insufficient to 
explain the ensuing reaction towards international migration as a general 
problem threatening Europe.  
It is worth quoting at length from a document the UNHCR drafted in 1985 for the 
‘Consultations on the arrivals of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in Europe’ 
(IGC, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/2, ‘Note by the High Commissioner’, page IV 
A ) where the High Commissioner addresses a ‘large-scale influx [of people]’ as 
one then key current issue. This ‘large scale influx’ is to be understood as the 
precursor to how the migration problem was subsequently framed in policy-
making and – to some degree – in academic circles. 
In recent years, large-scale influx into developing countries has been a 
prominent feature of the world refugee situation. To quote some 
examples, countries in Africa, […] and several countries in South-East 
Asia have provided first asylum to large numbers of asylum-seekers. […] 
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Except for South-East Asia, from where, in the absence of alternative 
durable solutions, nearly one million displaced persons have been 
resettled mainly to industrialized countries, the greater part of the refugee 
population has remained in countries of first asylum […]. 
(UNHCR, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/2 page 4 (11))  
Setting this above description in a wider context, it becomes clear that many of 
those displacement-producing conflicts are a direct result of the struggles to end 
colonialism and of the transformation into independent and sovereign states 
mainly in Africa (Mkandawire,2002; Hyndman, 2000; Allen, 1995). American 
involvement in wars against communism in some of the Asian countries was 
another important factor (Buckley, 2002: 13). However, the perception of 
industrialized Western European countries of ‘masses’ entering Europe appears 
somewhat exaggerated relative to world population and compared to the 
relatively small numbers of refugees which countries of the Global North hosted 
(and are still hosting today). 
Despite the best efforts of the Governments of first asylum countries and 
the financial support of industrialized nations, conditions for refugees and 
asylum-seekers in developing countries of first asylum in many instances 
remain problematic. […] In such circumstances, there is a natural 
tendency amongst refugees and asylum-seekers, particularly young men 
and/or those of urban/professional background, to seek an appropriate 
durable solution elsewhere. For refugees in this situation, industrialized 
countries, including Western Europe, with their relative economic 
prosperity and liberal asylum traditions, have become a pole of attraction. 
(UNHCR, 29 April 1985 HCR/CAE/85/2, page 4/5 (12)) 
The logic portrayed here has remained the leitmotiv for governments to think 
about migration ever since. Europe is economically attractive, its policies too 
liberal and it is in relative close proximity to, as well as having historically close 
ties with countries in Africa and Asia. Although many migrants may be able to 
go to countries in closer geographical proximity, for all the above reasons they 
do not. There are two main streams to regulate this ‘large scale influx’ or ‘mass 
migration’ from the perspective of Western countries: support countries of first 
asylum with aid and/or cope with those who move on through ‘transit countries’. 
Western European governments fear(ed) the latter which made the focus on 
country of first asylum and consequently ‘transit countries’ an important caveat 
in debates on Migration Management. 
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Assuming that the fear of numbers is a symptom of broader underlying 
uncertainty and change, additional issues mentioned in the documents 
reviewed become crucial, particularly matters of economic stringency and high 
rates of unemployment. Most migration literature refers back to the oil crisis of 
1973/4 in order to explain why guest worker programmes were abandoned 
(Appleyard, 2001; Castles, 2000; Joppke, 1998a; King, 1998; Weiner, 1995). 
However, following Pollard (1985) I want to propose that the end of the Marshall 
Plan and the slow dismantling of the Bretton-Woods-System were conditions of 
possibility for growing globalization and interdependence. This offers a more 
important explanatory approach for change; not only for the end of guest worker 
recruitment, but also for the rise in restrictive mechanisms and the conflation of 
refugees and economic migrants into illegal migrants. The wider effect of the 
end of the Bretton-Woods-System and colonialism was a complexification of 
relationships, into – apparently paradoxically – more fragmented relations at the 
same time as interdependence was felt more strongly.  This condition had a 
more concrete impact for the field of international migration in that clear 
distinctions between voluntary and forced migration were put to question. The 
1985 response by UNHCR to the delegation of the US Embassy as a follow up 
to an informal meeting of the IGC includes the following passage:  
The High Commissioner also wished to provide a forum […] for 
European countries which are encountering similar problems in relation 
to arrivals of asylum seekers and refugees […]. It is apparent that some 
of the problems discussed at these Consultations will be pertinent to 
certain issues raised in the context of […] irregular movement […] One of 
the concerns expressed by the United States in informal discussions is 
that the UNHCR study would address broader issues of economic 
migration […]. 
(UNHCR, 04 April 1985, Irregular Movements of Asylum-Seekers and 
Refugees: Meeting of Working Group of Executive Committee on 11 – 12 
April 1985) 
This short quote shows the beginning of the conflation of formerly distinct 
categories into ‘illegal movement’; justified by the perceived instability of welfare 
states and international political unrest more generally. Hence, drawing on 
various documents produced by members of the IGC (for example, a 
memorandum of 28 October 1987 No 391.84 by Jonas Widgren) it can be 
argued that the terminology of ‘irregular movements’ precisely establishes this 
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conflation of forced and voluntary migration. ’Irregular movement’ and by 
extension the ‘illegal migrant’ were thus constructed and already firmly in usage 
by the mid-1980s.  
In addition to the above described conflation, another moment driving 
governments to re-think international migration was that asylum-seekers and 
refugees came to be suspected of fraudulently claiming protection. For 
instance, in the mid-1970s through to the 80s the Malaysian response to 
Indochinese refugees illustrate the challenge UNHCR and the international 
community had to face. Malaysia perceived itself to be overwhelmed by a 
sudden mass influx of people who were ethnically related to the Malaysian 
minority and therefore seen to threaten the stability of the receiving country 
(Abbott, 1989). In effect Malaysia refused entry. The situation in Thailand was 
much the same. In response to this, Indochinese refugees were resettled as 
prima facie refugees. Thus everyone who declared themselves as belonging to 
that group automatically fell under protection by the UNHCR and were signed 
up for resettlement programmes to the Global North without any further 
questioning. Much the same was the case for Hong Kong - then a British 
territory - where boat people landed and were processed for third country 
resettlement immediately. This practice, however, soon came to be seen by the 
international community as lending itself to fraud as those prima facie refugees 
were increasingly represented to be economic migrants and not fleeing 
persecution at all (Abbott, 1989). These events introduced notions of displaced 
people as being bogus and a threat to the stability of a potential host country 
and the numbers of displaced people resettled or spontaneously arriving in 
Europe as being overwhelming for the host welfare state. Both these arguments 
were justified by an underlying notion that new arrivals were claiming for 
something they did not deserve (Holborn, 1975). 
In parallel, another key event influenced both the perception and the steering of 
international migration: the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 between the 
Western and Eastern geo-political blocs49 (Edwards, 1985). Two particular 
                                               
49 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
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sections in the Helsinki Final Act were explicit with regard to freedom for human 
contacts and to the rights of minorities more generally. The right to family 
reunification is derived from this and thus made emigration possible (Gaddis, 
2005). However, with emigration - that is freedom of movement - on the 
increase after 1975, a dilemma was created for the West. On the one hand, the 
West had pressed for adherence to international instruments, in particular the 
Human Rights covenants and conventions emphasizing freedom of movement. 
On the other hand, governments in the West faced the prospect of an east 
European exodus, as well as international crisis situations elsewhere, which 
created conflicting pressure on how the steering of migration was perceived and 
implemented.  
The key moments outlined above give an overview of the context within which 
interpretation and debate took place at the IGC and which firmly established the 
notion of an ‘illegal migrant’. Set against this background the events which 
unfolded after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 provided Turkey with a very 
particular position. I will turn to this now, in order to illustrate the process of 
constructing the ‘transit’ country’. 
 
The pilot project: Turkey 
Events which followed the Iranian Revolution added an element of urgency to 
developments in migration policy-making. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and 
its aftermath highlighted Turkey’s important geopolitical position between 
Eastern and Southern countries on the one hand and Western and Northern 
countries on the other. Turkey became the first country to be what is now 
termed a ‘transit country’, mainly for Iranians and Iraqis, as well as for people 
from countries in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East50 (Icduygu, 
2005). 
The full round of the informal consultations (held near regularly by the IGC) in 
1987 introduced a catalogue of measures which had been developed, in the 
                                               
50 More recently this list expanded to include people moving into Europe from Bangladesh, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Algeria, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, India, Palestine and Azerbaijan (Icduygu, 2005). 
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previous years by the IGC, in a working paper titled ‘Role of international 
organizations and governments in establishing an improved control of illegal 
movements: political and diplomatic action’. A list of tools to be implemented 
includes:  
 the coordination of visa practices (among these the exchange of 
conditions for granting visas and the harmonization of such 
practices); 
 ways for improving control of immigrants coming from countries 
with migration problems (such as: carrier controls in national and 
international legislation); 
 the abolition of the privilege of transiting without a visa (including 
more specifically, the common introduction of transit visas and 
exchange of information and agreements which oblige transit 
countries to examine applications of asylum seekers who seek 
transit. This is linked to a Europe-wide agreement on Country of 
First Asylum processing, which is today know as The Dublin 
Convention and Dublin II); 
 improved measures to prevent illegal entry (among these the 
exchange of information on ‘filières’ – today known as either 
smugglers or traffickers -, penalties for illegal residence and the 
use of Interpol for their identification); 
 exchange of asylum seekers’ personal data (today implemented in 
the Schengen Information System). 
(IGC, Gerzensee, 29.01.1987 Working Paper Agenda Item 4 C ) 
A second working paper for the 1987 IGC ‘full round’ meeting outlines the 
potential use of international economic, financial and development assistance in 
preventing illegal movements. This was geared at addressing internal migration 
in so-called source countries, as well as defining measures to be taken by so 
called ‘transit countries’ (IGC, Gerzensee, 29.1.1987 Working Paper Agenda 
Item 4 D ). 
Turkey was the first country chosen to implement those measures. A fax sent 
out from UNHCR headquarters in Geneva on 21 May 1987 by Jonas Widgren 
records the following agreement:  
Re Meeting W.G. on Iranian Asylum Seekers and Refugees on 18 and 
19 May 
[...] 
Secundo It was stressed that the issue of strengthening the control of 
irregular outgoing flow as well as other matters relating to the situation of 
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Iranians in Turkey should be re-examined with the Turkish authorities 
through UNHCR; 
Tertio It was agreed that the process should continue and that UNHCR 
should have further contact with the Turkish authorities as soon as 
possible to transmit the participants’ message. Next W.G. meeting 
foreseen end June; at which time six month trial period for arrangements 
made at the meeting will start. 
(IGC, 21 May 1987, HC TX EA, 391.84 100.GEN.IRN ) 
Thus, Turkey was now considered a country where illegal migration originated, 
and not as one to recruit work migration from. As opposed to undocumented 
migrants, who were already in the host country and had lost their status mainly 
with regard to social security, this new category of migrants crossed 
international borders without legal documentation permitting them to do so 
through another country. The issue became one of access to territory, rather 
than one of domestic integration or questions of protection. 
Migration of this kind was new in the sense that those international migrants 
coming into a European country had, in previous years, been easily absorbed 
into the labour market (and had thus been given a legal status). They had not 
been asked about their motivation for movement or their legal status on entry. 
This is relevant insofar as the majority of people moving through Turkey were 
fleeing turmoil and general violence in those countries on Turkey’s southern and 
eastern borders (Duvell, 2006). Those who did not have family or the possibility 
to build a livelihood in Turkey (for political, ethnic, religious or other reasons) 
would try to move on. Thus, refugees on their way to find a safe haven 
reasonably could not (and still cannot) be expected to have a passport, apply 
for a visa to the country in which they may end up applying for asylum, or wait 
to organize a transit visa in a country where they may be at risk of 
persecution51. 
In consequence, Turkey corresponded to the particular geopolitical situation 
which the IGC participants described during their discussions about 
international mobility and illegal migration, where categories conflate and 
                                               
51 This is already mirrored in the 1951 Convention (Art. 31). The article provides that asylum seekers 
should not be criminalized due to not being able to prove legal documentation. 
 
116 
general distrust is normalized so as to obscure migrants’ legitimate intentions of 
movement. A pilot project was set in place to gain more information and to 
develop new approaches (Collection of memoranda, faxes, notes and letters 
concerning the pilot project in Turkey in the context of the IGC from the year 
1987). The project included, in addition to the issues raised above, discussions 
around non-refoulement; temporary protection; resettlement; and 
return/readmission to Turkey. According to the records, there were three 
working groups: one working on irregular movements; a second covering issues 
of return/readmission; and a third concerned with the notion of non-refoulement, 
i.e. advocating for the Turkish government to give protection to asylum-seekers 
even though Turkey is not a signatory to the 1969 Protocol (Jonas Widgren, 
Fax, EA 89 391.84, 9.5.88 Confidential, Provisional Agenda, The informal 
consultations in Oslo 18 – 20 May, Agenda  Item 5, Annex 6). Issues of interest 
to European countries were given precedence. In the annex it is noted that 
[…] the Working Group endorsed, in July 1987, the idea of establishing a 
‘Tentative joint operational scheme on Iranians in Turkey’. Furthermore, 
the Working Group authorized UNHCR to mention to the Turkish 
authorities that an annual total of 3,000 resettlement places might be 
placed at the disposal of UNHCR, depending on the extent to which the 
Turkish authorities were prepared to participate in the various elements 
which would form part of a mutual informal agreement. 
(IGC, EA 89 391.84, 9.5.88 Agenda Item 5, Annex 6, emphasis added) 
Turkey’s sovereignty was actively undermined through an informal agreement 
which nonetheless bound Turkey to introduce formal measures, setting a 
precedent for the political, diplomatic and (although problematic) legal function 
of a ‘transit country’.  
The above elaboration has shown that the term ‘transit country’ seems to be 
attractive to the labelling entity – the European Union. Yet, it can also be 
attractive to the labelled entity - i.e. the ‘transit country’ itself. The labelling entity 
is for various reasons in the controlling position, the example of Turkey being a 
case in point. Turkey has been involved in accession talks with the European 
Union since the 1960s. This puts the EU in a position where it can make 
demands on Turkey to implement certain practices, to show good will in relation 
to their wish to accede to Union membership. Turkey, on the other hand, 
benefits from development and capacity-building support but is also indirectly 
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given the legitimacy to side-step its responsibilities and to justify any 
controversial actions by calling on its difficult geo-political position. On these 
grounds, I argue, that ‘transit country’ is a politically constructed space which 
fulfils a convenient labelling function in various ways. The consequence, 
however, is that it is not a neutral analytical concept through which to 
understand the particular situation of a person who finds him/herself in such a 
country.  
Designating countries around the European member states as being source, 
transit or destination countries (or all at once) is arbitrary. The accession 
countries in the European East, for example, can highlight how the discourse 
changes over time. Considering ‘transit countries’ to be a worry, the EU 
imposed regulations upon those countries from the 1990s onwards. The EU 
thus funded capacity-building in order to improve border controls and 
administrative systems dealing with people arriving within the territory of such 
‘transit countries’. However, as soon as those countries acceded to the 
European Union, they became labelled ‘destination countries’ and as a result 
attention and resources were turned to others, such as Ukraine and Moldova 
(Lavenex, 2006). This experiment and its outcome served as a blueprint and 
legitimizing example, since it is regarded as knowledge and information derived 
from an evidence-based approach as shown above. These are examples of 
illegitimate responsibility-shifting, based on the argument of interdependence 
and globalization, supported by a rhetoric of threat which is employed in order 
to combat unwanted asylum seekers, now commonly subsumed under the 
heading of illegal migrants, as shown above. 
 
The ‘Transit Country’ as a Tool 
In the previous sections I have shown how the conflation of voluntary and 
forced migrants has brought about a new definition of an ‘illegal migrant’. I have 
then argued that the notion of ‘transit country’ has been re-conceptualised from 
being a descriptive idea in geography to becoming a tool of governance. In this 
section I will show the reach and impact of the doctrines formed within the IGC. 
It is important to reiterate that the change in discourse brought about by the IGC 
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and picked up by academics has led to the particular phenomenon in ‘transit 
countries’ of suspension of people who cannot actually be identified.  
The practical outcome of this concept introduces the following logic: (1) 
protection in the region of origin (‘country of first asylum’ idea) leads to (2) the 
assumption that there are countries labelled to be ‘safe third countries’ and, (3) 
on those grounds, to the inference that people who move on from a place where 
they had found protection must necessarily be illegal.  
As of 1985 Western countries had already restricted entry into their territory to 
such a degree that UNHCR commented that 
Restrictive trends have been noticeable in applying the concept of 
country of first asylum and the refugee concept itself. One result of the 
restrictive application of the concept of country of first asylum has been 
that a relatively short period spent in another country with which the 
asylum-seeker has no other connection has been increasingly 
considered as sufficient for that country to be regarded as the country of 
first asylum. 
(UNHCR, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/1, page 6/7) 
What is more, this concept was not only applied to the countries surrounding 
Western European countries but even more so to ‘the region of origin’ as this 
was linked with the logic of financial aid and capacity-building. Thus, reflections 
such as “It is evident that many difficulties including those discussed in the 
present note could be alleviated if refugee problems were to be addressed 
effectively at their origin” (UNHCR, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/1, page 11) are 
important in supporting the idea that refugees are better protected and 
supported in close proximity to where they had to flee from52. 
The next step in this line of argument has thus been the labelling of some 
countries as ‘safe third countries’. UNHCR had already started to collect 
‘country of origin information’ as mandated by its ExCom in its conclusions 8 
(1977) and 30 (1983). Thus, governments had a template for categorizing 
countries as being safe or not. All Western European countries considered each 
other a ‘safe third country’ reciprocally, which means that claims for asylum 
                                               
52 For an overview critique of the idea of ‘root causes’ argument and approach see Saskia Gent, 2002 at 
http: //www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/1-3-3.html 
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were not accepted as reasonable. However, this idea was extended to Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East. Such policy provided the basis for the idea that 
people could find a place of protection near to their putative home. This 
proposal is referenced in an IGC confidential document. Here it is stated that:  
[…] co-operation would be to elaborate joint assessments on the 
situation in relevant countries of origin. States participating in the 
Schengen co-operation had already established a similar system. As 
suggested in the Swiss working paper [its original source], one might 
even go one step further, i.e. to establish joint “lists on safe countries of 
origin. 
(unknown author, no date, written after March 1990, 0071i, page 26)  
A fax sent some time after this meeting endorses the Swiss working paper 
(BMAA-Sektion IV, 19 March 1991). In effect, there was no longer any 
legitimate reason to attempt to enter and seek protection in Western European 
countries53 (conversation, Crisp, 12 November 2005). 
In the wake of these developments, governments experimented with language 
such as ‘onward migration’, ‘secondary movement’ and the like. Noll draws on 
data from an ICMPD source of 199754 and writes:  
It is quite another matter if persons attempt to migrate westwards after 
they have been recognized as refugees. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that this happens, but it is naturally hard to substantiate this claim with 
any official statistics. 
(Noll, 2000: 327) 
Now – two decades later – the term ‘irregular secondary movement’ (as defined 
in the previous chapter) is normalized in both policy and academic parlance. It 
is interesting to observe how normalized this concept has become, so much so 
that even NGOs self-mandated to monitor governments and International 
                                               
53
 The European Union has formalized these deliberations with their Conclusions adopted on 30 
November 1992 concerning countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution, WGI 1281; 
Circulation and Confidentiality of joint reports on the situation in certain third countries, 20 June 1994, 
Council of the European Union, OJ (1996) 274/43 and institutionalized these activities formally with the 
Conclusion of 30 November 1994 on the organisation and development of the Centre for Information, 
Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI), Council of the European 
Union, OJ (1996) C274. 
54 For other critical appraisals see Tuerk (2003), Betts (2006) (2006a), Loescher and Milner (2003), 
Human Rights Watch (2002) 
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Organizations use this language in their advocacy to maintain standards of 
protection for refugees. For example, a statement by the International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) during the UNHCR’s Forum on Irregular Secondary 
Movements of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers states that 
The issue of secondary movement is not an isolated one, and must be 
considered in the context of principled approaches to responsibility- and 
burden-sharing, as well as the question of effective protection. 
(ICVA, 2004: introductory paragraph)  
‘Irregular secondary movement’ has come to denote a situation in which a first 
forced movement within the region of origin has taken place, with protection of 
some sort found. In the case of Turkey, the country was expected by the IGC 
members to provide protection and at least temporary residence to (Iranian) 
refugees. However, no questions were asked with regard to the sufficiency or 
the appropriateness of the de facto protection offered on the ground. The same 
holds true for Europe’s activities in the Maghreb, to the degree that Morocco 
has instituted ‘show-policing’ which involves dumping people identified as illegal 
migrants in the Sahara, on the Algerian side of the border55. Consequently, in 
the case where people are thought to attempt to move on to Europe, this further 
movement is considered illegitimate; it makes people illegal on the basis of 
Western countries’ understanding and regulations of control. Why should 
European countries accept a claim for asylum if people have found protection 
elsewhere? Should these ‘would-be-asylum-seekers’ ever make it into Europe, 
their claims would be considered unfounded and therefore rejected.  
This held true for movements from other parts of the world as well. An 
enumeration of asylum seekers in the IGC documents informed governments 
who participated that, after 1984, more than 60 per cent of asylum seekers 
came from Asian countries, less than 20 per cent from Eastern Europe and little 
more than 10 per cent from Africa (unknown author, Oslo, 11.05.88, Policy 
Perspectives – A coordinated Refugee and Asylum Policy, p1). To phrase it 
differently, it follows that a person arriving in Western Europe must have already 
been able to find protection in the region of origin, because of the development 
                                               
55 For an in depth description see Michael Collyer (2006, 2006a, 2007) also Hein de Haas (2008) 
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aid and capacity-building invested in migrant-sending regions. Should a person 
move on, this would be illegitimate as this person must have passed through a 
‘safe third country’ and should be ‘readmitted’ to this ‘transit country’ enabling 
Western European countries to argue that they are not committing refoulement 
of persons in need of protection (Hyndman, 2008). 
The above description of conditions of possibility leading to the specific 
definition and function of what a ‘transit country’ constitutes, is the condition 
under which ‘illegal migrants’ can be constructed as deferred persons (neither 
physically nor individually known or identifiable for governments) as they in 
effect have not actually moved in a juridico-politically intelligible fashion. These 
are the people who fall below the threshold as mentioned in the introduction. 
Thus, the ‘transit country’ is about the potentiality of someone being in 
existence who has in fact not yet juridico-politically materialized vis-a-vis the 
crossing of a European border, because they are trapped. How then can we 
understand what the phenomenon is and what its consequences are? 
 
Consequences arising out of the Concept of ‘Transit Country’ 
Our state-centric account of spatiality is characterized by three assumptions. 
They are “first, that states have exclusive sovereign power over their territories; 
second, that ’domestic’ and ‘foreign’ are separate and distinct realms; and third, 
that the boundaries of a state define the boundaries of society” (O’Tuathail, 
1998: 17). Proponents of this view, according to O’Tuathail (1999), take 
structures for granted and so the mode of thinking and working is declarative 
and imperative, much like political realism. In this mode of thought the 
aspiration is to give advice to those in the decision-making body, while not 
realizing that this approach necessarily thinks in a binary of ‘us’ v ‘them’ and 
‘here’ versus ‘there’. This portrays the perspective the IGC seems to adopt. 
Authors of a post-structural critique denounce this as a “superficial and self-
interested [as well as exclusionary] way in which orthodoxy ‘reads the world 
political map’ by projecting its own cultural and political assumptions upon it 
while concealing these very assumptions” (O’Tuathail, 1999: 108). Such a 
critical perspective wants to examine theoretical assumptions in order to 
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question the existing structures of power and knowledge. “Knowledge”, writes 
O’Tuathail, “is always situated knowledge, articulating the perspective of certain 
cultures and subjects while marginalizing that of others” (O’Tuathail, 1999: 108). 
The orthodoxy is contradictory. On the one hand, a simplified universal notion of 
territoriality is assumed where institutions still base their decision-making and 
implementation on the tools and mechanisms of the past (O’Tuathail, 1999). On 
the other hand, arguments about fluidity, interdependence and uncertainty are 
employed to legitimize new knowledges. Above, I have shown the evolution and 
critically assessed the knowledge and truth-creation of the particular narrative 
linking ‘transit country’ - a particular governmental tool - with the definition of an 
‘illegal migrant’.  
The disappearance-from-recognition (the deferral) of some of these ‘illegal 
migrants’ as suspended persons is portrayed as a technical procedure, where it 
is sufficient - in a world that recognises belonging in terms of passport, 
identification cards and other methods of visualizing eligibility and rights - to 
render such status invalid.  It is useful to draw on the thought of Rancière 
(1998) to clarify what ‘suspension’ means. ‘Suspension’ is generally understood 
to mean a temporary debarment from, or cessation of, a privilege. I propose to 
understand the ‘transit country’ as a place of acute undecidability. In this place 
persons may find themselves to be suspended from their juridico-political 
existence in two ways. Either a person’s passport is not recognized as 
legitimate or else a person does not have an identity document and, as a result, 
this person is denied access to the wider community. That is access is denied 
to political subjectivity – a person finds him or herself to be in-between 
identities. Following Arendt (1958) I propose the main line of distinction to be 
between the activities sustaining existence and the juridico-political status of a 
person. In the case of those people finding themselves suspended in a transit 
country the phenomenon is such that they are reduced to the bareness of 
existence even though they theoretically have a juridico-political status (they are 
a political subject) where they have left, they ‘ought’ to have a status where they 
are and they will have a status where they may go – thus they are in-between 
identities but without political subjectivity. Therefore, there is the establishment 
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of a border-area that is deprived of the protection of the law56: suspension. It is 
this border-area, I argue, that some persons fall into and, by doing so, die 
metaphorically out of their own political existence.  
The suspended are no longer recognized as having a valid existence. The 
production of the suspended is a constitutive but unrecognized part of politics. A 
criminal – those who are deviant, such as the smuggled migrant - could claim 
certain legal guarantees and formal procedures. In contrast, a suspended 
person is completely unprotected die to his/her deferral. Since these individuals 
are ascribed a status beyond human and natural law, the suspended becomes - 
temporarily or not - some kind of invisible living dead (Lemke, 2003). In the 
context of this thesis I argue that the labelling of a person as being an ‘illegal 
migrant’ by a country in which they are not physically present because they are 
physically in a ‘transit country’, becomes such a ‘suspended’ person. Such 
people, stuck in a ‘transit country’, lose their juridico-political status, as they are 
assumed to be illegitimate. In being suspended, excluded from the juridico-
political community, they are thus reduced into living dead by the discursive 
construction of ‘illegal secondary movement’ and ‘transit country’.  
A convenient outcome (for governments) is that ‘the suspended’ become 
invisible. We do not need to recognize the individuals and their claims, which 
would call for – on the basis of our stated values of human dignity and non-
discrimination – recognition. So, they are held, precisely, in ‘suspension’, 
because the suspended are operational in giving validity to our old story (us v 
them) and in maintaining order. What is more, the notion of ‘the suspended’ 
keeps us alert enough so as to maintain and manifest our new discourse of 
uncertainty. After all, ‘the suspended’ are themselves highly uncertain. This 
consequence arising out of the construction of the ‘transit country’ then poses 
questions about sovereignty and citizenship. The classical idea of sovereignty 
pertaining to territorial integrity, political independence and non-interference 
allows us to read our political landscape only in terms of friend and enemy: the 
former have rights and duties, while the latter pose a threat. Thus, O’Tuathail 
                                               
56
 See also Agamben (1998) 
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reminds us that space is invested with power through the creation of 
knowledge57. However, reading Rancière and O’Tuathail together, the authors 
provide analytical tools to grasp the effects of changes with regard to space and 
political action – both fundamental for the classical understanding of 
sovereignty.  
 
Conclusion 
Chronologically, the IGC has invested meaning in the category of the ‘illegal’ 
before it started conceptualizing other categories relevant to international 
migration. In discourse theoretical terms this is logical as it is the point where a 
limit is established that invests meaning into human mobility more generally. 
The spatial re-definition of boundaries - the invention of the ‘transit country’ - 
was indispensable for the IGC, as a discursive construction with a political 
function within a changed global order.  
An asymmetry between old structures for decision- and policy-making and a 
new discourse promoted by the IGC around global interdependence and 
proximity brings about the phenomenon of ‘suspension’, rather than a binary 
between inclusion and exclusion, as will be developed in chapter eight. It is vital 
to emphasise that one consequence of the IGC’s doctrine formation is that 
beyond deviance (the illegal migrant) they introduce the category of suspension, 
which goes beyond mere exclusion and formulates deferral of the validity to 
exist. The illegal and the suspended are conflated in the IGC’s narrative, thus 
emphasising the urgency to act upon a securitized notion of migration by 
establishing the myth of an intangible and unknowable quantity of potentially 
dangerous people waiting to enter the European Union at the outer point of its 
external borders; aiding the normalization of the narrative in so far as the ‘illegal 
migrant’ who is within the territory of the European Union is ‘treatable’ and 
juridifiable as a political subject, and covering over the reduction of difference as 
radical violence of suspension as a phenomenon.  
                                               
57 See literature on Foucault’s (1997) notion of power-knowledge and its function within governmentality 
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Therefore, the first ingredient of a seemingly coherent and complete discourse 
is established against which in a next step ‘the norm’ can be conceptualized. 
Thus, the ‘transit country’, as geo-political space, fulfils a political function of 
enacting ‘suspension’. Suspension, accordingly, acts to stabilize Migration 
Management as a stable and fixed discourse which claims to be all inclusive of 
all phenomena there are in relation to international migration. Suspension, thus, 
becomes Migration Management’s constitutive outside. 
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Chapter 5 
The Migration-Development Nexus:  
or how to entrepreneurialize international migration  
 
Between the 1970s and the late 1990s in most policy and academic literature 
concerned with migration, the topic of migration for work into northern European 
countries was rather marginal, as the focus was on questions of integration of 
those populations. If it was mentioned this was only with reference to historical 
migration (Collinson, 1993). Thus, the ‘question of asylum-seekers and 
refugees in Europe’ was the preoccupation in the early 1980s for the IGC 
governments to come together, as has been shown in the preceding chapters. 
The relation of deviance/suspension was established. However, de-legitimizing 
much of the mobility of people across borders required the outlining of 
conditions of legitimate mobility in order to internally stabilize the narrative of 
Migration Management. The establishment of the norm/deviant relationship 
through the migration-development nexus provided the legitimate political 
subjectivity of the entrepreneurial migrant, who would fit the characteristics of 
an efficient non-threatening participant in the global economy as set out by the 
Trilateral Commission. Although marginal in the IGC, the discussions about 
adaptation of development policies were an important signpost towards 
formulating the migration-development nexus and the transition to openly 
talking about legal migration again. However, during the 1980s, legal and 
especially legal economic migration was the one topic loudest in its silence. 
Legal migration is largely constructed as a particular kind of economically 
motivated mobility both by policy-makers and academics58. It is primarily 
understood as migration for work. Legal migration is visible migration. It is the 
movement across borders that is legitimate for all involved, the migrant, the 
sending country and the receiving country. Most importantly it is economic in 
logic and legal in character, hence lawful. This point is not as banal as it may 
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seem, in particular in the light of the previous chapter which has focused on the 
suspension of a person assumed to be a migrant illegitimately aiming to enter a 
country’s territory. Empirically it is not banal since western European countries 
have historically tried hard to down play that in fact international migration is 
desirable. This chapter forms another step of my empirical argument leading 
towards the conceptualization of ‘Migration Management’ as elaborated mainly 
by European countries. The entrepreneurialization of migration, brought about 
by a particular linking of thinking in terms of GPE (Global Political Economy) 
with the migration-development nexus, renders some migrants as ‘winners’ and 
‘wanted’ actors in European economies.  
Here, I will focus on the historical discourse on the basis of which policy-makers 
have contemplated the steering of legal migration as mediated by the 
‘migration-development nexus’. The IGC draws on assumptions of the 
responsible actor and employs it (via the migration-development nexus) to 
partially (re)legitimize international migration for work as legal. It therefore 
establishes a norm against which other movements can be defined and 
measured. Thus, the legal migrant is constructed as the conformist, efficient 
actor who bears associated risks of mobility and adds value for all 
‘stakeholders’ involved. The narrative of win-win-win is thereby normalized. 
I argue that the migration-development nexus is a basket of concepts relating to 
economic migration incorporating an empty notion of development which, 
accordingly, is not clearly defined as such but makes use of different forms of 
articulation sponsored by the World Bank, UNDP, ILO, and other organizations. 
In this chapter I show how circular migration, as the most compelling narrative 
for European governments, is constructed. I show how circular migration was 
born out of the migration-development nexus, which originated in policy debates 
about forced migration rather than economic or voluntary migration. It is the 
most palatable concept because we know it already through other migration 
related concepts such as seasonal or temporary work migration, the idea of the 
frontalier59. It is also the most palatable because it fits within the idea of 
improvement (Murray Li, 2007) and responsibility. Migrants come to European 
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countries for a certain amount of time and everyone benefits, accepting the 
assumption that ‘we’ – the Global North – are the guarantor of advancement. 
The receiving society benefits because the migrant produces. The migrant 
benefits because she or he earns skills, experience and money and after the 
time is up the migrant returns with improved human capital to develop his 
country of origin. Again, win-win-win, as alluded to above. Circulation is (now) 
possible and coherent in our understanding as promotion of life-long-learning 
and entrepreneurship and it legitimizes legal migration into the European Union. 
The argument put forth is that policy-makers in the IGC have advanced the logic 
that circular migration tackles root causes (usually conceptualized in terms of 
poor infrastructure and/or poverty) and brings development. This view requires 
the underlying assumption of people’s own capacity for improvement. Such 
ideological grounding enabled scholars of migration studies to argue that 
migrants have agency. Yet, agency was not attributed to earlier generations of 
work migrants in the mainstream literature and policy discourse. In turn, this 
conceptualization of migrants led policy-thinking to focus on education, training 
and skill development, observing that working migrants sent remittances in 
money and kind which in many cases led to poverty-reduction60. 
The migrant began to be constructed as entrepreneurial, i.e. self-managing, 
competitive, productive and efficient within the social order. Out of this logic the 
promotion of circular migration seems to make the movement based on 
economic motivation legitimate. In short, circular migration has the capacity to 
combine most of the concepts linked within the migration-development nexus 
into a coherent logical narrative that resonates with the current European 
ideology of political economy. In this way, the migration-development nexus has 
made it possible to talk about legal migration again by way of 
entrepreneurializing some international migrants. However, theoretically, the 
migration-development nexus is problematic in so far as the migration narrative 
and the development narrative are much less integrated than is usually 
believed. The migration narrative is mainly articulated by justice and home 
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ministries and is focussed on control and regulation of the domestic sphere and 
the borders of national territory. It is hegemonic, thus silencing in part the more 
fundamental message which the development narrative aims to put forth - that 
migration should not be restricted as it is an important livelihood61 option for 
poor people. Thus, in what is portrayed as a linear and logical discourse, an 
unresolved paradox is nevertheless implicit. European governments want 
development to ensure people stay where they are, rather than genuinely 
provide for the normalisation and legalisation of the mobility of people. 
I will start my account by portraying the narrative shift and framing introduced by 
the IGC, motivated by the assumption that it is better to invest in development 
than to administer asylum seekers. In a second step, I will elaborate on why the 
migration-development nexus is important as a precursor to potentially 
foreshadowing migration policy that accepts circular migration as the prime form 
of legal migration since its ban in the 1970s. I understand legal migration – that 
which Migration Management constructs as the norm - as economically 
motivated migration which had been considered illegitimate in Europe for the 
past three decades. The norm and only legitimate form of mobility is thus the 
entrepreneurial migrant. 
 
The IGC: from the Administration of Asylum Seeking to Development Aid 
Migration and development were brought together as an articulation of 
deterrence without explicitly stating so. The logic behind the deterrence 
argument builds on the following brief sequence. If we develop the 
underdeveloped world then migration will be a less relevant livelihood strategy. 
Eventually, there will no longer be any legitimate reason for these people to 
land on European shores. Yet, this discourse began to be undermined by its 
own evidence: people kept coming. So, the logic went on to postulate that, if 
individuals become migrants regardless, their return can be justified by also 
returning skills and knowledge that can be utilised to improve individual 
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livelihoods and development more generally. This was the very first move 
towards thinking circular migration – a transformation of the migrant into an 
economically productive body. 
An important example from within migration-relevant research was that growth 
was/is seen as the ultimate goal under conditions of finite resources which 
have to be made sustainable and distributed equitably. It is something that can 
be attained through the sending and receiving of remittances as one possible 
livelihood strategy (conversation, Ratha, 29 July 2009; Maimbo and Ratha, 
2005). These insights popularised by World Bank research provided, in part, 
the grounds for conceptualizing work migration in terms of entrepreneurship, 
conceptualising migrants as promising actors of development, and thereby 
offering an alternative to a discourse which constructs migrants as a security 
threat. 
It is notable that within public debate in the 1980s it was not the break down and 
drastic change of the world economic order that was a focus of the debate but, 
rather, xenophobia (Favell, 1995; Goektuerk, 2007) responding to the 
perception that easier and cheaper access to transnational activities would 
‘flood’ Europe with migrants62. This would set the tone for the public discourse 
in the 1980s and serve as a justification for a strong governmental rhetoric in 
Europe against immigration, despite the slow U-turn which would lead to the 
articulation of the migration-development nexus and to the 
entrepreneurialization of migration. It was unthinkable to discuss the possibility 
of worker recruitment from abroad (Bade, 2003) or, more broadly, to accept 
economic reasons as a legitimate motivation for international migration. 
The problem was formulated as one of root causes where governments in the 
region of origin were over-burdened with refugees on the one hand but – it was 
argued by the IGC - also did not live up to their responsibility to do something 
about and contain their own poverty on the other (Ghosh, 1998). This was 
portrayed as resulting in young men migrating in an illegal fashion, forcing IGC 
governments to spend ‘good money’ on the administration of asylum seekers 
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rather than investing this money into development projects (IGC, 29 April 1985, 
HCR/CAE/85/1). The solution which was tentatively formulated by IGC 
members was to strengthen return and repatriation programmes on the one 
hand and to emphasise education and vocational training in the region of origin 
on the other. Both measures were to be integrated in newly adapted 
development policies.  
Yet IGC participants’ discussions were paralysed by three circumstances: (1) 
conceptual lack of clarity as discussions were, and remained, informed by 
assumptions underlying the migration narrative rather than those of the 
development narrative; (2) no inter-ministerial cooperation and divergent, 
mutually exclusive mandates of international (UN) agencies, due to differing 
notions of purpose within the two narratives – where the development narrative 
has at its core the aim of poverty-reduction through diversification of livelihood 
choices (Rogaly, 2002); and (3) the assumption that conditionality in bilateral 
agreements was needed in order to pressure countries of origin into conformity 
with European wishes to rid themselves of unwanted and undeserving migrants. 
For the IGC it then followed that the problem was ‘large-scale influx’ into and 
from the region of origin on the one hand:  
In recent years, large-scale influx into developing countries has been a 
prominent feature of the world refugee situation. To quote some 
examples, countries in Africa, notably in the Horn, continue hospitably to 
accommodate large-scale influxes of refugees and displaced persons in 
their territories. 
(IGC, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/1, page 4) 
Additionally the lack of capacity of the country of first asylum, if it is a 
developing country, was seen as an issue for Western European governments 
and the international community:  
Despite the best efforts of Governments of first asylum countries and the 
financial support of industrialized nations, conditions for refugees and 
asylum-seekers in developing countries of first asylum in many instances 
remain problematic. 
(IGC, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/1, page 4) 
On the other hand the situation in Europe was seen as equally problematic as 
Jonas Widgren, in his capacity as Under-Secretary of State, summarizes the 
perspective of his IGC colleagues:  
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[…] the overwhelming majority of today’s refugees and asylum seekers is 
to be found in developing countries – often in the immediate 
neighbourhood of their countries of origin – and only a few per cent make 
their way to Western Europe. Nevertheless, due to the very nature of 
asylum procedures [in the developed countries], even a relatively small 
increase of the number of asylum seekers may cause disturbances in our 
system. […] The number of asylum seekers has risen at a time of 
economic stringency and mounting unemployment. In a world where the 
gap between rich and poor countries increases, forceful economic, social 
and political factors push thousands of people to seek a future in other 
countries. Many of them are refugees according to the convention – 
others are not. 
(Widgren, Swedish Government, 28-31 May, 1985, written version of 
Statement during IGC meeting) 
In short, the context of the problem as seen by IGC members is that Europe’s 
economic stringency and high unemployment means that Europe cannot afford 
to host those people crossing international borders but that, at the same time, 
the conditions in the region of origin due to underemployment and 
underdevelopment are not ones in which people can either be contained or to 
which they can be returned. 
Instability and underdevelopment are identified as root causes which need to be 
addressed:  
It is evident that many difficulties […] could be alleviated if refugee 
problems were to be addressed effectively at their origin. As is known, 
initiatives to examine the question of the root causes of refugee flows 
have been undertaken in various United Nations bodies. The High 
Commissioner attaches great importance to these and to any other 
relevant initiatives which might be taken to deal with this aspect of the 
refugee problem. This matter is, however, one falling outside of the High 
Commissioner’s competence due to the purely humanitarian and non-
political nature of his mandate. It does, however, fall within the terms of 
reference of other competent United Nations bodies and can also be 
addressed by States directly either on a bilateral or multilateral basis. 
(IGC, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/2, page 11) 
This quote shows that the UNHCR can offer assistance but that this assistance 
is limited to the immediate refugee situation and that its mandate cannot expand 
to deal with the larger infrastructural and political problems in the developing 
world. In other words, the international community (still) emphasises UNHCR’s 
non-political mandate and argues that addressing root causes is beyond its 
mandate. Addressing root causes is seen to be the realm of governments’ 
obligations as Jonas Widgren states:  
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Governments must respect human rights and seek peaceful solutions to 
conflicts. They must also promote a fair distribution of resources in order 
to try to avert poverty, underemployment and so forth. When this is not 
done, people are often forced to leave their countries to seek a future 
elsewhere. 
(Widgren, Swedish Government, 28-31 May, 1985, written version of 
Statement during IGC meeting) 
This statement is directed at the classical agenda of development policy: the 
regulating of rural livelihood, the planning of mechanisms to address urban 
poverty, the reacting to ecological changes and finally nation-state building – an 
intrinsically political endeavour (Nederveen Pieterse, 2009: 34). Moreover one 
that has – and as development studies scholars commonly criticize – purely 
structural policies as ‘planned intervention’ at its heart, which leave no room for 
the possibility of empowerment of people or communities. The critique is that 
such a form of capitalism drives people out of their livelihoods into exploitation 
for the benefit of the Global North (Wallerstein 1987). 
Therefore, in the 1980s there is no official labour migration into Europe 
(Castles, 1986). Yet, there is a distinction between illegitimate asylum seekers 
and (as I will show) ‘normal migrants’ as mobility had not stopped even though 
the logic would have it otherwise. Both types of movement the legitimacy of 
movement to western Europe is questioned. It is at this point were the 
undecidability of the narrative is most obvious. The UNHCR already pointed out 
at that time that ‘the emergence of restrictive trends’ with regard to possibilities 
of entering the Global North, and in particular Europe, was seen as problematic. 
However, this statement generated no response. Instead, IGC participants 
began to outline, in a more nuanced fashion, what they observed as the 
particular problem. In this discourse, the situation of young men was highlighted 
and formulated as a problem which was on the verge of turning into a threat. 
These young men from urban environments in the developing world - so said 
the narrative - did not stay in the country of first asylum. They moved on – the 
phenomenon of secondary illegal onward movement discussed in the previous 
chapters. 
In such [problematic] circumstances [of underdevelopment], there is a 
natural tendency amongst refugees and asylum-seekers, particularly 
young men and/or those of urban/professional background, to seek an 
appropriate durable solution elsewhere. For refugees in this situation, 
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industrialized countries including those in Western Europe, with their 
relative economic prosperity and liberal asylum traditions, have become 
a pole of attraction. 
(IGC, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/2, page 5) 
It is interesting to note that this gendered construction of migrants is employed 
even today – especially with regard to economic migration; much of the 
mainstream migration literature makes no reference to the fact that labour 
migration is assumed to primarily be the migration of men63. The political 
subjectivity which begins to form at this point is one of angry young men who 
are unskilled and thus inefficient, non-competitive and thus a threat to the social 
order of the civilized, skill-intensive, science-based and innovative Global North. 
Thus, the narrative goes on, those who ‘self-select’ to move are portrayed as 
people (i.e., men) who seek entry into developed countries to gain economically 
and who are therefore not refugees. 
The steep increase of [the numbers of asylum seekers] over the last two 
years, and especially in 1985, has given rise to considerable concern. 
[…] The especially discomforting element was not so much the sheer 
number of applicants, although that certainly causes administrative 
problems, but rather the nature of the applications. Increasingly, asylum 
seekers got mixed up with normal migrants. 
(Korte-van-Hemel, State Secretary for Justice, Netherlands, 16 April 
1986, Opening Statement IGC meeting in The Hague, page 3, emphasis 
added) 
And ‘normal migrants’ are those seen to come for legitimate economic reasons, 
those who deviate but can be treated into entrepreneurs or those who are 
skilled and thus wanted:  
In view of the restrictive immigration policies of most western countries, 
normal immigrants increasingly pose as asylum seekers. These 
immigrants can be divided into two categories: those who are not in need 
of protection at all and those who are in need of protection but who, 
having found it in one country, move on to another country where 
protection can be enjoyed under better material circumstances. The 
open-ended character of our policy with regard to individual asylum-
seekers was never meant to cater for those considerations. 
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(Korte-van-Hemel, State Secretary for Justice, Netherlands, 16 April 
1986, Opening Statement IGC meeting in The Hague, page 4) 
Even UNHCR joins the chorus of voices which condemn those who try to move 
to Western Europe where they can live ‘under better material circumstances’. 
Asylum seekers – illegal migrants – are thus implicitly understood to be 
economically unproductive – they are tired and poor. Such economically 
unproductive people migrating into European countries are not seen to be 
acceptable. Thus, in a summary report a high-ranking UNHCR bureaucrat 
recalls that:  
[r]eference was also made to the abuse of asylum procedures by 
persons wishing to take advantage of the refugee mechanism for purely 
socio-economic motives. You will recall that the High Commissioner in 
his introductory statement made it perfectly clear that the office does not 
consider that such persons should be treated as refugees. 
(Moussalli, UNHCR, 29 May 1985, A/AC.96/INF.174, Annex IV) 
One practical step was to make sure that those urban professional men would 
not ‘queue-jump’. Instead individual status determination was to be applied by 
UNHCR in the regions of origin and governments called on themselves to 
combat root causes and particularly focus on the distribution of resources which 
would avert poverty more widely. This needed to be discussed in an ‘action 
oriented’ manner. One participant of the IGC noted that,  
[t]he lack of regular immigration channels has led to self-selection, 
through the claiming of asylum, to be used as a means of entry, [...] In 
effect, widespread abuse has led to a breakdown in the recognition of 
fundamental distinctions between the two categories: refugees as 
defined in the Geneva Convention and persons who, for economic and 
related reasons, use a claim for asylum as a means to settle in 
industrialized countries. 
(Fax from Linklater, EXTOTT, OSPH0748 to Campbell, Geneva, 07 
December 1990, page 4) 
The burden imposed by these economically motivated movements, seemingly 
abusing European generosity, could not be tolerated as the Dutch State 
Secretary for Justice formulates:  
Funds that could be used for the financing of projects for [the young men 
and those of urban and professional background in regions of origin] may 
have to be used instead for the reception and integration of the few 
resourceful enough to make their way to the West.  
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(Korte-van-Hemel, State Secretary for Justice, Netherlands, 16 April 
1986, Opening Statement IGC meeting in The Hague, page 6) 
This narrative frames these young men as a threat. The primary focus towards 
developing an aversion strategy for this threat is found in what the IGC briefly 
defined as ‘regionalization’64. ‘Regionalization’ is the title of an Annex to a 
document prepared for the IGC annual conference in 1985 stating clearly what 
IGC participants in principle agreed on as a solution to this problem:  
In the present context the term ‘regionalisation’ refers to the view 
expressed in certain quarters that, as a matter of principle, solutions to 
refugee problems should be sought in the region of origin, with the at 
least implicit criticism that UNHCR is not doing enough in this regard. 
(IGC, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/2, Annex VII, Draft, WC/emj, 20.5.85) 
It is interesting to note that IGC participants on the one hand reinforce the 
limited, non-political mandate of the UNHCR but, on the other hand, criticise 
UNHCR for not being a pro-active enough player. Consequently, an adaptation 
of development policies became a vital strategy. In this context IGC 
governments introduced the language of ‘co-operation and burden-sharing’. 
Financial aid needed to be given to those developing countries. Thus, “[a]ny 
meaningful assistance program would therefore have to be development-
oriented and would require resources on a scale far beyond what is available to 
UNHCR” (UNHCR, 29 May 1985, A/AC.96/INF.174, page 9). The rationale is 
outlined by UNHCR as follows:  
(a) Increased refugee relief and development assistance (with emphasis 
on refugee components) to countries of asylum and transit outside the 
industrialized world should be considered in its own right, apart from the 
question of irregular and spontaneous movements. The aim here would 
be to give an acceptable level of content to the concept of asylum and to 
maximise the contribution of resources to solutions.   (b) A review of the 
allocation of development aid to non-industrialized countries to determine 
the extent and ways in which such aid can contribute to solutions in 
countries of origin.   (c) Diplomatic efforts: Examination of the extent and 
manner in which individual states could further contribute to attenuation 
of the causes of exodus through their diplomatic means and channels. 
[...] (h) Role of other organizations: With respect to the three basic aims 
[refugee relief, development assistance and development aid], the 
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potential contributions of intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations should be actively explored. 
(High Commissioner of Refugees, 28 November 1986, 011 108155, page 
10) 
Even though UNHCR tries to kindle the interest of western European 
governments, which are also its biggest donor, the Office still tries not to link 
forced movements with the language of illegality because of its particular 
mandate – a vain attempt as can be seen from IGC working papers from 1986 
onwards. It also emphasises its role in local integration – an area of activity 
falling within its mandate:  
The need to link refugee aid and development was reaffirmed during the 
1985 Session of the Executive Committee and a consensus prevailed 
that the best means of helping refugees in low income countries to 
become self-supporting was through development projects that benefited 
both local population and refugees. [...] For refugees, a ‘durable solution’ 
means acceptance in the host country and the possibility of integrating 
into its economic life, within that country’s development plan. 
(UNHCR working paper for IGC meeting Oslo, May 1988, EA89-391.84, 
Annex 8, page 2) 
It was, therefore, argued that local integration as one of UNHCR’s long-term 
aims needed increased support from industrialised countries. UNHCR needed 
to improve its assistance programmes as one implementation of this aim. 
Assistance to urban refugees was identified and criticised as a weak measure. 
In its defence UNHCR lists:  
2. Some actions have already been taken to analyse these problems with 
a view to undertaking corrective measures. These include, inter alia, 
involvement of ILO in the design and implementation of projects 
benefiting urban refugees; special evaluations have been carried out in 
Central America and Africa to assess the effectiveness of urban refugee 
projects; re-orientation of educational assistance from university and 
academic education to vocational training has taken place.   3. Further 
measures are studied and include the possibility of stronger involvement 
of NGO’s and their local counterparts; establishment of a catalogue of 
skills of trained but unemployed urban refugees in Africa; etc. 
(IGC, 29 April 1985, HCR/CAE/85/2, Annex III) 
The wider logic promoted here (in theory rather than practice, as documents 
after 1985 show) was that improvement at the places of origin was fundamental 
to solve the problem of asylum seekers arriving in European countries. Regions 
of origin were, therefore, deserving of development aid as it was accepted that 
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these countries took on far more displaced people than European countries did. 
Switzerland, in view of this understanding, advocated for the creation of, and 
was made, a ‘clearing house’ by the other IGC participants for the identification 
of countries where economic problems were seen to cause international 
migration (IGC, Gerzensee 1987, Working paper, Agenda Item 4d, p2-3). Thus, 
thinking went beyond the identification of those countries in violent conflict 
which could be seen to produce refugees and moved on to identifying ‘interim’ 
destination countries. This, however, was still kept under the banner of dealing 
with Europe’s refugee crisis. 
A letter by Ernst Andres, Head of Permanent Mission of Switzerland, to a 
number of other Heads of Mission participating in the IGC and dated 5th 
December 1986, outlines what is seen as major problems: “Commitment for 
increased efforts, including political action, to tackle root causes of irregular and 
spontaneous asylum seeker movements [is needed]” (Ernst Andres, 5.12.1986, 
page 4); Andres continues by proposing agenda items assessing long-term 
solutions by way of a bilateral approach:  
action to be taken at international level: a) individual or concerted 
diplomatic efforts aiming at lessening the cause of massive departures; 
b) increased economic and financial cooperation with and support to 
countries affected by the migration movements; c) additional 
development assistance to countries directly affected by increased influx 
of irregular migrants [such as Turkey]. 
(Ernst Andres, 5.12.1986, page 4)  
In line with this, an extension of the argument was that European governments 
needed to address ways to reduce incentives to leave an underdeveloped 
country by investing development aid for economic improvement (IGC, 
Gerzensee 1987, Working paper, Agenda Item 4d, p2). The thinking behind this 
is, for example, that development aid needs to be invested in training for skills. 
However, in this context the idea of ‘brain drain’ became part of the discussion, 
a strategy allowing thinking of ways to ‘keep them out’ without being explicit 
about it. 
To categorically accept the young men and those of urban and 
professional background who had the resources to make their own way 
to Europe, as has been suggested, would promote the brain drain that is 
already impeding the progress of developing countries. 
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(Korte-van-Hemel, State Secretary for Justice, Netherlands, 16 April 
1986, Opening Statement IGC meeting in The Hague, page 5) 
The logic here is that young men migrating under the assumption that they will 
find work in western European countries are an important part of the work force 
in their country of origin and, through their migration, the capacity for 
reconstruction and development in the country of origin is hampered. Brain 
drain, although framed as a problem, serves simultaneously as an argument in 
favour of a second set of strategies in development policy discourse: namely 
return and repatriation. Thus, beyond the benevolent focus on supporting 
poorer countries - mainly in Africa - the IGC participants also considered the 
return and repatriation of ‘illegitimate’ migrants as a development strategy that 
would simultaneously alleviate European countries of the burden of illegal 
migrants already present on their territory. 
In a final comment Denmark mentioned that the starting point had been 
how to cope with irregular movements. There should be a ‘regional 
containment policy’ until voluntary repatriation or resettlement became 
real options. 
(R. van Leeuwen, 25 February 1987, Note IGC Gerzensee meeting, 
page 4)  
An official from the Swiss Department for Refugees emphasised in January 
1987 that a ‘plan of action’ must include among other steps: “b) Return of 
asylum seekers who have been denied refugee status and [...] d) Role of 
international economic, financial and development assistance in the context of 
prevention of irregular movements” (Delegierter fuer das Fluechtlingswesen, 
Switzerland, 12.1.1987). Yet, the UNHCR had already warned: “Even though 
they may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol 
definition the possible serious consequences of forcibly returning such persons 
to their country of origin must be acknowledged” (High Commissioner of 
Refugees, 28 November 1986, 011 108155, page 4). This warning is justified – 
in particular with regard to Switzerland which, according to the IGC documents, 
seemed to be less worried about returning Tamils to Sri Lanka (IGC meeting 
Oslo, May 1988, EA89-391.84). This is worth mentioning, as there was a 
widely-held opinion amongst most European governments and academics that 
it was – at that time – not safe to return these people to a country still suffering 
from civil unrest and violent conflict. Furthermore, in 1988, Sri Lanka was 
 
140 
proposed as a test case for combining in-country-development-aid with return 
practices from Europe. In a report on agenda item 6 of the Oslo meeting 
mentions:  
Consequently, a proposal of the Swiss delegation to extend the mandate 
of the existing working group on Tamils, by way of discussing Sri Lanka 
as a test case, was approved of. In practical terms, this would imply that 
development experts would be attend the working group meetings, if 
countries deemed it necessary. 
(Author unknown, no date, Report from the working group on relief aid 
and development assistance programmes – possible approaches to 
specific countries of origin, Informal Consultations in Oslo, 18 – 20 May 
1988) 
Practically, the general operational draft scheme was to be applied and tried in 
the particular context of Sri Lanka:  
Elaboration of schemes for the return in safety and dignity to countries of 
origin, or countries of first asylum, of persons whose asylum applications 
have been rejected, and obtaining the necessary assurances to this 
effect through diplomatic action. Promotion of conditions favourable to 
voluntary repatriation, and the provision of short-term and medium-term 
assistance to returnees, if appropriate, in the framework of development 
assistance schemes [should be endorsed]. 
(Widgren, Introductory statement, working group on Iranians, 18 May 
1987, page 4)  
Short-term assistance was understood to be a care package handed out by 
UNHCR which contained necessary food stuffs and appliances for the first days 
and if needed a small amount of money. Medium-term assistance was to be 
managed by other intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and 
ILO in order to facilitate early self-sufficiency (IGC, 19 August 1988, Meeting of 
the Working Group on Tamils on 29 June 1988, ref 391.84). 
Operational schemes and plans of action were declared but remained a reality 
only on paper. The discourse championed by western governments had 
focussed on addressing root causes. However, when actual planning of an 
intervention became necessary, the aid which UNHCR provided was in line with 
other emergency situations. Concerns about young men returning to reconstruct 
were not mentioned again, although European governments argued that a 
regional perspective would need UNHCR to adapt its assistance programs and 
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that these needed to encompass education for employability65. In light of the Sri 
Lanka experience as a trial case, it can be argued that the narrative which 
evolved in IGC discussions remained coherent only to the point at which plans 
of action were to be drawn up. Yet, I want to argue here that the importance of 
this ‘thinking-in-progress’ was less its real impacts but more in its ideational 
value, especially in terms of paving the way for the migration-development 
nexus – as condition of possibility for an articulation of circulation and the 
evolution of the entrepreneurialized migrant in its wake. It is worth quoting at 
length what had been established as consolidated knowledge in 1990 within the 
relevant policy circles:  
Causes 
A pre-requisite to dealing with the consequences of mass migratory 
movements is to identify their root causes. These are popularly divided 
into push and pull factors. Included in push factors are conditions in 
source countries such as unemployment, underemployment, poverty, 
deteriorating environmental conditions, civil and international armed 
conflict, ethnic conflicts, sudden or progressive natural disasters and 
political instability. [...] 
There is an increasing recognition that any action to stem the tide must 
take into account the circumstances underlying push factors. Notable 
among these are the human rights dimensions of national instability and 
international monetary and trade trends which may lead to the stagnation 
or even deterioration of developing countries’ economies and which 
cause refugee flows. 
Approach to Solutions 
The underlying premise of the search for solutions is that refugees and 
asylum seekers who are given protection and assistance where they are 
need not go into exile. [...] Costly though they may be, the absence of 
                                               
65
 Governments did not use the language of ‘skill’ at this point. However, ‘skill’ became one of the major 
focal points in the 2000s. This was much in line with what the Trilateral Commission had emphasised 
towards the end of the 1970s and the hegemonic discourse of the 1990s and 2000s had advanced as the 
individual responsibility of the working aged person to ensure to remain employable and is now know as 
the duty to ‘life-long-learning’. “Recognising that nowadays lifelong learning is key to both jobs and growth 
and the participation of everyone in society, EU Member States and the European Commission have 
strengthened their political cooperation through the Education and Training 2010 work programme.” 
European Commission, http: //ec.europa.eu/education/who-we-are/doc324_en.htm, accessed 4 July 2009. 
The EC’s programme also encompasses an international component. Crucially, skill became one of the 
markers of the inclusion/exclusion divide where ‘highly skilled’ migrants are welcome, whereas ‘unskilled’ 
migrants are not. 
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satisfactory interim solutions often leads to outflows of asylum seekers 
unwilling to wait for appropriate durable solutions. As a consequence, 
scarce resources which should be directed to the majority of refugees 
are instead expended on the relatively small group which is able to reach 
industrialized countries. [...] In order to be comprehensive, these joint 
policies must take into account the responsibility of countries of origin in 
the search for appropriate solutions, including those which address root 
causes, facilitating voluntary repatriation and aiding the return of their 
nationals who are not refugees. 
(Fax from Linklater, EXTOTT, OSPH0748 to Campbell, Geneva, 07 
December 1990, pages 2-4, emphases in original) 
The identified problem was that the kind of development aid that governments 
were thinking about went beyond not only the mandate of UNHCR but also, 
more problematically, participants to the IGC stated they did not have the 
expertise to deal with development questions or the permission of countries like 
Sri Lanka to intervene for that matter.  
Thus, the IGC participating governments viewed the ‘root causes’ as a real 
problem, emphasising the responsibility of countries of origin66. The underlying 
assumption of these debates was that the people arriving in Europe are 
basically what the migration studies literature identifies as economic migrants – 
those who move motivated by the search for employment and to earn money. 
The logical narrative that the IGC had established throughout the 1980s was 
thus about young men queue-jumping illegitimately. They had to be either 
returned to the region of origin to support reconstruction and development or 
those who had not migrated needed to be trained in order to have better 
chances to stay put. Therefore, development policies were needed to counter 
poverty and economic opportunities and hence counter the need for onward 
movement on the basis of economic motivation. The recognition that 
development expertise was missing in the IGC is indicative of how far the 
migration narrative among policy makers lies apart from the development 
narrative. 
 
                                               
66
 See Gent, 2002 for an in-depth discussion and critical analysis of the ‘root causes’ thinking; in particular 
it criticises the narrow ‘self-centred’ focus, its patronizing humanitarianism, its ahistorical and universalist 
approach to development and democratization and finally its sedentarist bias. 
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The Migration-Development Nexus: Policy and Academic Narratives 
The above politico-economic background and the conception of international 
migrants set up as degrees of bad versus good and entrepreneurial formed the 
framework policy-makers used to think about migration in the 1980s and into 
the 1990s and early 2000s. Migration and development in combination were 
believed to provide a strategy for deterrence – the logic being that western 
European governments develop the underdeveloped world and educate/train 
those who would otherwise illegitimately move. There would be no legitimate 
reason for these people to land on European shores.  
Western European bilateralism exploded in quantity from the late 1980s. 
Immigration related regulations focussed on readmission (van Selm, 2002). The 
readmission of failed asylum seekers built directly on the assumptions 
established in the IGC of young men ‘queue-jumping’ for economic prosperity 
and drew on return-and-reintegration-through-development-policies. The figures 
below are a visualization of the explosion of bilateral agreements between 
Europe and third countries. 
 
Figure 3: Bilateral agreements as of 1990 (Casarino, 2005-ongoing) 
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Figure 4: Bilateral agreements as of 2009 (Cassarino, 2005-ongoing) 
 
It is not suggested at this point that discussions within the IGC on the issues of 
migration, development and return had stopped. Rather, it is important here to 
show how those first ideas discussed in the 1980s found their way into formal 
policy discourse. 
Following the second Schengen Agreement of 1990, discussions of migration 
and development moved to a more formal level in European policy making and, 
simultaneously, became a normalized academic discourse (Hammar and 
Brochmann, 1997; Skeldon, 1997; Joppke, 1998; Geddes, 2000; Guiraudon, 
2000; Lavenex, 2004a, van Selm, 2002; Boswell, 2003; de Haas, 2005). 
However, the debates about migration and development were scattered and 
inconsistent with the exception of bilateral agreements between Europe and 
mainly (but not exclusively) countries in Africa. Diplomatic efforts were called for 
in the documents issued by IGC participating countries “inducing countries of 
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first asylum to better control potential abuses and irregular movements of 
asylum seekers” (Ernst Andres, 5.12.1986, page 5). Diplomacy was 
conceptualised in terms of bilateral negotiations where development aid would 
be made conditional on such countries’ activities with regard to asylum seekers:  
“In further consultations [...], the participating states will identify the developing 
countries concerned. They establish special working groups dealing with the 
situation in the countries of special concern to them” (IGC, Gerzensee 1987, 
Working paper, Agenda Item 4d, page 3). Such relationships were not seen to 
be part of ‘cooperation of likeminded governments’ but clearly thought of as 
asymmetric with the countries in the region of origin in a subordinate position. 
The working groups were thus to collect information on existing projects and 
establish the possible feasibility of new projects with a view to deterrence 
through focusing on the making available of employment opportunities in third 
countries (IGC, Gerzensee 1987, Working paper, Agenda Item 4d). Bilateral 
negotiations and the incorporation of conditionality with regard to migration was 
attempted as trial by the European Commission in their dealings for example 
with Sri Lanka and Morocco in the 1990s. 
Thus, western European countries – as visualized in the above two figures – 
began to introduce issues of international migration into what is called ‘mixed 
agreements’, which are bilateral agreements that cover not only one issue area 
like economic relations, but a range of issues as well as migration. The 
European Commission simultaneously published communications in 1991 (EC, 
SEC (1991)1855 final ) and in 1994 (EC, COM (1994)23 final) dealing with 
migration and development and additionally the Council of the European Union 
included comments on immigration in their Edinburgh declaration in 1992 
(European Council, SN 456/92). These documents should also be understood 
in the context of the Schengen Convention (which came into effect in 1995) and 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (which came into force in 1999). In the wake of those 
somewhat inconsistent attempts at linking migration and development in the 
formal dealings of the European Union, the High Level Working Group (HLWG) 
was created in 1998 in order to facilitate a more forceful and coherent approach 
which was to go beyond mixed agreements. This had already been advocated 
by the IGC working groups. In 1999, with IGC’s emphasis on action, the HLWG 
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issued the so called ‘Action Plans’ on a selection of countries such as Sri 
Lanka, Albania, Morocco, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan (CoE, 7429/00JAI 32 
AG 40). The attempt failed, at least in terms of material outcomes of ‘action’ 
with regard to deterrence of immigrants.  
Intriguingly, the broad idea of migration and development continued to be 
discussed. But conceiving of more practical governance tools remained 
impossible because migration for the purpose of work was still largely deemed 
to be illegitimate. The movement of people across borders was still perceived a 
development failure at the level of European migration policy thinking. Yet, the 
nexus of migration and development was institutionally maintained as a  
theoretical idea. The EU Council meeting at Seville in 2003, was a more 
successful endeavour to inscribe some of the doctrines formed in the IGC; and 
in 2004 the AENEAS Programme (a European budget line of 250 million Euro) 
was created to support the cooperation with third countries in the area of 
migration (EC, COM (2002) 175 final). Yet, the relatively clearer ideas since 
2003 may be attributable to the academic discourse enfolding around the 
migration-development nexus – as shown below. 
 
Transformation of Articulation 
Internationally, from the 1960s, the IOM and ILO had already mentioned links 
between migration and development, the former by focussing on the return of 
professionals and the latter with regard to a growing interest in remittances. The 
Global Commission on International Migration – a non-formal governmental 
forum sponsored by the Secretary General of the United Nations – introduced 
the idea to draw on the resourcefulness of international migrants and thus 
offered a counter-discourse to the sole focus on deterrence; ideas which were 
echoed in the Thessaloniki European Council of the same year.  
The phrase ‘migration-development nexus’ can be traced back to a publication 
by Nyberg-Sorensen, van Hear and Engberg Pedersen published in 2002. In 
this publication, migrants are portrayed as the solution to the problem of 
development rather than the outcome of failed development. Supported by 
some evidence through case studies, migration is explained more carefully in 
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terms of the exercise of migrants’ agency (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002: 5-37). 
The authors exhibit how narrow most of the thinking was at that time. For 
example, donor practice about refugees and emergency/humanitarian aid is 
bound to fail in terms of reconstruction and development as it is not 
conceptualized long-term and thus introduces an ambiguity on the side of the 
host country as well as on that of refugees towards each other and thus 
hampers commitment to change, but rather paralyses refugees into perpetual 
waiting (Chimni, 2002: 62).  
Further, Nyberg-Sorensen et al. critically engage with questions about gender 
and assumptions that it is young men moving. They show that women (often as 
heads of household) move and make a living whatever the circumstances in an 
environment where all international actors are oblivious to their existence 
because the concept of women moving independently has (still) not entered the 
imaginary (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002: 299).  
They also take issue with what had become known as the ‘three R’ analysis of 
Recruitment, Remittances and Return (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991) 
holding that it reduces migration to an objectified economic act and the migrant 
to the role of labourer (Olesen, 2002: 133ff). Most importantly though, the 
publication aims to speak to the development community, in so far as many 
authors are closely acquainted with critical development thinking but without 
being interested in issues of international migration.  
The development community – as shown above – seems to have been and 
remains largely elusive from considerations around migration and development 
because it a) does not consider migration a relevant factor in livelihood 
provision; b) if it does, the view is that it largely remains exploitative and c) rests 
on other assumptions about its nature than those used to make sense of 
migration (conversations, Peschke and Black, 10 September 2009).  
In conclusion, Nyberg-Sorensen et al. argue that an emphasis on migration-
development nexus is short-term, costly and inefficient and that migrants 
instead should be regarded as a development resource (Nyberg-Sorensen et 
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al., 2002: 288)67. Thus, subsequently the migration-development nexus as 
terminology and topic was taken up by academic research68 and in international 
organizations69. This resulted in Kofi Annan advocating a High Level Dialogue 
on Migration and Development70, culminating in the establishment of the Global 
Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD). The development discourse – 
which was largely separate from the migration discourse – had thus slowly 
become relevant to migration policy-making in explicit ways which made it 
possible to (re-)link the two discourses71.  
In recent years, the migration-development nexus has thus formed a pool of 
concepts (such as remittances, education and training and linked to that brain 
drain/gain/circulation, skill and diaspora) relevant to inter-linking economic 
migration with development. The basic assumptions the nexus builds upon are 
linked to the need for economic growth (conversation, Ratha, 29 July 2009). 
First, in emphasising a logic of improvement, development aid and related 
activities evolved from aiming to make so called ‘third world’ countries like the 
industrialised ‘first world’. However, the logic of improvement is more deeply 
                                               
67
 It should be noted at this point that since the publication of Nyberg-Sorensen (2002) vast quantities of 
knowledge has been created on and around the migration-development nexus. Most of these publications, 
with the exceptions of a few more conceptual publications in 2008 and 2009, are solely empirical 
descriptions of its constituents which doubtlessly add to our detailed knowledge of phenomena such as 
remittances and return or different forms of livelihood. These however, are not taken into account in this 
chapter – they are widely discussed elsewhere – as the purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the 
overall narrative and meaning of the nexus. 
68
 Among others the UK DFID funded the Development Research Centre on Migration and Development at 
the University of Sussex www.migrationdrc.org to name but one initiative coming out of Europe, but 
including also partners in the Global South. 
69
 The UNHCR took up publishing about the migration-development nexus in its ‘New Issues in Refugee 
Research’ series http: //www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d28526.html; as did IOM in their various outlets for 
research and policy advocacy. 
70
 http: //www.un.org/esa/population/migration/hld/index.html and Report of the Secretary-General, 2 
September 2004 ‘International migration and development’, A/59/325 to the Fifty-ninth Session, Item 89 (b) 
of the provisional agenda. 
71
 Migration has been dealt with in the development literature on and off since colonial times – in particular 
with a view to questions of rural-urban migration. See for example Lewis (1954), Todaro (1969), Todaro 
and Harris (1970) or Rostow (1960). 
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seated in European thinking as Tania Murray Li (2007) shows in The Will to 
Improve. Murray Li shows how the underlying assumption of European 
superiority has been incorporated into today’s ideology of a free-market-
conservatism. The rationale of improvement is to foster what is beneficial and 
mitigate what is destructive for a less developed society. This aim is to be 
implemented by drawing on expert knowledge delivered through consultants 
from the Global North devising management strategies facilitating (the relations) 
between men and things (Murray Li, 2007: 15ff) – development and migrants. 
The World Bank has taken on this mandate when it defined itself as the 
‘knowledge bank’ aiming to bring about orderly rule in conjunction with 
competitive, entrepreneurial profit making by the indigenous populations it 
treats: the rationale here being what Rose (1999) termed government through 
community. Community, as understood by the World Bank, is newly constructed 
as being able to be “mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programs and 
techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self-management 
and identity construction [...]” (Rose, 1999: 176). The individuals making up a 
community of potential migrants are rational actors. Through education and 
configuring of habits and beliefs (Murray Li, 2007) the proper management as 
alluded to above can be instilled. The aid recipient is now reconstructed as an 
actor.  
Second, the particular notion of agency which evolved through emphasising 
participatory methods in development led to an emphasis on the migrants 
(moral) responsibility to ‘do development’ by sending remittances, acquiring 
new skills and returning on the one hand or – if the migrant is unwilling to return 
– by engaging in diaspora72 activities to alleviate poverty in the country of origin. 
The entrepreneurial actor. The western developed world can positively impact 
                                               
72
 Diaspora is today commonly associated to a particular community of international migrants who live 
outside their country of origin but hold contact to ‘home’. See for example World Bank, Migration 
Information Source or scholarly articles by Mohan (2002), Bloch (2005), de Haas (2006) to name but a 
few. 
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this process of circulation by facilitating the sending of remittances and gaining 
of new skills that can be brought back ‘home’73.  
 
By Way of Conclusion: Circular Migration means Legal Migration 
Development in the ‘migration and development nexus’ is appropriated and re-
appropriated by the migration narrative in both policy and academic fora 
because it does not possess any specific meaning of its own. The migration 
narrative is the hegemonic one which has come to incorporate elements of the 
development narratives’ arguments and elements in such a way that it offers 
most scope for the coherent construction of a discourse which can then 
normalize in informal and formal policy fora, such as the GFMD and the EU. 
Accordingly, this formulation began to open the way for policy-makers to 
understand at least some international migration as legitimate and frame it in 
(economic) terms which made sense also within – by that time – slightly 
changed notions of sovereignty - as responsibility (Deng, 1996). This evolving 
narrative of the entrepreneurial migrant who can take responsibility for his 
personal and his countries’ development by circulating – the migrant still mostly 
being assumed to be male – is thus coherent within the broader politico-
economic ideology and can be more easily justified for the purposes of policy-
making.  
The migration-development nexus is the vehicle driving the reintroduction of 
notions that conceptualise economically motivated international migration to 
Europe as a legitimate form of migration. The nexus opens a space to counter 
conceptions which, until recently, have constructed international migration as a 
one-way permanent crisis reaction and as a sign of development failure. 
International migration for work becomes acceptable and state-sanctioned if it 
leads to the improvement of less-developed countries within the context of 
mobility as circulation. The endeavour of improvement is now made possible 
                                               
73
 In most of the research and writing both with regard to rural-urban migration and international migration 
the prevailing assumption is still that people are sedentary – even though academic literature now 
recognizes that this assumption is erroneous (see for example Malkki (1992), Malkki; (1995), de Haan 
(1999)). 
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through the migrants’ entrepreneurial agency and an assumed responsibility for 
their ‘home’ (-country). Circularity of movement promises that international 
migrants do not settle permanently but that education and capital is produced 
and distributed. At the same time illegal migration, so is the hope, can be 
stopped or at least be reduced. This logic is portrayed in the Concept Note for 
the GFMD in Athens in 2009, which is worth quoting as providing a succinct 
summary of current policy thinking:  
Circular migration has been singled out recently by both national 
governments and international organizations (including transnational 
organizations like the EU) as one possible option that could maximise the 
benefits of economic migration and minimise its costs. Circular migration 
patterns are thought to avoid brain drain for source countries, encourage 
brain circulation and investment back in the country of origin of social 
capital (in the form of communication skills and social networks suitable 
for developing business opportunities), human capital (knowledge and 
professional skills) and economic capital (investments that circular 
migrants do in their source country). 
Circular migration is seen by some governments as more readily 
acceptable by their national constituencies that may be wary of the long 
term burden of integrating migrants not only in the labour market but also 
at the social and cultural level. It is also considered to respond best to 
rapidly changing economic cycles, allowing thus for migrant workers to 
leave a destination country when a work opportunity is no longer 
available with the promise that they will be readily able to return to that 
country when job prospects improve again. In other words, circular 
migration patterns are seen also as a safeguard towards legal migration, 
discouraging people from engaging into irregular migration. 
(Concept Note for GFMD Athens, 2009: 7) 
This statement supports my argument that circular migration is seen to be the 
most coherent narrative born out of the migration-development nexus (re-
)legitimising legal migration to Europe. Its acceptability as a policy discourse 
has two reasons. Firstly, previous migration related concepts such as seasonal 
or temporary work migration and the idea of the frontalier have a degree of 
commonality with circular migration, allowing a building on previous knowledge 
rather than experimentation. Secondly, circular migration fits within the idea of 
improvement: migrants come to European countries for a certain amount of time 
and all those included in the process of migration for economic purposes 
benefit: the receiving society because the migrant produces, the migrant 
because she or he earns skills and money and after the time is up the migrant 
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returns with new skills to develop his country of origin. Multiple circulation is 
also possible and coherent within the context of promoting life-long-learning as 
the EU does. In short, circular migration has the capacity to combine most of 
the concepts linked within the migration-development nexus into a coherent 
logical story that resonates with the current politico-economic ideology. It is a 
discourse constructing a very particular kind of ‘benefit’ which fits within the 
wider discourse of the Trilateral Commission and stabilizes representations of 
political subjectivity conducive to the internal coherence of Migration 
Management. 
The idea of circular migration is constructed openly enough to integrate what 
European governments are still most concerned with: return and re-integration. 
For example, the chair of the IGC in 2008 made the topic of circular migration 
the theme for the year (Klein Salomon, 2008). Thinking within the IGC was 
clearly outlined during a presentation at the OECD meeting in Prague in 
October 2008. This presentation, in conjunction with the more formal 
publications from within the GFMD 2008 clearly showcases that the policy 
discourse and the academic discourse on circular migration differ considerably. 
On the one hand, policy makers still think of ‘brain drain’, the return and the lack 
of re-integration measures. On the other hand, academics tell a story of creative 
migrants choosing to move as one (among other) livelihood strategies where in 
particular circular movement is thought of as a process in which human beings 
have engaged historically since the beginning of time. These two views meet 
and combine only with regard to the anticipated positive development outcomes 
of circular mobility through the sending of remittances, skills development and 
capital flows:  
Circular migration is thought to promote business and trade development 
as well as cultural exchange between sending and receiving regions. 
Circular migrants are expected to make productive use of their 
remittances since they continue to have a stake in their country of origin 
so they are believed to be more likely to invest in education and/or in 
business and technical equipment for instance rather than in mere 
consumption needs. 
(Concept Note for GFMD Athens, 2009: 7) 
Migrants are entrepreneurialized at this point of agreement between policy-
makers and academic constructions of the migration-development nexus which 
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has circulation as its coherent core; and it is in this way, that the migration-
development nexus has made it possible to talk about legal migration again74. 
The ideology framing the economically motivated movement of people has 
fundamentally changed. Out of this change the economic migrant is today 
conceptualized as competitive and entrepreneurial, as a rational actor. It is a 
normative codification of the migrant. Yet, what has not changed is the 
assumption held by the Global North of need for improvement imposed by ‘us’ 
as the knowledge and skill providers. However, in understanding the migrant as 
rationally acting, he (sic) can also be called upon to take responsibility to not 
only benefit individually but to take responsibility for the development of his 
‘home’ using his capacity for learning and improvement. Such assumptions then 
lead – at least in theory – to an imaginary where European Union countries are 
willing to open up more channels for legal migration to those regarded as 
worthy of such an opportunity and capable of engaging in our rules of 
competition.  
To reiterate: the migration-development nexus is a collection of concepts 
relating to the economically motivated movements and activities of people. Its 
introduction into academic and policy debates has provided a space to (begin 
to) shift the focus from illegal to legal migration, or from illegitimate to legitimate 
movements. Both academia and policy-makers have devoted considerable 
efforts to identify the linkages between migration and development and about 
how to steer migration in a way conducive to development goals while, 
however, at the same time controlling the influx of people into the European 
Union. These considerations are based on common assumptions within the 
wider ideology of free market conservatism, thus overcoming divisions between 
liberal arguments of open-borders and Marxist arguments of exploitation and 
working class division. Discursively it then follows that the migration-
development nexus based within free market conservatism is formulated 
against the background of illegal migration as the basis upon which both 
                                               
74
 It is also at this point where voices from academia and migrant groups raise to warn not to make the 
migrant the sole responsible actor for development where the same policies to be enacted variable by 
governments, international organizations or NGOs have failed. 
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academics and policy-makers construct its. Thus, in what follows I will turn to 
arguing that both this discourse of entrepreneurializing the migrant to legitimate 
mobility as well as the discourse of securitizing the migrant to render some 
movement illegitimate are combined in what we today refer to as Migration 
Management. 
 
  
 
155 
Chapter 6 
Migration Management  
Discourse is the site of contrary arguments and contested positions. It has a 
structure which is defined by its oppositions. Supporting sets of ideas are 
accommodated as well as those arguments which contradict and oppose them 
(Duffield, 1996: 175) 
 
Migration Management is based on the discourse which evolved out of the 
Trilateral Commission, in which a hegemonic worldview was formulated and in 
which Migration Management is situated as one particular narrative. The 
narrative of Migration Management is composed of the two major articulations: 
the asylum-migration nexus which constructs securitized migration and the 
migration-development nexus which constructs entrepreneurialized migration. 
These two articulations depend on each other as hegemonic doctrines having 
come out of IGC’s informal plurilateralism. The core function of Migration 
Management is to make contradictory positions intelligible, thereby framing and 
guiding the ideas and practices associated with contemporary international 
politics of migration as enacted by the European Union. Migration Management 
sets out a typology on the basis of which policy-initiatives sort people into norm, 
deviance and suspension thereby formulating ‘access categories’. In this way, 
Migration Management is paradigmatic. 
Paradigms are terminological-methodological systems75 which give a frame, an 
ordering, that guide problem-formulation and solution-finding (Kuhn, 1962). A 
paradigm sets out a certain pattern of elements that are rendered similar. It can 
thus accommodate positions in an intelligible way which could, under a different 
framing, be seen as contradictory. Usually, the status quo – the paradigm itself - 
                                               
75
 Notwithstanding the many criticisms that this definition has received since being formulated 
and the obvious conflict of Kuhn’s positivism and my own discursive approach, I accept – for the 
purpose of this thesis – the basic Kuhnian definition as my starting point, especially because the 
literature on international migration and policy-thinking remains largely more positivist in its 
outlook. 
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is not challenged. Migration Management as paradigm establishes a typology 
that classifies those included and excluded into the social order into categories 
of the norm and deviant. These become the two pillars within which the 
international politics of migration are expressable. Yet, the norm which 
expresses what legal migration is and the deviant which designates illegal 
migration are two sides of the same coin when set against the suspended, who 
are not granted the validity to exist within the paradigm.  
Migration Management is a distinctive treatment of human mobility in that it is 
largely an expression of European sovereign power which determines access, 
allocates or denies place and determines who counts as subject and who does 
not. Along with Walker, it is a radical account of “an identity in which [...] 
citizenship has priority over [...] humanity, or at least has become the necessary 
condition under which we can aspire to realize our humanity” (Walker, 
1999:434). This is new in so far as, until the 1970s, the juridical status of an 
immigrant was epiphenomenal (Castles and Miller, 2009) to the social order. 
Most migrants entering western European countries were factually illegal by 
today’s standards in that they were without documents. The focus was on either 
getting manual workers or providing refugees from the communist Other with a 
new home. The situation of those without legal documentation was remedied 
once in country and not considered noteworthy. Migrants were functional in the 
first place, not legal, and they were integrated once they had arrived.  
The approach to migration has drastically changed from something that was 
integrative to something that is, today, purely instrumental and rooted in 
considerations of capacity for economic productivity and includes security 
considerations. Thus, entrepreneurial migration and humanitarian migration are 
acceptable political subjectivities. Migration Management, more practically, is an 
ordering tool which categorizes international migrants who aim to gain access to 
the Global North as manageable risks. By way of structuring the discourse in 
terms of compliance to requirements of legal access the two dominant 
articulations of ‘asylum-migration nexus’ and ‘migration-development nexus’ 
become coherent by focusing on the migrants’ capacity for bringing knowledge 
and supporting innovation. Migration Management individualizes, legalizes and 
instrumentalizes. It imposes a seemingly coherent and inclusive system. In 
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order to achieve this it establishes itself as international in focus and operation. 
In short, Migration Management is about the construction of an essentialized 
legal subject which is formulated on the basis of an assumed capacity for 
productivity.  
In the previous chapters I have shown the discursive evolution and the 
conditions of possibility for the formulation of the two building blocks which 
comprise Migration Management: the securitization of international migration on 
the one hand and the entrepreneurialization of international migration on the 
other. I have shown how a hegemonic ‘truth’ was built by policy-makers in the 
1980s in IGC discussions and, by way of critique I have begun to shed light 
onto what is at the same time radically excluded. The IGC documents reviewed 
make it clear that sometimes more and sometimes less implicitly the person 
they had in mind when discussing international migration was some conception 
of ‘the asylum seeker’ against whom urgent action was needed. Thus any 
conceptualization of the diversity of migration concepts and categories needs to 
be understood with this in mind.  
In this chapter, I want to take a step back and take a birds-eye view of the 
narrative by summarizing the hegemonic view which was constructed in the 
1980s. I will do this by further setting out and illustrating the typology which 
crystallized out of the IGC’s ‘learning exercise’; and, then offer a perspective on 
the consequences arising out of Migration Management as a paradigm. 
Preceding chapters have posed the question: How did we get to where we are 
today? This chapter asks: How can we characterize the situation in which we 
find ourselves today and in which we think? How can Migration Management’s 
working be explained? On the basis of answering the questions I will then think 
about what questions of effect this raises for the people and for politics.  
 
Articulating a Narrative as Typology 
According to the IGC’s Working Group on Un-Documented Asylum-Seekers “it 
was agreed that a distinction need to be made between un-documented asylum 
seekers who were of good faith, on the one hand and asylum-seekers who were 
un-co-operative or of bad faith on the other” (CA/NB/cc, Report on the 
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Consultative Meeting held within the framework of informal consultations on 14 
December 1990, Annex 8: 4). It is in this sense that the IGC juggles a twofold 
ambivalence. On the one hand there is ambivalence between who is a ‘good’ 
asylum seeker, who is a ‘bad’ asylum seeker (as discussed in the previous two 
chapters) and how to approach that distinction practically. This ambivalence 
leads, on the other hand, to the second ambivalence which is introduced by the 
surplus that these knowledges create. The suspended are both abstract and 
imagined as well as effectively present as a material physicality (even if either 
physically or socially killed) as entity which is excised from Migration 
Management. 
On the basis of this ambivalence, I wanted to understand the meaning or the 
sense of what is meant by illegal and legal migrant respectively. In this chapter I 
want to understand Migration Management more clearly – a concept that left me 
wondering as to where it came from and what its logic is. The IGC is not 
responsible for coining this term. However, I argue here that this particular 
informal plurilateralism is responsible for having formulated Migration 
Management’s underlying assumptions. In short, the IGC has formulated the 
direction and content of the paradigm, focusing it on a narrow understanding of 
legal status vis-a-vis access into the European Union. 
The IGC states: “Needless to say, an asylum-seeker should be considered as 
acting in good faith, until proven otherwise” (CA/NB/cc, Report on the 
Consultative Meeting held within the framework of informal consultations on 14 
December 1990, Annex 8: 4); only to then list the practical measures to deter 
asylum seeking we are all well acquainted with today. First and foremost, police 
checks at airports to “retain travel documents so that they cannot be disposed 
of” (ibid.) and civil servants at airports to “establish identity and travelroute of 
the asylum-seeker” (ibid: 5). It goes on adding to the catalogue: body-search; 
taking-into-custody and so forth and, more recently, using biometric 
technologies. This narrative points to a rather one-sided view on the deterrence 
of international migration. Thus, the emphasis is put on ‘..., until proven 
otherwise.’ How is it then possible that a strong focus on deterrence is 
combinable with facilitation of access? 
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The IGC documents – particularly in 1990 – show that the work of the years 
before was consolidated into a more ‘coherent’ narrative of how international 
migration is to be made sense of and to be approached. The major problem 
was identified as ‘asylum-seeking’ of which some is legitimate: either by way of 
really needing protection, and thus being awarded refugee status; or at least – 
as rejected asylum-seekers - by way of having the capacity of improving 
through training and skill development (ibid: 3). After all such people had 
successfully made their way onto European territory, thus some entrepreneurial 
capacity could be assumed. Some, however, are not legitimate. Asylum-seeking 
is easier to operationalize than ‘mixed flows’76, which is what the IGC had 
identified as the driving problem or causal explanatory from the start in the early 
1980s. However, against what characteristic(s) are the criteria for norm, 
deviance and suspension established? Which scenarios can illustrate the 
establishment of norm, deviance and suspension that the IGC had in mind and 
which were during the past two decades manifested to the point of 
normalization? 
In order to answer this question I want to first briefly outline citizenship and its 
particular problematic as European citizenship. The European citizen is 
established, according to some literature, on the basis of expressions of 
nationhood: belonging and originality (Weiler, 1997: 504). Political theorists and 
International Relations thinkers in the past few decades, (for example Arendt 
(1958, 1990), Koslowski (1999) and, particularly relevant for those studying 
international migration, Soysal (1994)) have re-conceptualized the meaning of 
‘nation’ away from a thick description of blood-line belonging towards a civic 
rights and responsibilities conceptualization based on pluralism and tolerance of 
difference.  
This is relevant as it follows from the development at the level of the European 
Union where the Treaty of Rome has established the freedom of movement of 
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 The assumption underlying the notion of ‘mixed flows’ is that the abstract movement of bodies 
into the European Union is composed of those who come for economic reasons, for 
humanitarian reasons or to abuse the system. Since the legitimacy of an individual is not easily 
identifiable, ‘mixed flows’ pose a problem for managers of migration. 
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the worker and, later, the Treaty establishing the European Union widened this 
to the freedom of movement of every person legally and permanently residing 
within the European Union. European citizenship, according to Balibar, 
combines ‘supranational structure in the form of administration and 
representative structures [ with] postnational anticipations in form of the attempt 
to create political identity that is open to continuous admission of new people 
and cultures’ (Balibar, 2004: viii-x) mediated by civil society77. However, such 
reformulation of citizenship poses obstacles: it still requires the establishment of 
‘a people’ and further even if history along with rights and protections are 
employed the question remains open as to how ‘a people’ can be represented if 
this is not done any more on the basis of ethnicity or culture (Balibar, 2004: x). It 
becomes a question of legitimacy, a question which hides the drawing of 
boundaries. These boundaries I have shown to be drawn at the point where ‘a 
people’ is constructed as skill-intensive, science-based, innovative, competitive 
and efficient (see also Walker, 1999:446). 
This is why, in the context of Migration Management just drawing on Human 
Rights and the rule of law (as rights and protections) as the basis for belonging 
will not be sufficient. Everyone holds Human Rights; this is the expectation in 
law. Politically, at least at the level of the theoretical, everyone is assumed to 
have citizenship (for a critique see Arendt, 1958; Gill, 2010). Thus, juridico-
political status based on Human Rights and the rule of law does not give 
guidance as to who ‘belongs’. The duty of the citizen is to realize the efficient 
capacity to be self-managing. This shows most clearly where migrants are 
sorted into legal categories and against which characteristics.  
The IGC, chronologically, first identified the ‘illegal migrant’ as the problem. The 
illegal migrant is the deviant: someone who has crossed an international border 
into European Union territory and is working without permission. As per 
categorization an illegal immigrant has entered on the basis of false or no 
documents, is judged to be an unsuccessful asylum seeker, has overstayed his 
or her visa or is regarded as victim of trafficking, but able to re-deem him- or 
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 Civil Society is understood to be the structuring devise for expressing diversity within the 
social order. 
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herself as such a person is deemed to be capable of reform. The European 
Newspapers are full of stories about illegal migrants working in the agricultural 
sector from the South of Spain through to farms in Britain and elsewhere, for 
example. In some instances they legally have ‘leave to remain’ but not a 
working permit. These are the deviant cases; their non-compliance with policy 
of lawful access becomes a temporary problem at the point when they are 
found out, after all they were entrepreneurial and strong enough to make it into 
the European Union. The Lancaster Guardian, for example, reports of a raid on 
a mushroom farm on the 27th of May 2010 when 27 people from Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, India and Nepal were arrested78. Other newspaper reports of the 
past few years cover stories, for instance, of Thai and Eastern European 
women who were forced to work in brothels. After being discovered, such 
persons will be taken into custody; immigration officers will try to identify their 
nationality and will attempt to deport them to a country which is seen to be ‘of 
origin’.  
Yet, many illegal migrants remain undetected or cannot be expelled. They 
integrate to the degree possible, support the labour market by way of working in 
areas that nationals of EU countries would not. Their children – if there are 
children – go to school and form friendships. Illegal immigrants – if their salary 
allows – send money or goods to their families who are resident in another 
country. Many European countries have regularization programmes in one form 
or another. Some of these programmes are restricted in terms of time or to 
specific groups of people. For example, Spain has had 6 regularizations since 
1985 focussing especially on people who work in the agricultural sector. 
Germany and The Netherlands regularized ‘failed’ asylum seekers in 200679. 
What is common to this category of the deviant is that they are seen to not 
comply with European regulations but, crucially, that they do have the capacity 
for realizing their human potential by being productive in the economic sense. 
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http: //www.lancasterguardian.co.uk/lancasternews/Illegal-workers-arrested-in-raid.6323633.jp 
viewed 20 June 2010. 
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http: //www.ncadc.org.uk/archives/filed%20newszines/oldnewszines/Old%2051-
100/newszine77/strangers.html viewed 20 June 2010. 
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As opposed to the deviant, the ‘normal’ – the legal - migrant is defined as the 
‘knowledge migrant’ by the Dutch government80, an idea which the EU has 
taken on board. Knowledge migrants are those who fill the gaps in certain 
industries across Europe. Stereotypifying, for the purpose of illustration, 
knowledge migrants are the nurse from the Philippines or the IT specialist from 
India, the CEO for a global company. Other forms of legal migrants at the 
opposite end of the knowledge spectrum of the ‘norm’ are seasonal workers: 
the asparagus cutters or the hop pickers from the Ukraine. The Pakistani who 
runs the corner shop is generally a legal migrant, as well as the Ghanaian 
offering alterations to the suit or dress that is too long or too wide, or the Afghan 
who comes to study for an engineering degree. All these migrants have in 
common that they are seen to be entrepreneurial; they are seen to have the 
right kind of self-managing, efficient and competitive attitude. They are 
entrepreneurial, innovators who seek to raise capital levels for themselves, their 
host country and the community they have left.  
Thus, if the illegalization of migrants begged the question for the IGC as to who 
can move, the entrepreneurialized migrant was the answer. What is common to 
both the category of the deviant and that of the norm is that these people are 
within European Union territory and they are productive, or at least seen to have 
the capacity to be productive. This is also true for those whose presence is 
justified by a need for protection: the Convention refugee, the failed asylum 
seeker granted humanitarian leave to remain or the victim of trafficking. These 
persons are all included into our techno-bureaucratic apparatus of recognition 
on the grounds of status or failed status. The deviant – illegal – migrant can be 
re-deemed by way of regularization as to be enabled to work legally, pay taxes 
and contribute to social cohesion in our system of differentity81. The deviant 
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http: //www.hollandgateway.nl/site/prod_dutch_working_non-european_highly_skilled viewed 
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 Differentity is gleaned from the work of Joseph Weiler (1998). I am using the concept here to 
denote the conflation of difference and identity characteristic of the multicultural society as 
expressed by civil society. It is a tightly managed plurality which acts strictly within the 
boundaries of social order. 
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migrant can also be treated by way of psychological support after a traumatic 
event in order to fit in. Both are intelligible as the normative subject central to 
our ‘good order’ of autonomous individuals who help themselves and thereby 
their community. Both have a place and a function in the social order. 
But then there are those others - who are the opposite of those who (have the 
capacity to) belong. They are not illegal in the sense of deviance; they have not 
crossed the boundaries of sovereign jurisdiction of the European Union. They 
are suspended. The IGC and other policy-makers assume these people exist 
but exclude them from the paradigm which renders mobility intelligible. The 
focus is on the moment in time and space before such a person attempts to 
access the European Union. It is both the abstractness and materiality of 
suspension as alluded to earlier.  A place? A process? Both? 
Four examples may highlight who such a suspended person may be. They also 
highlight that suspension is as much about place as it is about process: 
Amadou, Ms Kwembe, Ali,82 and Anpalagan. 
Amadou originates from Sub-Saharan Africa. He had a successful business 
which employed eight people. The circumstances in his own and in 
neighbouring countries became so unstable that he had to close his business. 
The consequence of this was that he found himself incapable of feeding his 
family and sending his children to school. He decided to leave:  
It’s not bullets and bombs that make you flee. There are other reasons 
that can make you go even further. If you’re just fleeing bullets, you just 
have to leave for a while, until things have calm[ed] down, then you can 
come back. If it’s poverty that’s chasing you, it’s like you’ve got fire 
behind you, and you just keep going. 
(quoted in Collyer, 2006: 132) 
Living in the Cote d’Ivoire Ms Kwembe recounts how when the political unrest 
started in 2002 her husband and her eldest son were killed in the streets, soon 
after her house was attacked. She left with her younger son and daughter for 
Mali. After a year of waiting there was no sign of improvement and she decided 
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 I am grateful for Michael Collyer offering to allow me to draw on his research in Morocco from 
2004 to 2008, where he had the chance to interview ‘illegal migrants’. The stories of Amadou, 
Ali and Ms Kwembe come out of this research. These interviews are not representative, but 
shed some light into the lives that I am conceptualizing as suspended in my research.  
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to move on (secondary onward movement as the IGC would define it) rather 
than use up the rest of her money while waiting (Collyer, 2006 and 
forthcoming). 
Ali was a local politician in Chad. He expressed an interest in a higher political 
office. In the wake of this his home was raided – he left. Talking to Collyer he 
said: “Once I arrived here I received a message that I should not return. They 
said I would be killed before I even left the airport” (Collyer, 2006: 133). 
All of these people came to Morocco. Collyer comments:  
In general the origins of migration can be traced to some traumatic event 
compounded by pre-existing circumstances, but these typically reflect a 
more complex mix of political, economic and social disturbances and 
could only very rarely (as in the case of Ali) be clearly attributed to a 
single cause. Individuals had to possess both the means and the desire 
to leave. 
(Collyer, 2006, 133) 
It is in this sense that suspension is about process. From the point of view of 
IGC participants, and European policy-makers more widely, two characteristics 
apply to these people. First, these people are not tied into the ‘normal’ 
processes within which they would be identifiable by their function and place in 
the social order, as either productive or protectable. They have lost their stable 
function and place which work provides, Ms Kwembe’s children are not in 
school, they do not have a stable address. They are not recognizable as 
refugees by UNHCR, because they have tried to help themselves and also 
because they would not fall under the strict criteria of the 1951 Convention. 
Second, their movement within and through different territories which neither 
have policies nor apply law comparable to that of the European Union to award 
juridico-political status is incomprehensible to governments participating in the 
IGC. What all of them find is a situation where they are stuck.  
Ms Kwembe’s story is illuminating in this regard. After a year she had not found 
work and lived off borrowed money or alms. “I thought I may be able to get 
work, that my daughter would be able to re-enter school” she recounts (Collyer, 
forthcoming: 6). Instead, and even though she had registered with the UNHCR, 
Moroccan police rounded her and her children up with others, put them on a 
bus and after many hours of driving ordered them to leave the bus – in the 
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desert. Her son was so agitated that he ran off. Ms Kwembe and her daughter 
walked back with other people through the desert, looking for her son. 
Eventually the bus came back, collected them and drove them back. She will 
not leave until she has found her son. Collyer comments:  
[...] she is exhausted by the difficulties she has endured and is now 
terrified at the prospect of being separated from her daughter in a 
subsequent police raid. On the basis of this story it is probably unlikely 
that Mrs Kembe and her daughter would be granted asylum in Europe. 
She admits that she left Bamako, where she was in no immediate 
danger, in search of work and the move from Bamako was not motivated 
by a search for protection. Nevertheless, absence of violence is not the 
same as protection, and she is hardly an ‘economic migrant’.  
(Collyer, forthcoming: 6) 
Place is thus the other aspect of suspension. Suspension can only occur where 
governance regimes which are vastly different meet. In this case the 
governance regime as constructed by the IGC meets the contradiction between 
a practically non-existing system as mobility between many African countries 
was until recently not a problem to be regulated and a system imposed by the 
EU which forces compliance in a non-sensical context. In the examples above it 
is the narrow strip between the European fences and/or the Mediterranean and 
North Africa at a particular point in time (Morocco only being an example, it 
could be Turkey or the Ukraine or indeed Mexico). Here people are (violently) 
hindered to enter the European Union on the one hand; and are (equally 
violently) rejected by Morocco which finds itself pressured by the European 
Union in its particular geopolitical position to act in a certain way on the other 
hand. At the point in time and space where the lack of function and place of a 
person and the clashing of governance systems such as the above under the 
assumption of territorial fixity combine suspension is created. 
Anpalagan is another example of a suspended person: he is one of the many 
dead. The newspapers are full of stories of those who have drowned83, 
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 http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7973322.stm viewed 20 June 2010. This is just one of 
many such stories since the late 1980s. 
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suffocated84, frozen85 or were run over by the vehicle86 they clung onto while 
trying to make it to be the inside illegal migrant, with a chance of being re-
deemed. The story of Anpalagan was uncovered by an Italian newspaper87 then 
picked up by other European newspapers88. The British Observer writes:  
The family of Anpalagan Ganeshu, a 17-year-old Tamil, can now grieve. 
Last month his plastic identity card fell from a pair of jeans, encasing 
human bone, snagged in a net along with cod. 'It was like a terrible 
message from the grave,' said the fisherman who found it. In the card's 
photo, Anpalagan wears a white shirt and solemn expression beneath his 
identity number. He was travelling with his brother, Arulalagan, 18, and 
was on his way to Britain to study, said his uncle Balasundaram 
Elieathamey. 
(Observer, 10 June 2001) 
In these stories the place is Morocco, or a lorry, a vessel, a plane, it is not at the 
border or effectively in a European country. It is the threshold which Migration 
Management establishes to render the norm/deviant distinction meaningful and 
which is enacted at the outer edges of the European Union. The IGC and the 
European Union have brought suspension about through their policies of 
Migration Management. In creating categories for who can apply for work visa 
and how this can be done; in their particular reading and interpretation of the 
1951 Convention and in their specific border practices suspension has become 
a material phenomenon at least for some people.  
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The process is one that leads people towards exhaustion and poverty into a 
‘stuckness’ which is curiously active in its paralysis. What these people have in 
common is that they are too poor, too exhausted and do not have the right kind 
of formal education or skill to be worthy of legitimacy according to Migration 
Management. They are existentially alone – Weiler talks of ‘excommunication’ 
(Weiler, 1997: 504). I call them suspended. These are the people excluded by 
policy-makers and civil servants when policy is drafted and conferences are 
planned. These people are real, yet they are nothing or dead-matter. 
 
Framing the paradigm and normalizing the narrative 
The radical violence these people encounter is a consequence of the broader 
logic of Migration Management which also conforms to the discourse of the 
‘good order’ as established by the Trilateral Commission. This context has 
nothing to do with conspiracy theory: civil servants participating in policy-making 
in the 1980s or today are not evil spirited. Rather suspension happens within a 
strong, hegemonic discourse of ‘truth’ in which the person becomes invisible, 
non-existent and irredeemable. The context, which lets suspension happen, is 
outlined in the IGC documents. 
The following consensus among participating governments is formulated:  
The strategy discussions held within the consultations have had the need 
to review the mixed flow situation as a primary staring point. The need to 
develop more comprehensive global refugee policies, and the need to 
adjust global development policies so that they do not result in large-
scale migration, have initially been of secondary importance in the 
informal consultations. However, there are obvious links between these 
[...] policy areas. The instruments for influencing the flows of asylum-
seekers [...] aim at promoting better conditions in countries of origin.  
(IGC, Swiss Chairmanship, Bern/Geneva, End of July 1990, Report on 
the first meeting of the working group on long-term perspectives and 
policies, held at Nyon on 12 and 13 March 1990: 5, emphasis in original) 
The document states further:  
All initiatives underline the need for more efficient and targeted selection 
mechanisms, whereby genuine refugees should be given priority vis-a-
vis non-refugees. [...] Furthermore, most initiatives underline the 
necessity of measures against the organized abuse of the asylum 
procedure, and the link between such measures and general measures 
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aimed at combating illegal immigration and irregular practices in this 
regard. 
(IGC, Swiss Chairmanship, Bern/Geneva, End of July 1990, Report on 
the first meeting of the working group on long-term perspectives and 
policies, held at Nyon on 12 and 13 March 1990: 6 emphasis in original) 
The policies are thus about formulating access; or rather denial of access. 
These statements are clearly normative in that they indicate that those who 
comply, those who show potential are to be supported; whereas those who are 
deemed (without definition) not to be genuine have to be combated. 
Migration Management can be understood as the construction of social 
practices and relationships; it is a partially fixed relational system which makes 
sense of the way we perceive reality. As stated above, I understand Migration 
Management to be such a construction, a paradigmatic system expressing a 
particular perception of reality. The particular perception of reality that I am 
focusing on here is that of civil servants as expressed in the documents of the 
IGC in the 1980s and early 1990s. Today, another set of voices needs to be 
added, that of academics who research international migration. ‘Migration 
Studies’ is not a distinct discipline as such89. Yet, what most studies that focus 
on migration have in common are their intimate proximity to migration-policy-
making (Boswell, 2009; Portes, 2004; Favelll, 2003; Fuchs, 1992). Both civil 
servants and academics thus shape our understanding of Migration 
Management and articulate it.  
Articulation is the practice establishing a relation between those elements that 
make up an identity, constructing and partially fixing its meaning, (in this case 
the nexi as elements of the articulation of the narrative of Migration 
Management). More concretely, the particular articulations of illegal migration 
on the one hand and legal migration on the other in the particular historical and 
material context of 1980s and 1990s Europe established the conceptual basis 
                                               
89
 Only Black (2001) and Hathaway (2007) make use of the term as such, even if in relation to a 
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to mean the field of study which is largely empirical, descriptive and which enumerates either 
qualitatively or quantitatively the phenomenon of cross-border human mobility as a problem for 
policy-making. 
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of the narrative of Migration Management today. This is a political process in so 
far as, in an environment of undecidability, a discourse was constructed as to 
what is understood as rational and therefore accepted knowledge and practice. 
This accepted knowledge and practice is supported – even in the case when it 
is contested – by academics in and through their work. The majority of 
publications construct the issues that fall under the banner of Migration 
Management as technical, rather than political. In an environment where the 
emphasis is on consensus politics and critical articulations are largely 
foreclosed by the dictatorship of conformist technocracy de-politicisation is the 
effect. The choice is narrow, either one is for Migration Management or 
questions are asked as to whether one supports underdevelopment, abuse by 
smugglers and traffickers, and the undermining of the functioning of the nation-
state by disorderly migration. 
Migration Management is portrayed as inclusive of all the diverse terms on the 
shopping-list offered by both migration studies and migration policy-making. 
Migration Studies today gives a wide and fragmented picture as to what falls 
under its banner (Geiger et al., 2010). There are the ‘fields of activity’ which 
migration studies investigates and these overlap with the interest and activity of 
policy-makers. The migration-development nexus, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, is a field of activity. More specific here are issues such as ‘circular’, 
‘temporary’ and ‘skilled’ migration. Then there are fields which are researched 
and policy developed for ‘border management’, ‘border technologies’, 
‘readmission’ and ‘return’ which is often – but not always - combined with 
research on ‘human trafficking’ and/or ‘smuggling’ (Walters, in Geiger et al., 
2010: 73-95). There are two other fields which are researched by a seemingly 
somewhat different academic community which are those centring on 
‘refugee/forced migration research’ and ‘integration research’; however, the 
knowledge produced here is also close to and overlapping with policy activities. 
As I have shown in the previous chapters, these are not new issues, but they 
are discussed within the wider logic underlying Migration Management which 
gives these issues a reconceptualised quality. 
In addition to the research and knowledge production on ‘fields of activity’, much 
research is focussed on key actors – including think tanks and NGOs who are 
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involved in shaping the fields of activities (Geiger, et al., 2010). However, the 
most significant - though not very critically analysed theme is that of the 
documentation of migration. The need for data that the IGC has called for so 
many decades ago which is now echoed by contemporary migration scholars 
and policy-makers alike in order to produce policy-relevant knowledge. In 
particular, the past decade has seen a flourishing of (statistical) data gathering, 
leading to the formulation, aggregation and fragmentation of migration into 
numbers. In itself, this is an ordering device which attempts to fix clear 
boundaries, thereby seemingly establishing decidable categories (see for 
example Meyers, 2004). 
Further, under the banner of Migration Management, a wide array of ‘training 
activity’ by academics (and other experts) can be observed. The training of civil 
servants in receiving countries; sending countries; at airports with a view on 
control and regulation of migration; but also training of those civil servants and 
other stakeholders which are active in the field of development practice (see for 
example FRONTEX website). This is not written about by way of analysis, 
simply done. It would be worth reflecting on this encounter. The proposition that 
such practices lead to the coherence of the paradigm and that such practices 
ergo undermine the capacity for critical analysis and interpretation may not 
entirely be constructed out of thin air. In particular, as the power hierarchy 
between civil servants who write and implement how things are done and 
academics whose work is at least sometimes funded by government may imply 
that freedom of thought may be compromised (Hess, in Geiger et al., 2010: 96-
118). This argument is based on the assumption that the mandate under which 
an academic works and the mandate which a civil servant is employed under 
are distinctly different, though both groups are called upon to bring about ‘good’ 
for society. In particular, when it concerns the relationship between Migration 
Management and control, where the narrative today calls for pro-active 
migration policies and as such is highly normative, but often not reflected upon; 
the conflation of academia and civil service becomes troublesome. Assumptions 
on which research is based as well as policy is written make prescriptions about 
how actors ‘should’ behave; governments should take all interests into account, 
creating win-situations for all; migrants should be well-informed and law abiding; 
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they should be flexible in order to react to the markets needs, which also means 
they should be ready to circulate and contribute to the home countries 
development. 
The IOM captures these fields of activity and articulations in the figure below – 
not least in order to show the composition of a coherent, integrated system:  
 
 
Figure 5: IOM’s Managing Migration Conceptual Framework http: 
//www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/migration-management-foundations/conceptual-
model-migration-management/model-comprehensive-migration-management as seen on 27 
February 2010. 
 
 
172 
Migration Management – the Paradigm 
The distinction for policy-making purposes, as well as expressions of academic 
and public opinion between legal and illegal migration is largely accepted and 
taken for granted. It is de-politicised. Accepted wisdom today is that migration 
needs to be managed. Thus, the distinction has become sedimented knowledge 
which is presented and accepted as ‘common-sense’ or ‘truth’. The legal 
categories serve to give the impression that it can be managed in toto. There is 
law which defines and regulates, it describes what is legitimately the norm (legal 
migration) and what deviates from this norm (illegal migration) as the poles of 
the same problem, it is therefore rational to instate policy which regulates who 
can move under which circumstances and which deals with those who move 
even though the norm describes such movement as not accepted. The decision 
as to whether movement is legal or not – and this is not necessarily explicit – is 
taken in a wider context of how the world is understood to be ordered. 
Concretely, under a world view of free market conservatism, which emphasises 
instrumental individualism and values freedom understood as competitiveness 
and productivity I have shown in the preceding chapters how an assumption is 
made as to who is entrepreneurial and therefore gains access and how, as a 
first step, the opposite of this was constructed and how this construction lead – 
in very few cases – to suspension from juridico-political status. 
Migration Management is thus shown to be an empty signifier; the signifier that 
is so devoid of content that it is capable of absorbing a range of diverse 
knowledges which fix the discourse (Laclau, 1996). The category of ‘deviant 
migration’ defines and stabilizes an identity composed of condensed meaning; 
in particular the notion of young uneducated men who are potentially a security 
threat in that they are likely to be either criminal or at least willingly undermining 
of European systems of social welfare and politico-communal stability – it 
essentializes and thereby presents an exclusionary moment. The category of 
‘norm(al) migration’ defines and stabilizes an identity of condensed meaning; 
here in particular the notion of responsible self-conduct through education and 
skill development in order to be entrepreneurial and therefore productively 
participating in the general growth and development of society. Again, such 
condensation of meaning essentializes and excludes.  
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The combination of condensation and exclusion happens in order to fix; to 
reach a state of stability and closure. Within the context of Migration 
Management what had been seen as distinct areas, the domestic decision to 
use labour from third countries for economic purposes and the international, 
explicitly non-political, humanitarian refugee regime, have been fundamentally 
transformed into a combined area of Migration Management which deals with 
the access of legal and illegal mobility of persons across national boundaries 
driven exclusively by arguments of instrumental rationality. Not only does illegal 
migration function to give stability to legal migration; notions of the would-be-
migrant serve as the un-incorporable, ultimate other. Migration Management 
with its logic that movement does occur, but that nation-states – based on 
arguments of sovereignty – not only have the right to, but the duty to regulate 
such movement and that there are hence acceptable as well as unacceptable 
movers is unquestioned.  
Migration policy-making at EU level has developed in close proximity to 
academic research. From the ‘comprehensive approach’ discussed in the late 
1990s to the ‘Global Approach to Migration’ in the late 2000s the EU has 
attempted to incorporate all those diverse elements which concern the 
international mobility of people into one ‘thing’, Migration Management. 
Migration Management has thus become a basket for both the qualitative and 
the quantitative enumeration of phenomena relating to anything and everything 
relating to the movement of people within and across countries. It is no 
contradiction that Migration Management has essentialized the phenomenon of 
migration into the two broad categories of legal and illegal migration while, at 
the same time, noting its fragmentation into many technocratic categories that 
any meaning is lost into the void of the empty signifier of Migration 
Management. The combined effort of migration studies and migration policy-
making in grasping the multi-dimensionality and complexity of the many 
different forms and types of migration we are identifying today, is precisely that 
– descriptive and technical. The qualitative listing by bullet points is a mere 
enumeration of issues, actors, places and approaches. In that sense it is not 
much different from the statistical enumeration of quantities of migrants, their 
status or their economic activity. Both quantitative as well as qualitative listings 
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de-politicise international migration as something to manage, rather than seeing 
it as something which is world-making and therefore political. 
My argument then is that the formulation and representation of Migration 
Management of the 1990s and 2000s simplifies and essentializes international 
migration and thereby guides the ordering of international migrants. Migration 
Management is then, by extension, about boundaries. It is about defining it 
against something other. Boundaries are found at the point where the poor and 
tired are not able ‘to keep up’ with the self-managing efficiency of the Global 
North; at the point of beginning and end of juridico-political status; at the point of 
beginning and end of territory. The hegemonic ‘truth’ accepts that states have 
the duty to regulate movement. The integrity of national boundaries, of 
sovereignty, is so important precisely because states increasingly more often 
define the problem as one of sovereignty – migrants undermine sovereignty.  
 
Migration Management and its Consequences 
Migration Management is then the individualizing, quantifying and 
representational tool with which the geopolitical powers of the Global North 
impose consensus and manifest domination. It is the simplification, the 
essentializing of those articulations of the 1980s IGC. Yet, Migration 
Management is also a radical violence towards those who are suspended. In 
the context of a narrative of inclusivity, rights and consensus which is heralded 
by countries of the European Union, the particular phenomenon of suspension 
is problematic – it raises the question of what politics is and how political 
subjectivity is produced. 
The wider problem is posed by the current notion of democracy – the discourse 
of consensus-democracy as elaborated by the Trilateral Commission – a 
system which is technocratic; which de-politicises all activity into mere 
calculations of means – end, problem – solution, cost – benefit relations and 
leaves no room for dissensus, for negotiation and for world-making. It atrophies 
democracy. By asserting a truth of differentity as inclusion that, which is 
excluded, in order to construct coherence of meaning, is so radically excluded 
that the effects of such exclusion pervert any argument in favour of consensus-
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democracy. In other words, if everyone can be included by way of normally 
behaving or being constructed as deviant but able to be treated into normalcy 
then the abnormal become invisible and are de-humanized to the point that they 
are exposed to radical violence. It is the administrative killing of the suspended. 
They are either killed juridico-politically or physically in effect. 
The concrete problem which follows from the above is the irredeemable person 
– the ‘bad’ asylum seeker – the stranded migrant who does not comply; who still 
tries to gain access without a hope to enter, return or integrate. The problem is 
the person not counted, not subjectified – the person without juridico-political 
status: person without validity to exist. 
How does this oblige us to rethink? Those without juridico-political status exist, 
physically, materially. But, “[t]hey try to become like everybody else by refusing 
to be something and to become integrated and assimilated in the logic of border 
administration. Migration is the moment where you prefer to say I prefer not to 
be” (Papadopoulos, 2007: 6). 
Thus, the problem of consensus-democracy and the problem of suspension 
raise questions. Questions about the impoverishment of the political; the 
dictatorship of technocracy and the complicity of law within this governmentality. 
It also raises questions of the ability of people as individuals and in community 
to challenge such governmentality, the potentiality for disruption and world-
making. 
  
 
176 
Chapter 7 
Technocracy: Banality of Evil? 
In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different 
parties who compete for power is replaced by a collaboration of enlightened 
technocrats [...] and liberal multiculturalists ... 
Instead of the political subject [..] demanding its universal rights, we get, on the 
one hand, the multiplicity of particular social strata or groups [...] and, on the 
other hand, the immigrant, more and more prevented from politicizing his 
predicament of exclusion 
(Žižek, 1998: 70) 
 
Migration Management is a radical violence towards those who are suspended. 
It suspends within the context of a narrative of inclusivity, rights and consensus. 
This is a process which began in IGC discussions and sedimented into a 
hegemonic doctrine adopted by the European Union in the 1990s and has since 
been maintained as common sense by governments and civil society. After the 
IGC formulated the paradigmatic contours of Migration Management and 
started to trial some of its related practices, the European Union - as well as the 
relevant agencies of the international community - adopted these practices into 
its approach to the governance of international migration. It is on this basis that 
Bimal Gosh (2000) introduced Migration Management as the ‘missing regime’ to 
the international community; calling for a comprehensive regime of regulated 
and efficient openness vis-a-vis cross-border mobility. What has since 
developed is a set of atomistic practices bound together by the narrative of 
Migration Management claimed to be based on neutral, evidence-based, fact. 
Is there anything new about this kind of technocratic governance? Much of the 
governance literature today takes the view that the international system is 
organized on the basis of an interplay of traditional nation-state governance, 
private and non-governmental actors closely involved in mechanisms of 
governance. The suggestion is that this interplay offers unprecedented 
possibilities for democratization and accountability at local, national, regional 
and international levels of governance. This is reflected by definitions offered in 
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the thinking of, for example, Czempiel (1992), Rosenau (1995), Finklestein 
(1995) or the Commission on Global Governance (1995) and has since inspired 
much of the literature. Whitman (2002) criticizes this perspective, asking what 
leads to the assumption that the involvement of private and non-governmental 
actors makes governance necessarily either more democratic or more 
accountable. Although technocracy as such is not new as Foucault and Weber 
have shown, I argue that the scope, depth and approach is new. In what 
follows, I want to focus on the technocratic governance. 
Neither the international environmental governance regime (Lipschutz, 2004; 
Newell, 2008), nor the international health governance regime (McInnes and 
Lee, 2006), or the sophisticated international trade regime have at any point in 
their existence made use of a construct comparable to the IGC. More 
importantly, governments have not made use of instruments of global 
governance which make decisions privately (as opposed to informally) in a way 
that neither the constructivist literature nor the realist literature can explain. 
Thus what is new is the locale: the disconnectedness from formal rule bound 
systems of democratic control. The practices of Migration Management are 
designed and implemented in an inscrutable manner in that they evolved in the 
privacy of the IGC and are posited as being beyond question. They are 
practices that, both at the point of their construction within the IGC and other 
policy-fora and at the point of enforcement by - for example – FRONTEX, 
undermine practices of democratic control more broadly. The rationale is pro-
active prophylaxis, not re-active responses to ‘emergencies’, as the quote below 
makes clear: 
The raison d’être of FRONTEX is not emergency operations but the 
consistent introduction of well planned regular patrols by member states, 
in order to limit urgent missions and to integrate the management of 
borders in all its dimensions defined by the member states. Doctors say 
that the best intensive care unit cannot replace prophylaxis; I would say 
that it also applies to borders. 
(Laitinen, 2007)  
Ilkka Laitinen is the executive director of FRONTEX. FRONTEX is tasked, 
according to the relevant Council regulation (2004), with the improvement of 
integrated management of the EUs external borders and to make this 
management more efficient. This only implicitly includes international migration. 
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However, since it is at the border, particularly the water boundaries, of the 
European Union where access is distributed, FRONTEX has become one of the 
major players of Migration Management as an implementing agency. Of its 
operational budget, sea operations take up 36.1 million Euros (the overall 
budget reported in 2009 being 88.8 million Euros) (FRONTEX, no date). 
Efficient management, understood as prophylaxis, is key to how international 
migration is framed – crucially as a technical problem to which solutions can be 
found and implemented. This has nothing to do with politics, rather FRONTEX 
is ‘getting on with a job’ in a way ‘that works’ according to the experts of 
international migration. 
Kasparek explains that “although the Schengen border is still considered the 
[threshold] of European sovereignty styled as an area of freedom, justice and 
security, the actual boundaries of jurisdiction, sovereignty and the ability and 
desire to control are much more blurred [...]” (Kasparek, 2010: 127). It is in this 
blurred space that FRONTEX operates and such blurring is its condition of 
possibility in the first place. Importantly, FRONTEX has an EU sanctioned 
mandate but leaves sovereignty in the hands of the member states – its 
mandate is to function as a think-tank and a coordinating agency within the 
wider structure of the European Union. It ‘borrows’ its forces for operations from 
member states. Thus, superficially, its task and structure are transparent. 
FRONTEX is a helpful example of how the IGC’s doctrines have been 
translated into prophylactic action without democratic mediation: the point 
where the contraction of policy and policing into polic(y)ing become visible. 
Based on the archival material reviewed in the previous chapters and 
observations of the evolution of Migration Management since the 1980s – I 
argue that technocracy has replaced politics proper. It is the particular kind of 
craft of government which evolved out of modern politics and reaches, in 
Migration Management, a new quality. Technocracy establishes a particular 
knowledge on the basis of enumerations and calculation – it establishes an 
empirical universality; on the basis of such ‘evidence-based fact’ polic(y)ing is 
the formalistic tool of post-politics which is institutionalised by the juridification of 
conduct. In short, technocracy along with the juridification of the social, are the 
characteristics of consensus-democracy (Rancière, 1999).  
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Technocracy atrophies democracy (understood as agonal politics) by reducing it 
to mere questions of calculation and the distribution of functions in an attempt at 
totalizing closure against dissent and alterity. In other words, its instrumental 
rationality and consensual focus reduces dissensual politics into routinized 
competition of the included; suspending the supernumerary, those who do not 
have a place and are not ac/counted for (Rancière, 1999).  
Further, the establishment of seemingly irrefutable empirical facts expressed 
through statistics, for example, are accepted as sole legitimizer for decision-
making; empirical fact thereby banalise politics and the administrative killing of 
the suspended. Banality here refers to the disintegrated moment of a loss of 
significance of the act on the one hand at the same time as this represents an 
outrageous wrong towards the acted-upon on the other hand (Arendt, 2011). In 
other words, the organized, impersonal division of labour – the efficient 
management of migration at the border and in other places - leads to the 
perception of disconnected, atomistic events of legitimate border control on the 
part of those who make the policy and who enforce it. Such individual events 
alienate the policy-maker and those who enforce such policies from the event. 
Action on the part of the policy-maker is perceived as logical and coherent as it 
is couched in a narrative of inevitability and thus, an awareness of doing wrong 
is dissolved and its significance lost, it just becomes common-sense and is 
therefore rendered banal.  
This stands in stark contrast to the perception of those who are suspended; who 
see their existential validity denied. Such denial is experienced in two possible 
forms as illustrated in the previous chapter: it either leads to the juridico-political 
death of a person or the person actually physically dies (Arendt and Jaspers, 
1993). In both cases it is administrative killing and, although not called that way 
because it is too low scale quantitatively, it is both a crime committed against 
the humanity of a person, in that the person is suspended and it is a crime 
against the human race in that a person is physically killed90 (Arendt and 
                                               
90
 Arendt and Jaspers (1993) obviously had these thoughts in the context of the Nazi regime as 
a bureaucratic killing machine. The thinking that Arendt developed during and after the 
Eichmann trial (and which rendered her such a contentious thinker) was at the cross-roads 
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Jaspers, 1993). Technocracy as banal polic(y)ing, however, needs to be 
discussed in more detail. 
It is to this discussion that I will now turn, guided by the following argument for 
this chapter: Migration Management is a functional-instrumental paradigm within 
the broader horizon of consensus-democracy. It is characterized by a 
technocratic treatment of human mobility which in consequence is radically 
violent towards those who are suspended. In the first section I will elaborate the 
meaning and functioning of technocracy. The following section will then look 
more closely at hyper-legalism as a tool alongside and within technocracy. 
Finally, I will discuss the consequence of these governmental practices, called 
Migration Management, for those acted upon and thereby show that Migration 
Management is an instance of banality of evil. The conclusion will note a certain 
ambiguity of my analysis and already indicate the possibility of generative 
potential of suspension, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
Consensus-Democracy 
Inspired by Foucault’s elaboration of the historical meaning of policing as the 
set of practices that utilize and maintain the population of a state, Rancière 
(1999) develops a particular understanding of the administration or 
management of society. La police is the acting and legitimizing force of 
technocracy. Police here encompasses the procedures of aggregation and 
consent of collectivities; the organization of power through state and non-state 
institutions and the distribution of places, roles and functions (Ranciere, 1999: 
28). The distinction of international migrants into those who are treatable and 
those who are entrepreneurial on the one hand and those who the European 
Union needs to take prophylactic measures against is an example for how roles 
and functions are aggregated and grounded within the social. 
                                                                                                                                         
between a particularism largely sympathetic to the special situation of the jewish people; yet 
much of her thought was driven by considerations of a more universal nature (Arendt, 2011). I 
draw on the more universalist considerations of ‘loss of world’, thinking and evil for the purposes 
of clarifying the effects of Migration Management without intending to appear disrespectful. I do, 
however, argue that the principle of banality of evil applies. 
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Even taking into consideration that NGOs, academics and other experts who 
are involved in the international politics of migration call for more transparency, 
accountability and the adherence to international legal standards, the basic 
notion of how categories are formulated is largely consented to or, at least, not 
questioned. Technocracy is the system of legitimization for such distribution of 
categories, roles and functions. In short, the police organizes the ‘normal’ as 
part of an on-going process of structuring. It is the normalization, sedimentation 
and maintenance of what has become hegemonic and is portrayed to be 
coherent, closed and fixed – in other words, stable and therefore predictable - 
which is the ultimate aim of managing migration in an orderly fashion as 
conceived of by the IGC (restricting some mobility, facilitating other mobility and 
fighting abuse). 
Rancière describes that which is coherent within the boundaries of the social 
order - what police does - as le partage du sensible: “the implicit law[s] 
governing the sensible order that parcels out places and forms of participation 
in a common world” (Rancière, 2004: 85). I have suggested that the discussions 
which have taken place in the Trilateral Commission which formulated the 
horizon within which the IGC started to think about international migration 
comprise such a partage du sensible. Crucially, Rancière goes on to explain 
that the “distribution of the sensible thus produces a system of self-evident facts 
of perception based on the limits and modalities of what is visible and audible 
as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done” (Rancière, 2004: 85). It 
then follows that what is created is something seemingly without outside, there 
are only partitions within. The distribution of the sensible asserts a truth of 
inclusion and tolerance towards diversity in order to construct coherence of 
meaning. That which is not identifiable does not exist. Or rather, in so far as it 
exists, it needs to be prophylactically addressed by, for example, FRONTEX.  
Policy in this context is the tool which codifies and enforces such partition. 
Polic(y)ing thus divides through sorting access or the denial thereof, in this case 
access into the European Union. Such divisions structure in order to offer a 
coherent totalizing account of a situation. In the context of Migration 
Management migration is considered as ‘natural’ and ‘beneficial’ but that there 
are those who are irredeemable who are not considered to be capable of 
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working towards their own entrepreneurialization: the suspended. The 
suspended ergo have no validity to exist within the paradigm of Migration 
Management.  
If policy was once thought to have a guiding capacity which formulates broad 
principles with regard to questions of right and wrong which in turn are then 
open to both dissensus and interpretation, within consensus-democracy 
principles are minimised into calculable, empirical values which become 
codified which, in turn, renders the legal subject one with the empirical subject 
(Rancière, 1992). “For me” writes Levinas,  
the negative element, the element of violence in the State, in the 
hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when 
everyone submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are 
terrible because they proceed from the necessity of a reasonable Order. 
There are, if you like, the tears that the civil servant cannot see: the tears 
of the Other. 
(Levinas, 1996: 23)  
Technocracy establishes this reasonable order which defines the social; it 
founds the common and banal on the basis of evaluating what it measures and 
calculates. “The mainstream acts as though certain persons know both the 
public good and the good of others, while those others are incapable of 
achieving this good without the intervention of those properly situated to run the 
affairs of [the common]” (May, 2007: 24). The common therefore needs experts 
to speak for it, to measure for it and to calculate for it to construct ‘accurate 
information’ so that consensual decision-making is facilitated. Hegemony, within 
the understanding of democracy as consensus-democracy, is the 
understanding that coercion is less effective than obtaining consensus for 
hierarchy and inequality. The individual or group enters into a relationship and 
by doing so, reality becomes something seemingly rationally opted for – it is 
arrived at by consensus. It is neither a passive submission to an external 
constraint, nor is it free adherence to explicitly stated principles. It is just the 
‘normal’ of ‘what works’ and therefore also beyond questioning. Hegemony – 
that is consensus-democracy - is invisible domination, it is polic(y)ing through 
technocracy (Swyngedouw,2008).  
Consensus-democracy is, first and foremost, an expression of order as 
common and non-litigious (Corcoran, 2010: 2-5).  It is formal democracy (free 
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market conservatism), administered through highly formalistic procedures – 
juridification (Deranty, 2003). Juridification is the intense and detailed 
prescriptive codification of the social, which de-legitimizes all possible 
contestation as it does not leave any room for quarrelling. In the case of 
Migration Management the informal plurilateralism of the IGC was the condition 
of possibility to bring about this particular way of polic(y)ing and juridification. It 
is consensual, as it emphasises ‘collective agreement’, leaving space for 
individual preference and variation, within the prescribed comfort of the like-
minded.  
This explains why difference is acceptable, but only in so far as it keeps within 
the boundaries of the acceptable and therefore within the bounds of the 
thinkable and sayable; something that has come to be termed ‘differentity’ as 
defined earlier (Weiler, 1998). Žižek describes Rancière’s conceptualisation of 
consensus-democracy as  
the attempt to [...] translate [politics] into police logic: one accepts the 
political conflict, but reformulates it into a competition, within the 
representational space, between acknowledged positions, for the 
(temporary) occupation of the place of executive power. 
(Žižek, 2006: 71)  
Žižek then goes on to explain that such police logic is portrayed precisely in the 
“Habermansian and Rawlsian ethics [...]: the attempt to de-antagonise politics 
by way of formulating the clear rules to be obeyed so that the agonic procedure 
of litigation does not explode into politics proper” (Žižek, 2006: 71). 
It is precisely this that happened within the IGC’s informal plurilateralism. 
International migration was de-antagonised – or at least questions of access of 
international migrants of a certain kind were de-antagonized. This was 
portrayed as necessary because the scrutiny through higher legal principles and 
the democratic, dissensual negotiations between peoples and countries were 
re-conceptualized from positive connotations of being a safeguard for 
democracy to negative connotations of being inflexible and inefficient. Instead of 
addressing racism and right-wing propaganda within European countries, the 
problem was re-constructed as one of access and contractual relationships with 
third countries for which clear rules could be established and implemented.  
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In short, racism became a hidden practice guiding policy-making on access and 
its policing. In this regard, consensus-democracy works by way of defining 
decomposable common empirical categories; their governance becomes a 
technical problem for professional politicians and their experts. Political choice 
is portrayed as objective and univocal (Corcoran, 2010: 2-5). 
 
Polic(y)ing 
“Technocratic discourse”, writes McKenna,  
makes use of abstractions such as [...] “efficiency”, “the national interest”, 
and so on, in much the same way that the great religions have named 
their gods as the ultimate arbiter of individual fate, past and future 
fortunes, and, indeed, the well-being of entire nations. 
(McKenna, 2000: 226)   
Through the IGC, and more generally through policy-makers in the Global 
North, such technocratic governing is undertaken by “(economic) planners, 
strategic thinkers and natural and social scientific experts” (McKenna, 2000: 
226). Expert discourses of calculation created by these elites are transformed 
into policy and disseminated through bi-lateral agreements, targeted training 
and information, establishing fact. These discourses are legitimate because 
such experts normalize international migration into a perceived urgent problem 
in need of technical solution. Technocrats claim objectivity of method - mostly 
by way of enumerating and formalizing. They thereby render their particular 
approach to international migration un-contentious, abstract and necessary; 
debate is closed off in that the discourse is formulated as a factual statement to 
be accepted. Any questioning, critic or opposition is treated as false knowledge 
or subversive propaganda – an ‘incorrect common-sense’ denigrated as un-
informed opinion or misled ideology (McKenna, 2000). 
Is this an accurate description of what technocracy in informal plurilateralism is? 
The classical idea of technocracy, Wilson argues, lies in Francis Bacon’s claim 
that knowledge is power (Wilson, 2006). This, and claims for the scientification 
of politics date back to Saint-Simon; scientists are judged to be superior to all 
others because of their powers of prediction, based on positivist assumptions 
that there are natural rules to society which can be discovered and established 
as truth through empirical research (Wilson, 2006: 505). The belief in 
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‘knowledge elites’ (Wilson, 2006: 505) provides legitimation for authority and 
leads to the formulation of bureaucracy as technical expertise. Weber built on 
this knowledge in arguing that the key to bureaucracy is rule-bound, efficient 
behaviour by administrators based on knowledge which is guided by political 
neutrality and instrumental rationality (Weber, 1976). 
Meanwhile, post-positivist approaches have successfully challenged this notion 
of technocracy by arguing that there no natural rules, nor is there a justifiable 
power basis for ‘knowledge elites’. Furthermore, post-positivism has shown that 
there is more than one knowledge. Indeed, there is a plurality of knowledges, 
some of which are accepted and, hence, hegemonic, some of which are 
rejected. In chapter two I have recounted how it was perceived to be perfectly 
legitimate for the Trilateral Commission to include only those ‘private citizens’ 
who were like-minded – the IGC works on the same principle, thus rejecting 
certain knowledges about international migration which do not fit. 
In addition technocracy is allied to a distinct understanding of learning. Wilson 
writes that “technocracy becomes not just the power associated with 
possession of superior knowledge, but the power of being able to engage in a 
process of learning [...]” (Wilson, 2006: 508). The IGC (and in its wake the 
European Union with the involvement of its knowledge experts) is a prime 
example of a learning community with its declared goal of data gathering and 
information sharing. The underlying rationale here is that governance can only 
be effective when all relevant populations are known. Such knowing is 
attempted by way of collating “enhanced information and statistical methods for 
identifying, mapping, measuring and reporting” (Craig and Porter, 2003: 54). But 
not only are those inside measured. Paradoxically, would-be-migrants, the 
suspended, are measured as well in an attempt to know them. The paradox 
here lies in the contradiction that experts attempt to know something that is 
otherwise constructed as an imaginary. The suspended are rendered knowable 
in an unsystematic way so as to not turn the suspended into identifiable juridico-
political persons. The following (extended) example may illustrate this rather 
abstract argument. 
HERA is the name of the first of those well planned regular patrols Laitinen of 
FRONTEX speaks of, sponsored by the Spanish government and supported by 
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other European members. Prior to 2005 many migrants arrived in Spain through 
the straits of Gibraltar. However, after the Spanish had increased their efforts to 
curb migration via this route, migrants increasingly travelled to the Canary 
Islands in small wooden boats. In reaching the Canaries, they reached Spanish 
territory. This has been widely reported throughout the European press and 
described in the academic literature (Carling, 2007; de Haas, 2008).  They 
crossed roughly 2000 km from the coasts of sub-Saharan Africa to arrive on 
Spanish territory still being about a 1000 km south of the European mainland. It 
hardly needs mentioning that this journey is dangerous.  
The initial HERA operation was presented as a ‘knowledge-gathering exercise’ 
(Kasparek, 2010: 129) in which experts questioned migrants about their 
countries of origin and routes of travel. It is precisely this approach to 
measuring, mapping, learning and reporting that is relevant here. As a result of 
this knowledge-gaining exercise more than 6000 migrants were deported. 
Successive HERA operations took place. A BBC report in December 2006 shed 
light on the actual operation undertaken by successive HERA activity. 
Effectively patrols took place not in the territory of the Canary Islands, i.e. in 
European territory as had been assumed so far, but in the territorial waters of 
Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde. FRONTEX intercepted boats attempting 
to leave and this was sanctioned by bilateral treaties Spain had negotiated with 
these countries. This is highly problematic, because it not only undermines a 
person’s right to leave a country which is provided for under international law, it 
also does not offer the possibility to claim asylum. In other words there is no 
opportunity to voice the need for the protection of the international community. 
The learning that FRONTEX did and the efficient management of what resulted 
from this learning assumed at the outset that those people leaving for Europe 
do not have legitimate claims. Such operations – based on having rendered 
some prior migrants knowable – assume ‘bogusness’, abuse of Europe’s 
systems and an incapacity to be entrepreneurial. 
These bilateral agreements sanction an infringement of territorial sovereignty on 
the part of, for example, Senegal in order to prophylactically protect the integrity 
of the European Union’s borders and territory.  Further, such bi-lateral 
agreement sanction refoulement, as it can be argued on the part of the 
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European Union that Senegal is capable and willing to offer protection to 
refugees otherwise they would not have signed such agreement. Thus, by 
prophylactically intercepting people who attempt to leave African territorial 
waters, they could not file a claim for asylum. If they had arrived on European 
territory, their claim would need to be heard and rejected before they could be 
deported. It is on the basis of assumptions which are portrayed as justifiable 
because some measuring, mapping and learning had taken place that 
interception at sea and neo-refoulement is legitimized.  
This ‘successful’ trial was then taken as the blue-print for Operation Nautilus to 
target the route between Libya, Malta and Italy. Yet, Nautilus was designated a 
failure in 2008 by Laitinen, not least because Libya’s Gaddafi was less easily 
persuaded to relinquish sovereignty of his territorial waters and shoulder the 
burden of caring for those ‘illegal’ migrants that never reached the shores of 
Europe in the first place (migreurop, 2010). It took an agreement between Italy 
and Libya according to which Italy pays 5 billion dollars over the next 25 years 
to ‘secure’ cooperation and formalize what de facto amounts to interception at 
sea and deportation without hearing potential claims for asylum (Kasparek, 
2010). Such moves are cynically claimed to be in the best interest of ‘illegal’ 
migrants: deterrence as an act of protection of those would-be-migrants for their 
own safety, as so many people die in the attempt to cross into Europe. This is 
particularly cynical in the context of recent press reports in which a NATO 
aircraft carrier was involved and did not react in time to rescue a boat with 
people who had left Libya. Rather, a NATO spokesperson reacted defensively 
to the accusation that people had died while waiting for recue describing the 
Mediterranean as the wild-west, beyond the governance of formal states 
(Guardian, 08 May 2011).  FRONTEX is also said to be active in the Aegean 
Sea (migreurop, 2010) and at other points of entry into the European Union.  
The above example does not only pose a series of questions with regard to an 
imposition of power onto other territories and an active infringement of rights 
and protections. More importantly at this point of the discussion is that the 
example shows the paradox of claiming to want to know about and active not 
knowing of suspension. Illegal migrants are interviewed about routes they took, 
their living and travelling experience, their social anamnesis. Yet, those who get 
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stuck and do not succeed in being deviant – the suspended - are ignored as if 
they don’t exist despite the existence of empirical fact and the possibility to 
know. Appadurai supports this somewhat contradictory analysis of the 
characteristics and practices of technocracy in stating “enumeration [is] a 
central technique of social control. [...] It enable[s] the authorities to feel that 
they know [...] which render[s] the population more controllable” (Appadurai, 
1996: 117).  
Enumeration, however, does not only encompass statistical data. Enumeration 
also includes qualitative knowledge, so far considered tacit knowledge, obtained 
informally, ethnographically (Kothari, 2005). FRONTEX did not only measure for 
statistical reasons, it also mapped and measured the qualitative information 
they received, for example about the routes people had taken, or the 
motivations for why they accept a little wooden boat as way into the European 
Union while endangering their life. Thus learning takes place alongside the 
formulation of categories, justifications and practices, as is shown in the above 
example of ‘research’ undertaken by FRONTEX. Today’s technocrats ‘go to 
considerable lengths to find out empirically about local contexts’ (Wilson, 2006: 
509).  
There is a caveat though, even if post-positivism has successfully challenged 
positivist approaches; it has not changed, but rather expanded technocracy in 
that today superior quantifiable knowledge has learned to assimilate other, 
qualitative, knowledges in so far as these rarely fundamentally challenge the 
grounding assumptions held by those producing the particular kind of ‘evidence-
based fact’. Civil servants draw, where convenient, on the information provided 
by academics of other organizations which produce ‘empirical fact’, but the 
policy-making process is opaque and non-participatory (see chapter three). 
However, the underlying principle of collection of vast ranges of knowledge in 
order to learn, in order to come up with solution oriented policy does apply. 
Thus, in Migration Management we do look at expanded technocracy, a 
technocracy which applies learning in a ‘classified’ and strategic way with the 
clear aim of social policing. The particular rationality that is put forth here is of a 
deeply functional-instrumental character.  
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The rationality declares that what is important to understand for the mass of the 
population is that the decisions implemented are “decisions that any intelligent 
person in a position of power and authority would be required to make when 
confronted with accurate information [...]” (Winner, 1977: 258, emphasis added). 
The assumption is then that there is such a thing as uncontested, rational and 
therefore ‘accurate’ information. Related to this is the notion that ‘accurate 
information’ needs to be based on calculation as the main tool and driving force 
of technocracy. What is the rationale and how does technocracy work so that it 
is afforded such all-encompassing position of certainty?  
Technocracy predicated on calculation: its instrument is calculation and its 
expression is through calculation. The problem is that “calculation as such has 
neither a concrete product nor does it provide care” (Parry, 2008). Calculation 
as techne creates a product. A person. A pattern. A policy. An instrument 
implementable on a person. It essentializes. Douzinas writes:  
When normative universality becomes a calculable globalization, it turns 
from a lofty, albeit impossible, ideal into the lowest common denominator 
of state interests. [...] It is an empirical universality, based on the 
competitive solidarity of sovereign governments and on the pragmatic 
concerns and calculations of international politics. 
(Douzinas, 2002: 451) 
Understood this way, technocracy produces common “worlds to be organized, 
controlled, manipulated, studied, and known” (Barnes, 2001: 379). The trivial 
and routinized conduct that characterizes technocracy does not require 
independent thought and moral questioning. 
The problem is that technocracy constructs and trivializes its reality. Entities 
which are to be acted upon are not reflected upon any more. Technocracy does 
so by using numbers, numbers that are not merely representations. The context 
within which numbers are used makes a difference. They are complicit in 
legitimizing power, authority and control. Numbers are put to use and filled with 
meaning according to the hegemonic order of the time. In this instance 
consensus-democracy and more narrowly Migration Management as a narrative 
within it. As such numbers are neither good nor bad, but the use they are put to 
under technocracy qualifies (Hannah, 2001: 516). Calculation is a conscious 
practice in which choices are made as to what and who counts, what and who 
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accounts for norm and deviance; and what and who is not countable – invalid 
and therefore suspended – by extension.  
Thus, the rationale to afford technocracy such an all encompassing position 
today is the belief that calculation and measurement gives stability and certitude 
on which basis an empirical practice can be established and acted on. Stability 
and certitude is what the IGC strives for in a time where they identify that 
migration is out of control. Such an atomistic approach leads to the 
phenomenon of ‘one-more-on-the-list-of-causes’ (Epstein, 2008: 11) as can be 
witnessed in Migration Management. What such calculation hides is the 
incompleteness and the messiness of context. Furthermore, what enumeration 
hides is the abstraction and distance it claims by introducing a particular kind of 
formalism – sombre things are constructed that are dealt with in a sanitized 
‘problem solving’ way. A utopia is established, not of an ideological kind, but of 
an empirical kind and it claims to correspond to an absolute reality. A guarantee 
for ultimate, totalizing stability. Technocracy, la police in Rancière’s words, de-
politicises all activities into means-ends and cost-benefit calculations. It is in this 
sense that Migration Management is the banality of evil.  
Technocracy recedes into the common sensical and becomes something that 
we agree to every day without reflection. Arendt shows this when discussion 
Eichmann (Arendt, 1965). Banality sets the criteria for judgement of what is 
acceptable in such a way that is not questioned because what it proscribes has 
lost significance, it is seen to be rational and consensual. Activities taken within 
this (perverse) new normality would amount to a non-sensical threat to the 
common order. The wrong done becomes imperceptible, as behaving according 
to abstract ethical criteria would feel abnormal. 
 
Juridification 
In order to expand on the working of technocracy – especially in the context of 
international migration and beyond the physical realm of the European Union – I 
will now briefly highlight one of its instruments: juridification. The lawful state, 
according to Rancière, is a combination of a realist, pragmatic wisdom of ‘what 
works’ and the absolute rigour of the legal norm (Rancière, 1992). The fact of 
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the state becomes identical to the norm of rule (Deranty, 2003), therefore (in 
this case) Migration Management is necessary; therefore it is legitimate. Any 
policy maker of any of the countries participating in the IGC, the EU or other 
regional organizations who have now – in one way or another – signed up to 
Migration Management can claim that what is done in the context of the 
regulation of international migration is legal. “Legalism” as defined by Shklar 
(1986) is an  
ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, 
and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by 
rules’. Placing emphasis on form rather than substance without regard 
for history and for social and political context can be found in legal 
positivism as well as in natural law. 
(Shklar, 1986; Beck et al., 1996)  
Juridification goes beyond this; it transforms the status and function of law more 
fundamentally. Deranty explains that it “finalises the eviction of any [rupture] 
and reduces [law] to the expression of factual life” (Deranty, 2003: paragraph 
33). It thus works towards the above described empirical utopia that 
technocracy strives for within consensus-democracy, eradicating any 
dissensus. This is problematic as law is not a universal principle. It can and 
must be quarrelled over; it is an expression of a very particular lifeworld – in this 
case that of Migration Management enacted through FRONTEX for example. 
Rancière concludes:  
In the one corner, the world of good: that of consensus eliminating 
political litigation in the joyous harmonizing of right and fact, ways of 
being and values. In the other: the world of evil, in which wrong is made 
infinite. 
(Rancière, 2002: 46) 
In the case of the international, ‘legalism’ is problematic as law cannot be 
established ‘as law’. Conventions and treatises are such that even if binding to 
those who ratify them. They are not easily enforceable through the same 
mechanisms as have been established within nation states. However, many 
international lawyers, legal academics and some international organizations 
attempt just that, to give international law a standing ‘as law’ emphasising its 
technical and non-normative elements of regulation (Koskenniemi, 2002:516). 
Yet, in effect form is placed over substance in order to find a common 
denominator for the rule to be followed. Moreover, legalism needs to be 
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understood in the context of the Foucaultian observation that everything is 
perceived to be dangerous and thus needs urgent and pro-active addressing 
(Foucault, 1997: 256). Juridification answers the need to formalize and be pro-
active at the expense of litigation over substance. What results from this re-
formulation is characterized as ‘hyper-legalism’ by Inder (2010) which she 
defines as  
a formalistic approach towards international law and international legality 
that allows states and other actors to benefit from the rhetoric of 
compliance with international law, without any constraint on their actions 
in practice, in order to both legitimize and depoliticise state policies. 
(Inder, 2010: 221)  
‘Law’ then becomes empirical ‘right’ of technocratic governance (Deranty, 
2003). It becomes ‘right’ because what legitimates law-making is the necessity 
to cater for prescriptive codification of the empirical utopia at the expense of all 
that does not conform to the paradigmatic framing of Migration Management. 
Such trend can be observed by actions undertaken by the EU: following the 
designation of certain countries as ‘transit countries’ the EU now ‘cooperates’ 
with Libya, Mauritania, Turkey and the Ukraine among others around the 
Mediterranean and within sub-Saharan Africa as well as Eastern Europe in 
order to implement policies on the basis of such juridified approach to law and 
space. The case of Mauritania-EU relations is illustrative. 
The principle of non-refoulement is regarded as customary international law 
(UNHCR Advisory Opinion, 2007). Expressed largely (but not exclusively) 
through negative obligation, the spirit of both Refugee and Human Rights law is 
protection against the arbitrariness of government interaction. Though there is 
no ‘right’ to claim asylum – a person needs to go through a ‘refugee status 
determination procedure’ in domestic law (Goodwin-Gill, 1998) – international 
instruments require governments to live up to their obligations to protect where 
this is claimed to be necessary. It is at the point of claim making where 
Migration Management changes how migrants are treated, i.e. EU activities fall 
short of actual refoulement, but have the effect of preventing persons from 
launching asylum claims and seeking protection. The example of Mauritania is a 
case in point, where the European Union can legally claim – through its financial 
and technical engagement – to live up to its obligations under international law. 
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Mauritania is to provide protection to those who may possibly actually be in 
need of it, while it also is to police and enact Europe’s categories of access and 
prevent those from attempting to find their way in to Europe that IGC countries 
do not want to have. Thus the form is honoured, crucially without regard to 
substance as the policies that are now enacted and enforced do not constrain 
government action in such a way that a claim for protection could even be 
made. Further, European influence in Mauritania places conditions on the 
country with regard to what it should make policy on with regard to migrants. 
Since 2003 Mauritania is a ‘partner’ in the fight against illegal migration. It is 
partner to various regional consultative mechanisms and sees international 
organizations such as the IOM active in its country. The ’Country strategy paper 
and national indicative programme for the 2008-2013 period’ marks Mauritania’s 
capability to manage migration flows as an important indicator of its governance 
profile. Eight million Euros are allocated for  
qualitative improvement of work undertaken at border posts, support for 
the services entrusted with surveillance of the territory, the training of 
services responsible for managing migrations, raising awareness about 
the dangers of irregular migration, the review of the legal framework and 
penal procedure, reflection concerning the regularization of migrants and 
the development of a regional partnership for the positive management 
of flows. 
(EC, no date) 
The context, however, to this country strategy is that Mauritania has traditionally 
received migrants and had allowed the movement, i.e. circulation and 
settlement of migrants, generously on its territory. Migration was, until European 
influence, not a priority or indeed a problem on the agenda of either successive 
Mauritanian governments or its population (Bensaad, 2009). 
This has changed: migreurop records in its 2009/2010 report that “the people 
arrested by Mauritanian security forces have been sent back by Spain or by 
Morocco, intercepted at sea, or even suspected of seeking to leave Mauritanian 
territory to head towards Europe” (migreurop, 2010: 21 my emphasis). A 
testimony collected in February 2010 recalls; “They [Mauritanian police officers] 
caught me twice in my room to send me to Mali. Whereas in fact, I was not an 
illegal, I worked. I worked as a cook” (migreurop, 2010: 23). Quite beyond the 
disturbing observation of falsely arrested people based on assumptions 
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communicated by the European Union that this situation creates; there is a 
disturbing irony here in that western European countries have until 1989 based 
their strongest argument against the Soviet Union on its prohibition – which is in 
contradiction to international law – for people to leave their country.  
Today, the Mauritanian government records those interceptions. migreurop 
reports how their researchers were able to look at documents given to Malian 
authorities on handing over such intercepted persons. 
Nouadhibou on 29/09/09 [list of 19people]: intercepted following an 
attempt to undertake an illegal journey to Europe. Along with such 
document the Malian border guard receives a payment to be handed to 
the returnees – in February 2010 a testimony recalls around 22 Euros for 
37 people. 
(migreurop, 2010: 22-27) 
The above example shows how not only are people potentially barred from 
making a claim to needing protection; worse the ‘hunt for illegals’ places 
potentially anybody in the situation of abuse by authority on the sole cause of a 
suspicion they could be a migrant aiming to reach European shores. This is the 
prophylaxis that FRONTEX is so systematically enacting. 
Substantially international instruments set out standards for the protection and 
the adherence to rights accorded to a human being qua human being – the 
intention, broadly speaking, is that of outlawing a fundamental wrong done to a 
person; in short, the provisions as set out in human rights instruments. Yet, it is 
difficult to make such normative claims when it is just the form that is honoured. 
Thus, before being deported to Mali or Senegal, suspected illegals are detained 
in circumstances which hardly accord to international standards of rights and 
protection. Amnesty International (2008: 23) reports how the Spanish 
government helped to set up what is referred to by the Spanish authorities as a 
‘holding or detention centre’; a ’reception centre for illegal immigrants’ by 
Mauritanian authorities and ‘the centre of the Red Cross’ by migrants. A 
testimony is quoted by migreurop recalling treatment before refoulement:  
When I was arrested by the Mauritanian police officers in Nouadhibou, I 
was handcuffed like a criminal, I was taken to the police station’s prison 
and to the centre of the Red Cross. I stayed there for two days, and I was 
expelled on the third day. [...] In the centre, one can only leave to piss 
and you can only go to do it with a police officer, you piss and then you 
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return. [...] Down there, the Mauritanian police officers, they beat people 
to death. 
(migreurop, 2010: 23) 
It is reported that it is factually impossible to claim asylum, or have legal 
representation – never mind any possibility to a right to appeal which would 
theoretically be standard. The basic rationale of international law – to protect a 
person from harm or worse loss of life at the hands of a government – is not 
upheld. Technocracy and juridification transform what law is, through the 
construction of those who are invalid: a mass or flow or flood or some other 
collective description of the suspended cannot be a normal subject which is 
capable of either being wronged or of making a claim – it is a thing to be acted 
upon. 
The European Union member states have largely abdicated responsibility for 
asylum seekers or more precisely would-be-migrants constructed as 
existentially invalid – undermining the possibility of representing them as asylum 
seekers, i.e. people who claim a need for protection, in the first place. The 
situation is constructed in which people become suspended. What is enacted 
has the formal markers of law. Yet, what is practiced is policy implementation 
without compliance to the idea of constraint on the part of government. The 
rhetoric of right and protection on the part of an individual is perverted. Policy 
that has neither been scrutinized in a democratic process, nor was it opened to 
legal challenge as the EU can claim not to be responsible but will nonetheless 
understand Mauritania as a safe third country because it conforms to European 
proscriptions of policy-making. This is a mockery for those who have lost sons 
and daughters or those who find themselves stranded in between countries 
where they do not have a place or juridico-political status. They are denied the 
legal personhood that the political process constructs. It follows that 
juridification is the single-minded technocratic goal oriented efficiency which 
regards politics as too inflexible, time-consuming and burden-some, and holds 
normative considerations – the recourse to a debate over what is ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ - as ideological noise undermining empirical – that is evidence-based – 
knowledge creation and the establishment of secure fact. 
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Not Legal, not Illegal, but Alegal - Suspended 
Technocracy banalises the relations of political subjects into mere competition 
at the same time as it acts as radical violence against those who are suspended 
from the totality of consensus-democracy. Migration Management lists 
categories of the included, it claims to be holistic, comprehensive of every 
possible movement there is. This is expressed in juridified terms of access. In 
this regard citizens, legal and illegal migrants who are within the territory and 
under the jurisdiction of European Union member states are identified 
(Rancière) or subjectified (Foucault) as owning a place, a share, a count, a 
voice. The becoming/being-subject is the ultimate marker of belonging, 
inhabiting a subject-position (Laclau) within the discourse of consensus-
democracy. Yet, if everyone can be included by way of normally behaving or 
being constructed as deviant but able to be treated into normalcy then the 
abnormal become invisible in a radically violent system which, at the same time, 
claims to be inclusive and tolerant. What does this mean?  
Hannah Arendt writes that “[i]t is quite conceivable, that, one fine day, a highly 
organized and mechanized humanity will conclude quite democratically – 
namely by majority decision – that for humanity as a whole it would be better to 
liquidate certain parts thereof” (Arendt, 1976: 299). This is not to say that the 
EU or IGC technocracy goes about killing in as conscience, directed and 
systematic way as Nazi-Germany did. Yet, Arendt’s quote gives voice to the 
phenomenon of banality discussed in the above sections of consensus-
democracy. How can we understand such radical exclusion?  The IGC, when 
thinking about international migration in the 1980s, was driven by the notion of 
having lost control and needing to restore order. In line with this, international 
migration was reconceptualised as a question of access and formulated in 
juridified terms. The category of the legal encompasses all those movements 
that are deemed beneficial, therefore normal. The illegal are deemed deviant 
but treatable. However, there cannot be an idiom for those who are not 
redeemable. Migration Management constructs itself as comprehensive and 
fixed; hence there cannot be an intelligible surplus outside of something that is 
normalized as holistic. Order needs closure and, discursively, Migration 
Management performs such closure. As a result there is only a hazy imaginary 
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of those other ‘illegal people’ – asylum seekers and would-be-migrants. ‘Illegal 
people’ is a misnomer.  
Lindahl (2009) explains that there are two forms of legal disorder. One when 
human behaviour breaches a legal norm, the other challenging the very 
applicability and distinction between legality and illegality – the meaning that 
Rancière (2002) gives to politics proper. The key here is that the assumed 
existence of threatening, security harming and invalid people who want to get 
into the European Union to abuse the integrity of the system is, in the first place, 
a constructed ‘truth’ enacted through technocracy. Yet, this imaginary is strong 
and very real in its effects – both financially for the European Union and by way 
of radical violence for those ‘identified’ as the embodiment of the imaginary. 
Here we are facing the same paradoxical problem with sovereignty. Legislation 
sets boundaries, it sets spheres of validity as Lindahl (2009: 58) calls them - 
subjective, material, spatial and temporal spheres of jurisdiction. For the 
purpose of the IGC members, their own boundaries seem to be very clearly 
drawn – the EU countries, Australia, Canada, the USA are the clearly 
demarcated spheres of validity. That is in short, spaces of sovereignty. Such 
sovereignty is grounded, according to mainstream political theory, in the 
description of a ‘self’ – sovereignty: the self-determination of a people. In terms 
of law a singular self ‘I’ vis-a-vis ‘you’ and a plural self ‘we’. Lindahl writes: 
“[C]ollective self-legislation not only yields the basic structure of legislation, as 
an act of positing legal boundaries, but also of what counts [...]” (Lindahl, 2009: 
58) or who counts by extension. Thus, sovereignty denotes the moment when a 
‘we’ gives itself a bounded jurisdiction. 
Yet, equally, for the IGC and taken further by the EU, there does not seem to be 
a boundary for exerting influence on other countries jurisdictions. And this, 
precisely, is the problem: a very unidirectional process which sets the rule but 
does not offer the means for modification of such rule for those affected by it. 
Lindahl remarks: “constituent power inaugurates a polity by acting as a 
constituted power” (Lindahl, 2009: 59). It then follows that there is a surplus (as 
power differentials needed to be overcome and/or excluded) to the legal order. 
At least, it renders boundaries between, and definitions of, what is legal and 
what is illegal provisional and incomplete.  
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The suspended cannot be but alegal. The space of the suspended is the 
moment and geographical place where the very applicability and distinction 
between legality and illegality is challenged; it is the space of alegality. Some 
migrants are suspended, precisely because the order discursively established 
itself as seemingly closed and complete. Suspended, because - to use Hannah 
Arendt’s terminology - those would-be-migrants; targeted by the imagination of 
EU policy makers, suffer from a ‘loss of world’. However, such loss of world is 
provisional, it is alegal. The loss of their juridico-political status came about by 
unidirectional action of the EU onto another countries jurisdiction within a 
particular hegemonic order, discursively established no more than 30 years ago 
and represents “[a] system of constraint [that] becomes truly intolerable when 
the individuals who are affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it” 
(Foucault, 1988: 294). However, the very existential invalidity of the suspended 
- their loss of world - challenges technocracy and makes its instability and 
incoherence visible. 
Arendt remarks that a democratic process can do radical violence. She notes 
even people who are regarded as decent and ordinary are capable of inducing 
extraordinary suffering, justified by the hope of overcoming disorder and 
perceived insecurity (Arendt, 1965). This is done through employing a 
hegemonic technocratic discourse, understood as common sense. In our aim at 
certainty and closure we submit to regulation, a regulation of the common which 
is ultimately violent as it necessarily excludes that which is not coherent within. 
“[E]vil represents the will to name at any price” (Badiou, 2003: 66-7). Naming is 
done on the basis of calculating. Migration Management presents in this sense 
an instance of the banality of evil. It is precisely those ordinary people acting 
within a seemingly coherent system where places, capacities and functions are 
distributed and a common is instituted in such a way that the supernumerary 
(Badiou) or surplus (Laclau) cannot be accommodated. This is where some 
migrants have no validity of being in the communal world, where we make and 
enforce internally logical policy that nonetheless has the effect of radical 
exclusion and administrative killing. 
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A final example: refugeeness and strength in being suspended 
In his auto-ethnography of borders Khosravi (2010) narrates his journey of one 
and a half years from Iran via India to Sweden where he was granted refugee 
status on humanitarian grounds. He gives the reader a compelling and moving 
(hi)story of what it means to be an illegal migrant determined to reach Europe 
and also what becoming a refugee does to a person. He analyses his 
experience of arriving in a refugee camp (for refugee status determination) in 
Sweden.  
Refugee camps constitute the most significant characteristic of the 
modern nation-state. One significant feature of all refugee camps [...] is 
that they impose ‘refugeeness’, not [only] as a juridical category but 
rather as a mode of being, an identity, on individuals. 
(Khosravi, 2010: 70)  
 
It is worth quoting at length the difference between being a non-valid illegal and 
being inscribed a refugee:  
Through a pathologizing bureaucracy, camps produce refugees, or rather 
refugeeness. As a war refugee, I was not seen as a ‘normal’ and 
‘healthy’ individual. Apart from the medical examinations of my body, I 
was treated, according to the most positive interpretation, as a child who 
did not know what was good or bad for him. The clientization of the 
refugee began as soon as she or he entered the camp. In the Artic camp, 
I was educated to become a ‘victim’. Neither lashes on my back, time in 
prison nor a year of statelessness could take from me my dignity as the 
Artic camp did. Until then, I might have lacked documents and a state, 
yet I was full of life, will and courage. All that I lost in the process of 
‘becoming a refugee’. [...] I, who had crossed so many borders and lived 
in dangerous places, shared rooms with prostitutes and a cell with a 
murderer and drug smugglers, had become afraid to take the bus to the 
city centre, in one of the safest countries in the world. 
(Khosravi, 2010: 71 my emphasis) 
The prospect of asylum seeking is constructed to disturb the orderliness and 
ordinariness of the social, this seems to need protection at any cost; the 
banalisation of the measures taken to protect cover over the outrageousness of 
such action done on the suspended person and on the acting society. 
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Conclusion 
None of the above recounted description of technocracy is new. Many of the 
examples narrated above are known. However, herein, still lies the 
outrageousness of Migration Management as abstraction conceived by Informal 
Plurilateralism and implemented in the European Union. Much of the action the 
European Union undertakes is inscrutable and closes itself off to questioning 
and modification. The technocratic order masquerades as the natural order and 
it thus is unthinkable to question such order other than within the prescribed 
perimeters of that order. 
By favouring informal policy-making Migration Management “provides a 
reassuring and legalistic language to accompany and legitimize tough, non-
democratic and often inhumane measures of control and enforcement” (Geiger 
and Pecoud, 2010: 13). Those targeted by the exclusionary practices of 
Migration Management - and consensus-democracy more broadly - can 
consequently not been seen or heard, as they do not find a place that would be 
countable in the closed system of calculating, accounting, formalizing and 
naming. 
European Migration Management, as conceived by the IGC, enacted by the 
European Union and normalized by civil society, is therefore a deeply 
technocratic system which undermines the enabling and initiating potential of 
both law and politics. In other words it undermines the two most important, 
though deeply ambiguous, instruments of a democracy. How can such banality 
of evil in the form of radical exclusion be approached? In the following chapter I 
will elaborate how agonistic politics can be the undoing of technocracy through 
the presupposition of equality and I will discuss the ambiguities of agonistic 
politics. This ground is a concern which is shared by discourse theory more 
widely: that there needs to be scrutiny and open discussion in order to put a 
check on the abuse of power as either totalitarianism or dictatorship in its 
various guises. 
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Chapter 8 
The Generative Potential of Suspension 
Democracy is not a regime or a social way of life. It is the institution of politics 
itself, the system of forms of subjectification through which any order of 
distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their ‘nature’ and places 
corresponding to their functions is undermined, thrown back on its contingency 
(Rancière, 1999: 101) 
 
I have shown, throughout the course of the past chapters, how Migration 
Management envelops the security and humanitarian justifications to regulate 
movement in an interdependent world of individuals expected to strive for their 
individual entrepreneurial identity. I have further argued that those who are 
constructed as not being able to conform to the logic of Migration Management 
have no validity to be part of the social order constituted by consensus-
democracy. They are suspended from juridico-political status and thus from 
gaining access. The naming at any price which characterizes Migration 
Management takes the form of a technocracy which banalises the radical 
violence practiced on those who are suspended.  
Yet, the suspended live and intervene. They act on the world and, by way of 
initiating activity, they compel a response. Thus, in this final chapter I will argue 
that consensus democracy is not viable because there will always be forces, in 
this particular case suspended individuals, to disturb or even undermine the 
total closure that consensus-democracy and in particular Migration 
Management strive for. It then follows that conceptualizing politics in terms of 
consensus does not work. Rather, politics and - in particular - democracy is 
better conceptualized in terms of agonism as this is capable of accounting for 
the generative and creative moments of sharing space both geographically and, 
closely tied to this, politically – most importantly it allows for those who 
otherwise remain un-ac/counted for. This is important: where antagonism sets 
up a radical negativity and thus cannot engage in relationships other than 
annihilation; agonism is the struggle between adversaries which has the 
capacity to open to quarrel over what is regarded as legitimate knowledge and 
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action. Thus, agonism can be a response to suspension. Suspension is a more 
subtle and hidden/ignored phenomenon. The IGC fights ‘illegal migration’ but it 
does not explicitly fight the suspended. Thus, there is no antagonistic 
relationship, in fact there is the possibility to establish a relationship and 
agonism is capable of giving room to this. 
In this chapter I therefore aim to show the importance of providing for a space 
which allows for the struggle over meaning initiated by the suspended. What I 
envisage by the staging of dissensus for recognition is illustrated by the 
following examples: in Disagreement Rancière recounts the story told of the 
Roman plebeians on Aventine Hill (Rancière, 1999: 23ff).  After an uprising 
against the patricians, the plebs retreat over Aventine Hill, where they reinvent 
themselves. They do not reinvent themselves as violent revolutionaries, as 
expected of them, but as a community mimicking that of the patricians, giving 
themselves an order and claiming speech. Such mimicking is important as it 
makes use of a symbolic expression that is intelligible. The patricians had set 
themselves up through domination over the plebeians; an order which holds 
that the plebs are ‘men of earth’ and therefore deprived of logos, of sensible 
rational speech. After their retreat, the plebeians enact institutions such as that 
of diplomacy. Therefore they claim the same properties the patricians deny to 
the plebs. When Menenius, the appointed consul of the plebs, comes to appeal 
to his people to maintain the old order and thereby (re-)establish the unequal 
relationship between the two, the plebs have already set themselves up as 
equals rather than waiting for the verdict passed on them by the patricians.  
The in-egalitarian order is shown to be just that, random and contingent 
domination. The patricians thus conclude that ‘since the plebs have become 
creatures of speech, there is nothing left to do but to talk to them’ (Rancière, 
1999: 26). This conclusion is remarkable as it led to a conclusion other than the 
expected reactions of either rendering them noisy and silenced or annihilating 
the plebs as they threaten the established order of domination. It led to an 
alternative construction of reality, that of recognizing equality (in the 
Rancièreian sense) in expression and action. Thus, Rancière re-tells the story 
not so much as that of a revolt against a dominant order but rather as a quarrel 
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over the issue of speech itself. A struggle over the basic definitions of sharing-
the-world and how to realize this equality. 
This example shares some characteristics with the situation created by 
Migration Management. According to Migration Management the relation 
between the EU and the suspended is structured by European domination, 
which holds that those being deprived of an entitlement of juridico-political 
status – the suspended – are not capable of efficient productivity; they are 
beings of no ac/count – capable only of noise/silence91. Yet, when the 
suspended stage the inequality between themselves and the Europeans the 
suspended are already equals and in some cases they act on this equality, for 
they understand and re-appropriate the principle of no ac/count into a place 
from which they can act.  
In this chapter I will focus on action by those suspended who I have 
conceptualized as socially killed. This is not to denigrate the outrageousness of 
physical death that some people meet; these too leave traces which cause 
rupture. The example of Anpalagan is a case in point: the finding of his jeans, 
some left-over bones and ID-card forced the European Union to recognize his 
existence.  Yet, Anpalagan is not left alive. He therefore does not have the 
capacity to engage in the quarrel over the basic definitions of sharing-the-world 
and righting a wrong through forcing recognition by direct interaction. The 
suspended people who are left in the forests and deserts outside the borders of 
the European Union, who the EU does not ac/count for face a differently – and 
more disconcerting – situation. They are physically there and among us, equal 
to us while invalidated to be. Any form of discourse reductive of difference to the 
point of this particular radical violence is unacceptable as it undermines the 
exercise of equality as constitutive of the world. 
The two examples above are not equivalent. The plebeians understood 
themselves as a community and were seen to be so by the patricians. Migrants 
                                               
91
 In this case the voice/noise terminology stands in to mean more than speech/no speech. For 
want of better phrasing it is to express the capacity (to decide) to act whether that is by verbal 
expression or deed or by conscious withdrawal. It is to express a position where a person 
refuses to be a victim, to be acted upon and thus the refusal to accept oppression. 
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more generally, are constructed as juridified individuals when they are acted 
upon. However, the ontological individualism shows itself to be a difficult 
assumption precisely at this point. The suspended are generalized, abstracted 
and therefore imagined as a group – if not a community – at the point when they 
are made sense of in policy-making, as an opaque jumble of (collective) bodies, 
a flood, a mass, a wave. Such mass cannot be juridified. In contemporary 
consensus-democracy a group only counts when its members are holders of a 
juridico-political status. It is this logic which denies the claiming of asylum in IGC 
countries by imagining a jumble of bodies rather than an identifiable subject. A 
flood is scary, it cannot make intelligible claims. 
Yet, when this opaque jumble of bodies acts, through mimicking of hegemonic 
practices for example (as I will show throughout this chapter) it forces a reaction 
and, in that, it stages its dissensus and thus has the capacity to bring about 
rupture. The suspended do not submit to their fate of social death, they 
instantiate the political moment. In this instance, the political shows itself to be 
inherently relational, though asymmetric in its power distribution. The political, 
as staged by the suspended is a quarrel over the issue of speech itself. It 
enables us to ask questions about the production of inequality and ways to 
challenge such inequality. It allows us to ask questions about politics and the 
political, about who can be on the stage and voice demands to be ac/counted 
for, who can act and force transformation. 
In the following, therefore, I want to address questions arising out of a rethinking 
of democracy along the lines offered by those proposing an agonistic view of 
how the political works. If the premise of the European Union is that “The Union 
is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights [...]” (European Union, 
2009, Article 2, Treaty on European Union92) at the same time another premise, 
that of the narrative of Migration Management as formulated by the IGC/EU, is 
to precisely refuse dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
                                               
92
 viewed at http: //eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ: C: 2008: 115: 0001: 01: 
EN: HTML, March 2011). 
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respect for human rights. The European Union contradicts itself in words and 
deeds. The EU has so far not come to the conclusion that, since the suspended 
are equal, there is nothing left to do but to talk to them. The suspended remain 
the supernumerary; their equality is not recognized, they are not heard. Rather, 
in a cynical move the European Union re-acts by bureaucratically raiding, 
imprisoning, killing and thus silencing those suspended migrants that would 
aspire to a voice.  
I will approach these questions in three steps. Firstly, I will problematize 
democracy. In so doing I will think about the possibility of politics and ‘the 
political’, in order to prepare the ground for thinking about what can right the 
wrong of suspension. On the basis of this framing, I will, secondly, offer some 
thinking on how technocracy can be disturbed, how those without a voice, 
without a count, can and do make claims of being accounted for vis-a-vis the 
European Union. Finally, I will outline the possibilities for change, guided by the 
overall argument that no order can achieve perfect closure. There is a dual 
moment of disruption, one being the resistance of accepting inscriptions of 
invalidity on the part of the suspended, the other being a moment of speaking 
to, and thus critically thinking about, the dominant order and its allocations of 
place and function. 
 
Democracy and Rupture: Agonistic Politics 
This section will first outline the problematic nature of democracy and, in 
particular, the barriers to dispute which are de-humanising. On the basis of this I 
will explain why dissensus is to be valued and elaborate my vision of agonistic 
politics, mainly drawing on Jacques Rancière.  
I have shown that contemporary democracy is a process of formalising 
governance – it is consensus-democracy, which allows for corrective measures 
constructing a competitive environment, which, however, banalises its 
operations and silences the dissensual character of a differently conceived 
democracy as rule by the plurality of the demos. In short, it silences agonistic 
politics. 
 
206 
What though is democracy? Rancière argues that both historical and 
contemporary discussions of democracy are implicitly or explicitly derogatory 
towards the idea of democracy, even though it is claimed to be the only 
acceptable way of doing order in the 21st Century. Historically, the response to 
democracy was either one by which ‘aristocratic legislators’ protected “the 
government of the best and [saw to the] preservation of the order of property” 
(Rancière, 2007: 2-3). The USA’s constitution is exemplary; or, one by which 
bourgeoisie’s laws and institutions active under the banner of formal democracy 
were seen to be of the realm of appearances and the struggle was for ‘real’ 
democracy, a rather more European version of the critique (Rancière, 2007: 2-
3).  In any case, democracy is - in this view - portrayed as a system to establish 
and divide order according to a particular system of distribution. It was always 
held in contempt for being a system which allowed for ‘the masses’ to engage in 
politics in the first place, which only in the second place can allow for the luxury 
to cater to liberties and equality where ‘the masses’ are involved. A similarly 
motivated critique, Rancière holds, is put forth by contemporary thinkers who 
emphasize excess. 
Thus, today ‘excess’ is identified as the problem which needs to be controlled 
by democracy, which is to say the lack of a single principle which governs. 
(Rancière, 2007: 7) Yet, this excess is precisely the principle of politics, 
Rancière argues. Norval explains that  
it is this principle of politics that Rancière takes to be the essence of 
democracy: a democratic order is a heterotopic order, a deviation from a 
natural order of things, where the ‘natural’ places of things are disrupted. 
It is an order founded on the absence of any title to govern. Not only that, 
but it is the disruption of any and every title to govern [...]. 
(Norval, 2010: 6) 
This, in particular, applies to the order of the police. What remains, according to 
Rancière is the power of “anyone at all, the equality of capabilities to occupy the 
position of governors and of the governed” (Rancière, 2007: 49). Thus, the 
political act – democracy - is that which disrupts the vacuous mindlessness of 
suffocating technocracy. Rancière equates politics and democracy.  
Technocracy is consensus-democracy’s practice which, in the end, leads to the 
abdication of responsibility for its doing and enacting. In other words, the 
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participatory or deliberative perspective cannot conceive of the possibility of not 
being accounted for, where everyone has a place and a function under 
assumptions of inclusion. Yet, as a consequence, sedimented consensus-
democracy not only produces a radical yet largely unobserved violence, it also 
produces two paradoxical phenomena which both function as a barrier to 
dispute: that of vacuum and that of suffocation. I will discuss below. 
In the context of consensus-democracy, in particular with regard to international 
migration and more specifically Migration Management, Europe lacks a place, a 
performative realm of equality where people are able to share, compare, debate 
and contest each others’ opinions and stories about their experience and 
perceptions. That is not to say that it does not cater for differentity; yet, a 
vacuum comes into being at precisely the moment when all debate is stifled93 
by an attempt at closure. Within the context of liberal, deliberative and 
communicative, communitarian or multicultural political projects, there is a 
strong tendency towards transcending, ameliorating or reconciling divisions 
arising out of plurality (Habermas, 1984) which empty potent ideas into 
integrative signifiers to the point of rendering them meaningless and thus 
creating a vacuum. Both governments and their experts are actively implicated 
in enacting what Žižek (2002: 3) calls a Denkverbot, a prohibition on thinking or 
considering alternatives, arising out of the need to transcend and create the 
anything and everything of consensus. Often this is blamed on media distortions 
of an issue, such as that of access of migrating peoples into Europe. Thus, the 
inability to express and debate a plurality of opinions leaves a vacuum which all 
too easily can be “filled by ideologies, noble lies or propaganda” (Sharpe, 2010: 
57) such as, for example, right-wing narratives of homogenised nationalism that 
needs protection against all foreignness. 
At the same time as such a vacuum is created, consensus democracy also falls 
prey to the tendency to micro-regulate to the point of suffocation. In its paranoid 
drive to assure ‘public opinion’ that governments are in control of any kind of 
                                               
93
 Within Europe recent attempts at rupture were quickly criminalized, as can be seen in 
Assange’s wikileaks experience (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11937110) viewed December 
2011. 
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social process, consensus-democracy makes sure that too much individuality 
and plurality is heavily regulated. Thus it seeks to avoid dissent. Our 
democracies today embrace diversity, but only if it conforms enough in its 
differentity to the closely circumscribed rules of regulating a persons’ every 
move and behaviour (Hardt et al, 2001). In the case of Migration Management 
the plethora of access categories under point-systems for the granting of visa is 
a helpful illustration of such circumscription. For example, access categories 
clearly define who knowledge migrants are if they are to be perceived as 
beneficiary in-migration and therefore fit within the frame of differentity.  
Arendt argues that these (paradoxical) phenomena of vacuum and suffocation 
have very similar effects: they are dehumanising in that they undermine the 
most important basis on which people can become and act (Arendt, 1976). Both 
strive at totalizing, at closure, and both impose a Denkverbot. One way in which 
the Denkverbot expresses itself is the often heard warning that any radical 
emancipatory project will inevitably end up in some version of totalitarianism or 
dictatorship; it is the neo-liberal/conservative claim that any other way of 
governing aims at total control, and is therefore fundamentally dangerous to 
liberal (consensus) democracy. Another, more concrete way the Denkverbot is 
expressed, is to maintain that it is clearly the prerogative of government 
sovereignty to decide who enters and who is denied entry, in this case the 
European Union, and that – therefore - access needs to be strongly controlled 
and this control needs to be strictly enforced.  With this, consensus-democracy 
has an effect on the ability to think and judge and ultimately on the ability to act 
politically, leading to a consequential abdication of responsibility.  
In order to understand how and why this happens and to grasp how dissensus 
is to be valued over consensus-democracy, I explore Hannah Arendt’s 
elaboration of the concept of ‘world’, not only because most thinkers of agonistic 
politics draw on her thought in one way or another, but also in order to contrast 
the description of consensus-democracy as a contemporary hegemonic 
phenomenon to an alternative - agonistic politics. Arendt understands ‘world’ to 
be the inter-subjective realm of public spaces. It is not the space, however, 
which Arendt seeks – the agora. It is the public space of circulating discourses, 
the interaction of speech, practice and place. In Stuart Elden’s words (drawing 
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on and discussing Heidegger’s thought) it is the site, as ‘platial’ phenomenon, 
where human existence and, as such, history happens and where the political 
becomes relentless questioning (Elden, 2000: 412). Relentless questioning and 
inter-subjective experience enable an in-between as space of contestation. It is 
a shared being evolving in and through contestation (Arendt, 1958). The ‘platial’ 
of the in-between can be, for example, the fences of Ceuta and Melilla when an 
enforcement officer encounters the suspended person trying to climb into the 
European Union. In 2005 the officers decided to shoot. It could be conceivable 
that an enforcement officer opens the gate instead and thus allows for ‘world’ to 
come into being, for encounter to be valid and for the suspended to end the 
state of ‘loss of world’. ‘World’ needs a space for becoming, a space open to the 
development of staging dissensus, of plurality - where natality, the beginning of 
something new, can unfold. According to Arendt, plurality is thus the constitutive 
condition without which ‘the political’ would not be possible. Disputes over the 
definition and realization of what is shared and of being-together-in-the-world 
need to be possible.  
Thus, in doing politics it is vital to allow for space where provocation and 
struggle is possible. Proposals for agonistic politics call for re-conceptualizing 
democracy based on this notion of the agon (Schaap, 2009). Agonists do not 
assume that conflict is a ‘problem’ to be kept in check and to be solved. Rather, 
the diverse strands of agonistic politics reject consensus-driven ideas of the 
political to embrace the ever-present and generative potential of contentious 
exchange and regular throwing into question of modes of political order to 
subject the normalization of such order to scrutiny. This more abstract notion of 
agonism, the practice of dissensus, is based on the Greek introduction of 
democracy when struggle and contest for excellence was coupled with the logic 
of equality in a performative realm (Arendt, 1968). In short, what agonistic 
politics embraces and emphasises is an invitation to courageously rupture 
conformity and to preserve contentious spaces of ambiguity and questioning 
which allow for dispute over definitions and the realization of being in the world 
on the basis of radical equality.  
Common to the different approaches to agonism is an understanding of the 
political as a quarrel over the issue of speech (who and what can be 
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expressed). It needs to be possible within the context of the dissensual 
character of rule by the plurality of the demos in order to safeguard against 
banality, Denkverbot and radical exclusion. This is done in public spaces, the 
‘platial’ phenomenon of inter-subjectivity in which history is made and can only 
be made there because we share equality, which is the capacity of natality – to 
initiate which everyone and anyone owns. Agonistic politics emphasises 
provocation, contestation and struggle as it protects against totalizing attempts 
at closure and points to the generative potential of rupture. More specifically 
then, how does agonism make it possible to see, think and address exclusion 
and think change? How can agonistic politics break the technocracy and 
juridification of Migration Management as expression of the contemporary 
international politics of migration? 
In order to elaborate his theorisation of the political, Rancière assumes, as do 
most poststructuralists, the absence of any foundation. Further, most 
poststructuralists emphasise the ineradicability of exclusion as a consequence 
of the necessity of frontiers for the making of meaning and the circumscription 
of identities constituted within discourse. On the basis of this, Rancière explains 
that the political begins with the creation of a space which orders by dividing the 
perceptible from the imperceptible – the police order is set up as a fixed and 
closed totality as I have shown in the previous chapter. The political is then the 
moment of breaking up this police order. It is disruptive and sporadic (Rancière, 
1999). The political provides the space where the hegemony of Migration 
Management is scrutinized in terms of its unqualified acceptance of seemingly 
static and essentialist identities, by problematizing its foundational distinctions 
(Laclau, 1996; Foucault, 1984). Robert Kaplan’s conceptualization of Africans 
as bringing crime, disease and pure chaos to the developed world may serve as 
an example of essentialized identities and foundational distinctions in this 
context.  
Rancière’s vision is based on the assumption that the principle of the political is 
excess (Arendt’s plurality). The singular hegemonic police order is a 
constructed communitarian artifice (Rancière, 2007) which has sedimented into 
a common sense which seems natural. Such singularity – because it attempts 
at totalizing and the erasure of excess - always risks creating and sustaining 
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wrong. A wrong is radical and outrageous because it violates the logic of 
equality in which Rancière grounds his thinking and contemporary critique. Yet, 
plurality/excess is ever capable of creating novelty. Mobility is the example par 
excellence. Movement has always brought different forms of knowledge and 
approaches from one geographical area to another exposing settled 
communities to pluralisation and thus obliging willingness to engage with new 
articulations (Connolly 1995: 38). Europe, for example, learned through mobility 
of magicians about medicine and algebra, which were both imperative for its 
development but which were in the beginning excluded as the devil’s works 
(Schlesier et al. 2004). It then follows that a wrong – any kind of exclusion - is 
likely to disrupt the ‘natural’ order of things, in particular if it stages claims for 
recognition. Thus, Rancière does not deny that exclusion exists – or is relevant 
for the production of meaning. What he forcefully points out is that the social – 
the police order – as totalizing stability is a myth sustained through the violation 
of those human beings constructed as being of no ac/count.  
The political is therefore relational. It is a relation established by processing a 
wrong, by staging dissensus against being excluded and of no ac/count. The 
suspended set themselves up in such a way that the European Union cannot 
but ‘speak to them’, recognize them as being valid.  The task of the political is 
the setting up of a dispute in relation to, and with, that ‘natural’ or hegemonic 
order which allows parties to be constructed by way of confrontation over the 
struggle of being ac/counted for. Crucially, this starts with a conflict over the 
existence of a stage and who is to be present on it. A wrong is only political 
when it enacts the basis of action which is the mere contingency of equality, i.e. 
a confrontation between the orders of the police and an egalitarian logic by 
challenging the existing distribution of the sensible and not playing the allocated 
role (Rancière, 1999). That is to say, by asserting equality. In short, in a healthy 
democracy conflicts need to be establish-able in order to overcome exclusion 
by staging dissent. “Democracy is not a regime or a social way of life. It is the 
institution of politics itself [...]” (Rancière, 1999: 101). 
In the context of Migration Management Rancière’s view of democracy is 
important, as it is a perspective which makes clear that consensus is precisely 
the mechanism that covers over the gap between those who allocate places 
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(the IGC/EU) and those who are without validity to exist (the suspended). In 
other words, Rancière’s perspective allows us to see the conflict which arises 
out of a wrong which consensus democracy covers up. The political is  
conflict over the existence of a common stage and over the existence 
and status of those present on it. It must first establish that the stage 
exists for the use of an interlocutor who can’t see it and who can’t see it 
for good reasons because it doesn’t exist as a struggle to be had. Parties 
do not exist prior to the conflict they name and in which they are counted 
as parties. 
(Rancière, 1999: 26-27)  
Rancière’s thought can aid in thinking through the effects of Migration 
Management and the suspension resulting out of technocracy. More 
importantly, it can also help to go beyond this analysis and interpretation to 
show how this is indeed only part of the story and how dissensus is always at 
least also potential. 
 
Political Subjectivity and Staging Equality 
What does such staging of dissensus look like in the context of Migration 
Management? In order to illustrate such politics, I draw on the work by Michael 
Collyer mentioned earlier. These examples will help to show how suspended 
people claim subjectivity and why this claiming is a political act. Yet, the staging 
of dissensus is not a unidirectional exercise. I will therefore also draw on two 
further examples to show how staging dissensus and the verification of equality 
will need thinking and judgement in the Arendtian sense of these concepts. This 
section will approach equality as a presupposition from which all action and 
thinking must start. The grounding assumption is that, because we are all born 
with a capacity to initiate (Arendt’s natality) anyone is equal to anyone else. 
The preconception in which those who are seen to be irredeemable are held is 
that they engage in criminal activity and are, more generally, incapable of 
economic production and thereby abuse support systems and the order of the 
social. Rancière contrasts the political act from an act that is not political by 
using the worker as an illustration (Rancière, 1991). Workers who engage in 
resistance act as expected of their essentialized identity. This is not a political 
act because the hegemonic order expects this to happen and can 
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accommodate the event within its discourse, in the case of strike for example. 
However, the worker who engages in poetry at night stages a political act in that 
the worker poet constitutes a subjectivity which is not incorporable into the 
established order of roles and functions (Rancière, 1991: 21-40). It doesn’t 
make sense that a worker would engage in intellectual activity, or more 
generally in activity that cannot be constructed as violent and/or criminal. What 
is important here, is that the worker acts contrary to his or her ascribed and 
anticipated range of possible roles and functions. 
In the case of Migration Management, the example of smuggling is helpful to 
illustrate what does not constitute a political act before elaborating and 
illustrating what constitutes a political act. Smuggling, according to European 
legislation is a crime94. Yet, it is also an expected behaviour of those would-be-
migrants in Morocco, Turkey or elsewhere bordering the European Union:  
In most cases, smugglers are migrants themselves. Realizing that their 
knowledge acquired through (often painful) experience may be used by 
other migrants in exchange for remuneration, some migrants decide to 
enter the business of smuggling of migrants. They may then become 
specialized professional smugglers, or they use their knowledge to 
finance the completion of their journey to Europe. 
(UNODC, 2011: 2) 
The language of the above quote shows the ambiguity with which smuggling is 
incorporated into the system. It is a criminal act, yet it is also constructed as a 
business which is specialized, professional and requires knowledge. It is this 
logic of incorporation that turns smuggling into a non-political act and expected 
behaviour. It is thus not capable of rupturing the hegemonic order. 
What then constitutes rupture and how can political subjectivity be claimed? At 
certain points of what Collyer terms ‘fragmented journey’ (Collyer, 2007: 668) 
chance encounters of mobile people form into what can very loosely be termed 
a community. These are places where information is shared and assistance is 
provided. The places where these encounters occur are called ‘camps’ by 
Collyer’s interview partners. They are located along the Algerian border and in 
                                               
94 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
2241, No. 39574. 
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the Moroccan woods in the vicinity of Ceuta and Melilla. The social organization 
of these frontier areas by the suspended people bring about communication and 
collective action. One of Collyer’s respondents reports: 
[...] each camp has its governor. They have a full government, there’s a 
prime minister, a finance minister ... that’s what they call them. Every 
three months the government will leave, and before they go they will 
designate the next government. They collect money from people coming 
in. 
(Collyer, 2007: 681)  
This particular form of collective action allows dissensus to be staged and 
equality to be claimed. The allocated place of such suspended is that they are 
not seen to have the capacity to be ‘civilized’ in the way modern Europe 
imagines itself as forming institutions and living in an ordered way by rules. Yet, 
in forming a government and replicating the structures of exactly those who hold 
the power to dominate through structures of technocracy, the dispute is staged. 
It is a dispute between those who are not ac/counted for and those who allocate 
the count of roles, places and functions. It is political in that the suspended 
question the basis and legitimacy of the hegemonic way of ac/counting. By 
mimicking government structures recognizable to the dominant order (as 
finance minister or prime minister), the suspended stage a disagreement with 
the ‘nature’ of their radical exclusion as neither capable of entrepreneurship nor 
worthy of treatment and therefore non-valid. This is a political act capable of 
rupture because a suspended person posing as prime-minister is not 
incorporable in the essentialized construction of the suspended person as non-
valid. It is making use of what is intelligible for the hegemonic system; however, 
in such a way that equality of status needs to be acknowledged but neither in a 
violent way, nor in a way that those who are suspended are automatically 
included as differentity. They have to be acknowledged as self-governing entity 
on their own terms. 
The answer to such mimicking of legitimate institutions of formal democracy 
came swiftly in 2003 insofar as such places of collective action were violently 
dispersed by Moroccan police forces enacting Europe’s policing of borders 
(BBC, 2003). It is much easier for enforcement authorities to ‘fight’ these people 
when they are abstracted and essentialized, rather than to have to face a 
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collectivity with names and functions, which has to be recognized as being 
capable of organized structure and economic production. More importantly, their 
organization into a government-similar order compels a response because it 
undermines the preconceived cliché of these people being incapable of 
productivity and efficiency, a prime minister sleeping rough in the woods but 
commanding a government does not correspond to the expected behaviour.  
Such an act by the suspended commanded recognition – the concession of 
accepting they are on stage and therefore compel a response, even if it is a 
physically violent response. It altered the authorities’ reaction at least in so far 
as they needed to spend resources. An administrative procedure had to be 
created. The BBC’s Chris Morris reported how Africans were forced to sign a 
document by the Greek authorities where the would-be-migrants certify that 
they had entered Turkey from Greece (BBC, 2001), thus making sure they 
would not stage claims against Greece by stating that they had left the country 
on their own free account. However dubious this maybe (both in terms of its 
legality and in terms of its political geography), such administrative procedure 
constructs a juridico-political status and thus makes these suspended people 
deportable, as in cases of Moroccan camp dispersals (BBC, 2003). Yet, staying 
alive is not always an option. In the case of the Greek authorities the would-be-
migrants who had signed the papers were forced to swim/wade across the 
Meric River to the Turkish side. In the process of crossing some disappeared in 
the waters, washing up dead on the banks where they were found later by local 
farmers (BBC, 2001). In the case of Morocco, people are reported to have been 
abandoned in the desert without food or water (MERIP, 2006). 
A further example, also mimicking the principles of legitimate civilizational 
organizations of a democracy, though this time in urban settings, is the setting 
up of small scale solidarity groups similar to NGOs. Such organizations are 
formed of suspended people who officially constitute themselves through 
appointing chairmen and board members (Alioua, 2005). When it is time to 
move on successors are appointed. Collyer reports that on the basis of 
networking through virtual means continuity is given for example, in July 2006 a 
few of these organizations were able to participate in a parallel event to a euro-
african conference in the context of a governmental meeting on migration and 
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development (Collyer, forthcoming: 22). It is the replication of the role of formal 
delegate to a conference – saying things in an authoritative way – that is the 
mimicking, and thus verification, of equality. The act of making use of 
recognizable mechanisms and practices on the one hand whilst acting in an 
unexpected way on the other, forces the building of a relationship, one of 
recognition. Those who have no validity to exist stage dissensus and claim a 
place that was not provided for – they stage equality and claim to be recognized 
as having entitlement and the capacity to speak and act.  
Thus, “[p]olitics exists because those who have no right to be counted as 
speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting up a community by 
the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more than this 
confrontation” (Rancière, 1999: 27).  “What makes an action political is not its 
object or the place where it is being carried out, but solely its form, the form in 
which the confirmation of equality is inscribed in the setting up of the dispute, 
[...]”(Rancière, 1999: 32). A wrong is a “mode of subjectification in which the 
assertion of equality takes its political shape” (Rancière, 1999: 39). What of 
political subjectivity then? How can the camp ministers – whose existence is 
invalid – be acting politically? In which way are these people political subjects? 
Political subjects, on Rancière’s account, do not exist as such before the 
political struggle is staged. They do not exist on account of their being in-
between identities. The ministers of the camp are, effectively, not citizens of a 
state nor are they effectively recognized juridico-politically as either aliens or as 
legitimately existing by the European Union. The contradictory nature of being 
suspended, of being even though the existence is invalid, is the condition of 
possibility for suspension. Suspension is then also generative rather than only 
devastating. The ‘suspensive subject’ (Deranty, 2003: paragraph 8) is defined 
as both being and not being. It is thus the site of a struggle about who counts as 
a subject at all. In staging the wrong of the inequality of social order the political 
subject – through the process of validating equality – shortcuts the structure of 
social order. 
Rancière argues that the political – radical democracy - emerges out of people 
acting under the presupposition of their own equality irrespective of those 
enacting the hegemonic, technocratic logic. That is to say, equality is achieved 
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through verifying it in practice. It is because everyone and anyone has the 
capacity to understand one’s place and function and hence the capacity to 
understand the contingency of such places and functions. It is this equality that 
is asserted by those deemed to be without the right to existence – the 
suspended. It is the presupposition of those who act. But is this enough to stage 
dissensus and rupture the hegemonic order? Inter-subjectivity is relational 
rather than unidirectional, subjectivity is established through a dispute between 
those who have been wronged and those who do wrong. 
Therefore, the other moment where political subjectivity could potentially come 
into being, the police order be undermined and the political therefore enacted, is 
the instance where those who are to protect the hegemonic system from being 
undermined have the chance to show independence of thought and judgement 
in their action. Arendt offers useful guidance when she warns about the 
seductive but potentially disastrous tendency to identify thinking with the 
insatiable quest for (scientific) knowledge. In short, the seductiveness of 
technocracy that the narrative of Migration Management brings about and is 
framed in. The oblivion of thinking that is mere thoughtlessness at the mercy of 
‘truth’ as obedience, conformity and orders (Arendt, 1958: 3) is what makes 
technocracy evil. Instead, thinking freed from the demands of knowing and its 
‘truth’, begins with and increases wonder (Arendt, 1978). Wonder, for example, 
about how it is possible that smuggling can be construed as criminal act at the 
same time as it is construed as a professional, knowledge-based business 
without stumbling over the many contradictions inherent in the quote mentioned 
above. 
Thinking is the faculty by which we seek to understand the meaning of 
encounters which guides acting. It is fed by the present and works with 
fragments from the past, not to resuscitate the past but as a process of 
crystallization, as a process of thinking something through (Arendt, 1968: 205-
6). It is the being able to perceive the suspended as valid equal rather than 
worthless bodies. In this sense it is not the dialectic leading to a higher 
synthesis, as the technocracy of Migration Management attempts to do. It is a 
courageous and independent activity without pillars and props (Arendt, 1968) 
that moves beyond the Denkverbot that Žižek describes. The political function 
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of thinking is precisely to make sure that plurality is not reduced to an 
essentialized fixity, such that it is conceivable that a suspended person may 
have a claim to the entitlement of validity, rather than being suspended as a 
jumble of bodies where it does not make a difference whether they are socially 
or physically dead. 
Thinking manifests in speech by way of using metaphors as thinking deals with 
invisibles, with representations of things that are absent; in thinking we develop 
conscience – in other words the ability to be ethical, to judge what is good and 
what is evil (Arendt, 1978: 103). Judging, according to Arendt, is the faculty 
which realizes thinking – it concerns the particulars and things in the world of 
appearances. Judging is then first and foremost being engaged in a silent 
dialogue with oneself and it needs to lead to being one with oneself (Arendt, 
1978: 193). This point is crucial as there are no guarantees against evil – to 
think that there is would be to fall back into the illusion of having firm ‘banisters’ 
to hold onto. Such an illusion reduces the need to think to a minimum and to act 
according to the mores and myths of convention (Arendt, 1965: 49), which all 
too easily invites the mindlessness of technocracy. If Migration Management 
were ‘thought’ and ‘judged’ in the Arendtian sense many instances of wonder 
would appear. For instance, is it acceptable that in the process of enforcing our 
sovereignty there is not only death, but more distressingly suspension in the 
form of being juridico-politically killed?  
Thinking is thus essential for politics, a politics that (as Arendt holds with most 
proponents of agonism) is based on equality which appears and manifests itself 
in plurality and action. The verification of equality thus needs the act of staging 
dissensus. But it also needs the condition of thinking and judgement which is 
relational and open to such staging. The examples below help to illustrate the 
notion of thinking and judging that Arendt proposes but raise questions at the 
same time in the context of Migration Management. 
A Nigerian in Rabat reported “About a year ago, we were in Gourougon, near 
the fence and a Guardia came and opened a gate in it. ‘Come! Come!’ he said. 
We were afraid and ran away but that night hundreds of migrants went through!” 
(Collyer, forthcoming: 23). Collyer contextualizes: 
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Initially this seemed an odd fabrication but other migrants in various parts 
of the country, and even several in Ceuta recounted the same story, 
always the Guardia opening the fence and always occurring some time in 
the early autumn of 2004. This seemed to be an urban myth, but the 
coincidence in the nature of timing of the stories was striking.  Then in 
Ceuta, an NGO employee described a very significant arrival of migrants 
towards the end of September 2004. More than 400 individuals arrived 
[...]. 
(Collyer, forthcoming: 23) 
Why would a Guardia open the gates to let people in, particularly given that the 
Guardia’s presence there is to ensure that there is no ‘invasion’ into European 
Union territory? In 2005, only a few months after the events described above, 
15 people died at the fences either because they were shot or pushed off the 
fences by those Guardia. Opening the gate could have been an instance to 
demonstrate independence of thought or at least wonderment at the many 
contradictions in the construction of a suspended person. It could have been an 
indication of judging that there may be grounds for questioning the fixity and 
essentialism of the hegemonic order and more concretely the radical violence of 
Migration Management. The Guardia could have been moved to a response, to 
acting politically, by opening the gate. This event could have been a reaction 
akin to the patrician concession of ‘speaking to them since they appeared on 
the stage’ as disruptive action, in which the staging of dissensus is not only 
accepted but supported, responsibility is taken. If thinking is the capacity to see 
things otherwise, judgement is the embodiment of that thought and Migration 
Management were exposed to be mere conformity to arbitrary rules, this could 
have been an instance where agonistic engagement could have happened and 
therefore rupture could have been initiated on the part of those Guardia. 
Yet, this was not the case, as Collyer goes on to contextualize:  
[The NGO worker] suggested that the Guardia had deliberately 
encouraged their arrival in order to discredit the PSOE’s95 most recent 
amnesty for undocumented migrants. Although such an account is 
impossible to prove it does appear rather more substantial than a 
standard conspiracy theory. It is also supported by the statistics. The 
PSOE declared an amnesty for all undocumented migrants in 
employment in early September 2004 (El Pais 14.11.2004). UNHCR 
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statistics show that asylum applications in Spain rose by 36% [...], 
compared to a general decline throughout the year (UNHCR 2006). 
(Collyer, forthcoming: 24) 
A final slightly different example of (supposedly unintended) disruptive action is 
the situation where police is made to work to the benefit of the migrants. Thus, a 
man from Sierra Leone recounts an event he had experienced where the 
migrants had given themselves up to the police in order to get closer to a 
border.  
Last summer, we were in Bel Younes [outside Ceuta] and someone 
heard that the controls into Melilla had been eased – sometimes that 
happens when a new group of the border guards arrive. We decided to 
give ourselves up to the police. They didn’t know what was happening! 
We all came down, out of the forest with our hands up and they put us in 
buses. There were three busses that day! They drove us to Oujda [14km 
from the Algerian border] and we walked to Melilla. Some people 
managed to get in. 
(Collyer, forthcoming: 28)  
Here Collyer explains “Ceuta and Melilla are about 300km apart, so it would not 
have been easy to walk the entire distance, but since Melilla is only 50km from 
the border where these migrants guessed they would be taken it was simpler to 
walk from there” (Collyer, forthcoming: 28). Rather than accepting the position 
of suspension, the migrants took action and manipulated the border control 
practices in such a way that they were able to not play their part as allocated 
but instead to stage a conflict which established them as actors on the stage as 
equal. The suspended were able to claim asylum – the ultimate political act 
Migration Management in effect seeks to make impossible. Their crossing of the 
boundary into European territory compelled a reaction which establishes – as a 
consequence - the juridico-political status such a person was supposedly 
incapable of.  
The political thus “creates a political subject—it creates a people—through the 
actions by which they come into being as a people who at once see and impose 
themselves as equal” (May: 2007: 24). The staging of dissensus alone then has 
the capacity to disrupt. Yet rupture needs the dual moment of staging and 
thinking. The examples chosen above testify to the generative potential of 
suspension, but is this alone enough to initiate change? 
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Re-inscription and Transgression 
No order can achieve perfect closure. It is this impossibility which makes 
rupture – the staging of dissensus and following from this, subjectification - 
possible. Drawing on the above examples, I argue that the seeking of asylum, 
which is practically impossible within the context of Migration Management 
within the territory of the European Union, is the ultimate political act and, with 
that, the verification of equality which is democracies’ presupposition.  
It is in the paradox of suspension that the potential of a generative moment can 
be found. The generative moment is expressed through Arendt’s fact of natality 
(Arendt, 1958). Because we are all born with the capacity to initiate, anyone is 
equal to anyone else. It is the equality of the demos that makes rupture and the 
political – democracy – possible. On this basis, it is then possible to think the 
dual moment of disruption: one being the resistance to accepting inscriptions of 
invalidity on the part of the suspended; the other being a moment of speaking to 
and thus critically thinking about the dominant order and its allocations of place 
and function, to think and to judge. This dual moment can lead to rupture and 
rupture has the potential to transgress technocracy – rupture is thus generative 
of change or renewed oppression. 
So, following Hannah Arendt, I ground equality and the dual moment of 
disruption in natality. Natality is the spontaneous action that “marks the start of 
something new, seizes the initiative [and] forges its own claim” (Arendt, 1958: 
113). It is this acting, as a political moment, that Hannah Arendt explains is 
initium – a capacity that everyone has, without qualification. Arendt states that 
people “are not born in order to die but in order to begin” (Arendt, 1958: 246). In 
building a government of their own, in constituting and somehow maintaining 
NGOs, and in taking their chances and not accepting their invalidity to exist, the 
suspended act politically. They claim appearance on a stage to claim 
subjectification. The fact of natality as newness and improvisation, as creative 
and therefore generative act of the demos, is grounding equality. It is this 
ineradicable possibility which generates transformation and re-inscription.  
How, though, is this done if the European Union as the wrong doer does not 
engage in the Arendtian thinking? If equality and political action is something 
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which only comes about in the enacting of it, how can the suspended 
nonetheless claim political subjectivity? It is done, for instance, through what 
Slavoj Žižek calls disidentification (Žižek in Butler, 2000). Disidentification, can 
be understood in terms of the idea of a politics of subtraction (Žižek, 2006a), not 
a mere withdrawal, but transformation. Those suspended, sleeping rough in the 
woods, first make a statement which sounds like stating ‘I’d rather not ...’.  ‘I’d 
rather not accept the invalidity of my existence’. The consequence of this 
statement is to build a government, to institute a community, to appoint 
ministers, or even to give themselves up to the police. In short, to mimic and 
thus by way of claiming the egalitarian logic, of appearing, to force the 
Moroccan authorities, as long arm of the European Union, to acknowledge a 
new fact and thus recognize their existence on the Rancièreian stage and act. 
Mimicking is important as it establishes a re-inscription of known concepts in a 
factually new way – the suspended person as minister or the suspended person 
influencing the process of policy-making. Not by way of awkwardly knocking on 
the door pleading to be included, but by way of subjectification, by establishing 
the fact of the suspended as being an acting person on the stage. The symbolic 
order is re-inscribed. This is preceded by establishing the fact of having this 
capacity to act in the first place and not being subject to the fate of suspension. 
The disagreement staged is that over the suspended person’s validity to exist 
juridico-politically – the refusal to observe and submit to the imposed radical 
violence. Thus, in choosing a structure of organization, which is mimicked on 
the basis of that which imposes radical violence, and further in choosing 
designations like ‘finance minister’, the suspended force acknowledgement as 
equals: capable of governing, thus capable of political subjectivity. 
The second moment of disruption is the moment of critical thought which leads 
to a consciousness of breaking with the trained narrow-mindedness of the 
know-how of the expert. Breaking with the obedience that the common, the 
banal, commands and, as such, speaking to the situation of imposed radical 
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violence. Such ‘speaking to’ is disruption from ‘within’. It is civil disobedience96. 
It is an active thinking about what we are doing and links to a question asked 
along lines initially framed by Honig (2001): What problem do the suspended 
solve for Migration Management? The answer that it simply maintains the 
dominant order – the distribution of roles and functions in set places - would not 
be incorrect. But it would certainly be insufficient as the only answer. Rather, a 
fuller answer lies in making it near impossible to claim asylum. Claiming asylum 
is a demand for recognition of existence – of being valid and equal. That is to 
say, claiming asylum is the assertion of the randomness of a distinction 
between those who command, those who obey and those who are without 
juridico-political status – the questioning of any justification why some are 
deemed to have a capacity for having subjectivity and others who are deemed 
unworthy of even subjection to a dominant order. ‘Speaking to’ and disrupting 
from ‘within’ and with that forcing the dominant order to hear a claim for asylum 
is the acknowledgement of the randomness and contingency of such 
distributions of place.  
Yet, Arendt warns:  
If it should turn out to be true that knowledge (in the modern sense of 
[scientific] know-how) and thought have parted company for good, then 
we would indeed become the helpless slaves, not so much of our 
machines as of our know-how, thoughtless creatures at the mercy of 
every gadget which is technically possible, no matter how murderous it 
is. 
(Arendt, 1958: 3)  
Recent newspaper articles illustrate what such warning, made so many 
decades ago, was referring to. The recent revolutions in countries such as 
Tunisia or Libya have triggered a renewed focus on people trying to enter the 
European Union on little boats crossing the Mediterranean. In one particular 
instance, there were 72 people on such a boat. It was left to drift for 16 days 
and all but 11 people died as a consequence. The Guardian newspaper reports 
that a call for rescue was sent out and soon after the boat people saw a military 
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helicopter hovering over them – their call had evidently been heard. It is 
reported that a NATO vessel was close by, but NATO had apparently not 
logged a call for help. Instead, when the little boat finally washed-up on Libya’s 
shores, those surviving were arrested by Gaddafi’s troops, with the effect of one 
man dying shortly after in detention97. In short, European Union countries, as 
members of NATO, can get away with impunity when disregarding their 
requirements under international law – which stipulates that any vessel is to 
come to rescue regardless of the circumstances and of who needs to be 
rescued98. At the same time, those implementing sophisticated surveillance 
technology are known to act swiftly when ‘intruders’ are to be deterred, as I 
have shown in previous examples relating to the practice of FRONTEX, which 
covers the same Mediterranean sea space. It is the following of orders, the not-
thinking mindlessness of conformity and the incapacity to question that is 
murderous. Knowledge, in Arendt’s view, is concerned with ‘truth’. ‘Truth’ in this 
sense is always calculated and thus exclusionary. It maintains the dominant 
order, in this case the situation of a high-tech fence and the acknowledgement 
of people being radically violated by this fence and the knowledges and 
technologies which sustain the fence. Yet, the managers of migration do not 
think. 
What then of resistance? The political does not demand of elites and institutions 
to rectify inequality – that would be illogical on its own terms, as the distribution 
of roles and functions brings about and legitimizes just such inequality. 
Resistance accepts a notion of inevitability inherent in the police order. 
Resistance that protests exclusions on the basis of subjection will, according to 
Žižek and others, in the end merely lead to co-option by the hegemonic system. 
Thus, Žižek states:  
The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack 
on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic 
relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome 
was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful 
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souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s 
policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: 
not only did the protestors in no way prevent the already-made decision 
to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimize it. Thus George Bush’s 
reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: 
‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing 
here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also 
in Iraq!’ 
(Žižek, 2007: 7)  
In contrast, the political demands entitlement to be named and recognized as 
part of the police order. Crucially, it operates at a distance from the state but 
aims at its re-inscription and transformation within the context of plurality (rather 
than differentity) – it is in this sense that suspension is generative and that the 
staging of equality is pragmatic rather than prescriptive. It is also in this sense, 
that either vacuum or suffocation are avoided which may give rise to an 
extremism capable annihilation of difference altogether. Rancière, as Deranty 
(2003) explains, thus proposes a perspective that neither amounts to deferral 
nor to revolutionary opposition but towards punctual rupture which forces re-
inscription. Therefore, he qualifies that a complete break is not only not 
possible, it is also not necessary.  
 
Conclusion 
To recapitulate, and drawing on the formulation by Matthew Stone (2010), the 
politics of consensus  
preaches ideals of equality [to come], inclusion and the embracing of 
difference, what is actually produced is at best a banal repetition of 
sameness whereby everyone, paradoxically, is homogeneously ‘different’ 
and at worst it manifests the neutralization of particular values as 
universal and apolitical. 
(Stone, 2010: 106) 
It is “the reduction of the political to regulation by bureaucratic means and 
economic criteria” (Stone, 2010: 106). Human beings are reduced to objective, 
calculable and essentialized units (Stone, 2010). Thus, most accounts of politics 
assume that the political emerges out of the social condition which gives rise to 
the political as distribution and competition (to be managed). The political is 
then a derivative of the social. Instead, agonistic politics emerges with the 
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refusal to observe the place and function allocated to people and things. It is the 
moment when noise (the Rancièreian notion of excess) is turned into 
voice/practice and the common order of things is ruptured through staging 
claims for recognition. Agonism, thus, stages ‘the scandal of democracy’. It 
promises dissensual and pluralistic arrangements which have equality as the 
very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted (Rancière, 2007). 
Equality is the unconditional given of and for democracy. 
It then follows that agonism rejects the notion of political subjectivity that 
modernity puts forth: the assumption of a unitary, autonomous, rational, self-
referential man as the standard. In this view, the human being is socially 
constituted by temporal and spatial fixity; geared towards progress under the 
impression of ultimate death situated in the sovereign binary of citizen versus 
alien. The post-structural criticism holds that the subject is rather to be seen as 
the site of ambivalence – it holds subject positions within a contingent discourse 
allowing for both qualified agency and subordination. Thus, the process of 
subjection is both becoming subordinated and becoming subject. Yet, this still 
remains within the realm of the police – of technocracy – where people are 
ac/counted for. Within the context of Migration Management this is not 
sufficient, because it does not allow for the possibility of suspension. It is the 
process of subjectification through the struggle about who counts, through the 
staging and claiming of equality, that the suspended become political subjects. 
Political subjectivity is thus borne out of being in-between identities – being 
wronged. 
In this context, Honig’s (2001) question about what problem the suspended 
solve for Migration Management and for technocracy more generally, rather 
than asking what the solution to the suspended is becomes analytically 
relevant. The suspended are the opaque mass against which a fixed identity 
and belonging is defined – the sovereign binary of citizen/alien is reinstated. 
The suspended justify a discourse based on a truth of rightful access. 
Discourses of treatment and entrepreneurialism legitimize the suspension of the 
possibility of asylum as a political claim to equality. Approaching democracy 
agonistically would serve not to fall for the fallacious assumption of being 
without a gap and would allow for the law (understood as litigation) to be seen 
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as a place of struggle – allowing for the recognition of the possibility that there 
are exclusions which will challenge consensus. It allows for a politics which 
embraces re-inscription and transgression and re-gains some of its polemic and 
public character, rather than closing off, silencing and violating it, as is the case 
at the moment. 
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Chapter 9 
Summary and Concluding Thoughts 
Democracy is the community of sharing, in both senses of the term: a 
membership in a single world which can only be expressed in adversarial terms, 
and a coming together which can only occur in conflict 
(Rancière, 1995: 49) 
 
The motivation to think and write about Migration Management was driven by 
the position that any form of discourse reductive of difference to the point of 
radical violence is unacceptable as it undermines the exercise of equality as 
constitutive characteristic of the world. The contribution I have made is three-
fold as indicated in the introduction. I have offered an understanding of a 
particular form of governance, that I have conceptualized as ‘informal 
plurilateralism’, which has moved considerations of international migration onto 
the foreign policy agenda of countries in the Global North and South. I have 
offered a reading – through the IGC – of Migration Management accepted to be 
a benign solution to an urgent problem. By way of this reading I have offered an 
alternative understanding of the historical conditions of possibility of what is 
normalized as Migration Management and the production of political 
subjectivity. Finally, I have offered a conceptual formulation of how the radical 
violence of not having a juridico-political status can be made intelligible even 
though the process of negotiating foreign policy does not acknowledge such 
violences and have then shown that being seemingly irredeemable, that is 
being suspended, also has generative potential, rather than simply the 
relegation to social and possibly physical death. 
Yet, one question remains unanswered: How to actively relate to that with which 
we disagree? Here I can only offer a concluding argument in three steps: If the 
radical violence inherent in Europe’s Migration Management is to be stopped, a 
forum like the IGC must be dissolved or at least be brought back into the realm 
of public scrutiny and discussion. This may go some way to counter the 
technocratic tendency toward totalizing and essentializing, which would open 
the possibility for more litigiousness which is not suffocated by juridification but 
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may allow for an extended degree of ungovernability. On this basis, and more 
practically, with regard to the topic at hand, asylum seeking can be re-thought 
as one way to counter the radical violence of suspension and the possibility to 
claim a place on the stage and start a disagreement. 
On the basis of this stance I will, in the following, firstly reiterate and summarize 
the major discussions and findings this thesis contains based on the same 
structure as was offered in the introduction. Secondly, I will take a moment to 
think about possibilities for an adequate response – practically - to Migration 
Management, the existence of the IGC and the construction of and 
consequences for, those who are suspended.  
 
Reiteration and Summary 
The Discourse and the Invention of a new Narrative: Migration Management 
In chapter two I described the transition of an ideology during the 1960s and 
1970s which set the stage for and framed this research. In particular I recounted 
how free market conservatism within consensus-democracy as a discourse 
came about as coherent and global hegemonic phenomenon. I also situated the 
international politics of migration into this broader context. 
Chapter three introduced informal plurilateralism as a form of policy making. 
Here, I argued, ideas are mooted, molded and filtered into technocratic systems 
of governance at the national, European and international level, where they are 
then normalized into formal discourse.  
Informal plurilateralism has crept into policy making in international fora on 
migration, pushing aside more transparent processes, particularly the more 
openly negotiated multilateral agenda. In the 1980s a narrative surfaced which 
constructed international migration as a matter of common urgency for some 
governments. It was understood that it was internationally a contentious issue 
and therefore too controversial to discuss in a multilateral setting. The situation 
was described as ‘new’, characterized by growing uncertainty and complexity in 
which UNHCR was said to be too rule-bound and inflexible. As a consequence, 
some governments – mainly European – withdrew into informal plurilateralism.  
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I have described plurilateralism as a gathering of ‘like-minded’ governments 
which emphasize a strong notion of commonality or ‘we’-identity. The 
membership is chosen and strictly controlled. Plurilateralism enables the 
identification of common problems, in order to find a common and flexible 
answer to identified challenges. Informal plurilateralism, by extension, insists on 
confidentiality and an absence of formal procedures; it meets in privacy. The 
goal of informal plurilateralism is to develop a shared understanding and foster 
homogeneity of approach. Crucially, informal plurilateralism – in this case the 
IGC – is extra-institutional; it is autonomous and in no way formally linked into 
or bound by international or national legal standards, as its participants attend in 
a private capacity. Concretely, informal plurilateralism as enacted within the IGC 
seeks to develop and define new knowledges and practices, in particular in 
terms of information gathering, evidence-based and pro-active mechanisms vis-
à-vis international migration. The IGC is thus a conceptual machinery impacting 
on hegemonic doctrine formation, with its primary concern being the irregular 
movement of asylum seekers.  
I have argued that the benign presentation of the IGC as welcome addition to 
multilateralism obscures the closed and non-transparent nature of these 
conversations which lead to the formulation of common definitions and doctrine. 
 
Articulating the Narrative 
Thus, it was in the 1960s and 70s that the conditions of possibility were laid for 
this rather drastic change of ideology guiding political thinking and action. 
International Migrants were among the first to be impacted by this change 
towards technocracy. Chapters four and five shed light on the two articulations 
that were a consequence of the changed discourse within which the IGC made 
sense of what orderly migration would be and what action towards this goal 
would be implemented. Chapter six showed how these articulations accumulate 
into the narrative of Migration Management. 
Chapter four explored the historical construction of the ‘transit country’ as one 
answer to the perceived loss of control over migration that governments of the 
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developed North. More importantly the ‘transit country’ serves as a discursive 
tool to set the limit of the hegemonic narrative of Migration Management. 
The IGC’s construction of ‘would-be-migrants’ as illegal asylum seekers who 
move illegitimately across the EU’s territorial boundaries in an attempt to get 
into the EU, is a consequence of the ‘asylum-migration nexus’. This nexus is 
based on a narrative which holds that migrants move through assumed to be 
‘safe third countries’ in order to access the EU. Such transit mobility is 
illegitimate as protection can be claimed in a country neighbouring the 
European Union. Asylum seeking is thus effectively made impossible. 
The re-inscription of some countries which immediately border the European 
territory as ‘transit countries’ is further vital to give coherence to the discourse of 
Migration Management as a stable and fixed narrative capturing all phenomena 
of human mobility. In this sense ‘illegal migration’ is established as one of two 
pillars which conceptually build the paradigm of Migration Management. Transit 
country is thus the EU’s tool to securitize people not within the realm of their 
jurisdiction as well as to pressure those countries labelled as a transit country 
into compliance with EU policy without appearing either coercive or undermining 
sentiments of self-determination of such countries. In effect the logic of transit 
country suspends certain groups of people in that those who get stuck are 
without juridico-political status. 
Yet, the use of ‘illegal migrant’ conflates two categories. Such conflation is 
relevant in that it marks at the same time as it hides the limit of Migration 
Management as a discourse. On the one hand a category is constructed which 
contains people without juridico-political status who are therefore not identifiable 
as claim-bearers; they are without political subjectivity. Suspension is the 
radical exclusion from political community – a disappearance-from-recognition – 
into mere bare existence. Suspended people are metaphorically dead. On the 
other hand ‘illegal migration’ denotes the concept of deviance. A migrant 
illegally present within the territory of the European Union is not wanted, but can 
draw on a basic minimum of legal guarantees and procedures, something that a 
suspended person cannot do as he or she is in a different spatial and 
conceptual reality.  
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Such construction, adding suspension to simple schemas of inclusion and 
exclusion, norm and deviance, demonstrate radical violence through the 
reduction of difference of Migration Management. However, such suspension is 
also the condition of possibility for rupture and therefore for political action. 
Chapter five portrayed the other articulation of Migration Management. Migrants 
have always been conceptualized as either a functional means towards growth 
and production or as exploited for capitalist purposes. With the ideological 
changes introduced first by the Trilateral Commission which constructs 
‘developed countries’ as knowledge societies migration for economic purposes 
became illegitimate, as most migrants were conceived of as poor and 
uneducated and hence not compatible with the aims and needs of the 
knowledge society. 
The IGC was instrumental in deepening this narrative in arguing that asylum 
seekers were bogus as they were really people who sought economic 
betterment by way of abusing the scarce resources of Europe. Development 
was introduced into this narrative based on the logic that people only need to 
move because their ‘own home’ is underdeveloped – in short, mobility is either 
a failure of development or it is rooted in abusive intent. The conclusion drawn 
by the IGC was that development aid should be instrumental as a deterrence 
mechanism.  
However, migrants kept coming and so the discourse thought to introduce 
measures to stop migration was further transformed. On the one hand 
‘countries of origin’ were made responsible for fighting the ‘root causes’ of 
emigration. On the other hand, ‘host countries’ returned migrants who had 
gained skills and could therefore also take responsibility for developing their 
‘home’ country. This logic led to the evolution of ‘circular migration’ as an 
exceptional but accepted solution. European countries had never stopped 
making use of seasonal workers; so the idea of circulation was not new. Yet, 
with the introduction of the development narrative into migration policy-making 
circularity could be drawn on as an idea that was recognized as familiar. In 
effect, European countries started to negotiate bilateral agreements with 
developing countries which had elements of tying development aid to return 
agreements. Despite these activities these policy initiatives largely failed. 
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Intriguingly, the idea of marrying migration to development continued to be 
discussed. 
It was not until 2002, when academics started to be interested in the 
relationship between migration and development, that this discourse became 
more coherent. In the academic discourse migrants were conceptualized as 
actors, i.e. as actual subjects rather than mere objects. The academic discourse 
further conceptualized migration as a legitimate livelihood strategy. It is through 
this transformation that the migrant could now (also) be conceptualized as 
capable of being a responsible, competitive and entrepreneurial being. As such 
policy-makers were able to conceive of some migration as legal, granted it is 
circular, productive and skill-generating, i.e. they return and develop. 
Thus chapters four and five charted the transformation of the migrant on the 
one hand into a phenomenon that can be securitized which allows for the 
suspension of such a person’s juridico-political status; and on the other hand 
into something entrepreneurialized - the economically productive body which is 
instrumental in enabling policy-makers to allow for political subjectivity. Further, 
the entrepreneurial migrant is post-hoc central to telling the story of why the 
illegal migrant (i.e. the asylum seeker who is economically unproductive 
according to the IGC) is differentiated so violently. 
Chapter six outlined the paradigm of Migration Management. So far, the 
analysis has focused on how migration had been re-constructed from an 
integrative to an instrumental approach – the questions posed were largely 
‘how’-questions. The IGC has been shown to articulate international migration 
into securitized and entrepreneurialized phenomena of movement. Migration 
Management is therefore a particular treatment of human mobility which has 
radically violent consequences. The image which drove the IGC to so drastically 
re-formulate our understanding of international migration was the asylum 
seeker. Documents show how unexpressed assumptions about the asylum 
seeker as the criminal, diseased, poor and incapable of improvement – thus 
beyond redemption – was the underlying imagination for the discussions about 
urgently needing to get migration under control.  
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These articulations accumulate into the narrative of Migration Management 
which takes the place as a new paradigm; it renders contradictions within and 
between the two articulations intelligible and coherent. It also guides policy 
formulation and implementation by sorting and defining access into the 
European Union based on a notion of securitized economic productiveness. 
Through formulating such an inclusive Migration Management simplified and 
essentialized not only our understanding of international migration, but also its 
related practices. It is in this sense that Migration Management is an empty 
signifier, so open to interpretation that any reading of the politics of international 
migration can be accommodated.  
The problem that the IGC had faced was that the illegalization they had 
formulated begged the question as to who can move – the answer was the 
entrepreneurialized, productive migrant. Yet, in doing so it renders those who 
are seen not to be capable of productivity and efficiency unworthy and therefore 
suspended. The IGC thus established a typology in which the citizen was posed 
against both the legal and the illegal migrant as one side of a coin respectively; 
thereby radically excluding those who are constructed as being irredeemable 
and having no validity other than in spaces of suspension outside of the 
European territory. Such boundaries are seen to be inevitable – this common 
sense is sedimented and thus has the function of giving stability to the narrative, 
which is situated within the discourse of consensus-democracy. 
This chapter therefore brought the answers to these how-questions together 
and showed ‘what’ Migration Management is before moving on to ask questions 
about the consequences. Migration Management performs a double-retreat. 
First, it performs retreat from politics: informal plurilateralism leaves the public 
space at the same time as it constructs the political as technical, calculable 
problem. This has the effect of atrophying democracy. Second, it retreats from 
responsibility: it produces the suspended by administratively erasing their 
juridico-political status (as well as potentially killing them physically) through 
operating on a preconception of their irredeemability, being without any validity 
to exist. Thus the consequence of Migration Management is radical violence. 
This double-retreat was then discussed in the final two chapters of this thesis. 
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The Effects and Consequences of Discourse and Narrative 
Chapter seven started from the premise formulated by proponents of Migration 
Management, and consensus-democracy more widely, that stable and 
comprehensively predictable governance is needed. A consequence of this 
premise is a particular approach to governance characterized by a technocratic 
and juridified treatment of human mobility which results in the administrative 
killing of the suspended people and the atrophying of democracy.  
Consensus-democracy is introduced as the expression of order as common and 
non-litigious which translates politics into police logic where everyone and 
anyone is said to have his role, function and place; a system is thereby 
produced of self-evident fact based on particular limits and modes of what is 
sayable, audible, and do-able. Its practice is characterised by technocracy; the 
approach to establishing and maintaining the ‘reasonable order’ of consensus-
democracy, and more concretely Migration Management. It does so by defining 
and enacting those limits and modalities of the discourse and narrative.  
In this way, technocracy makes use of abstractions legitimated through an 
expert discourse which is based on calculation; a formalistic and formulaic 
approach which sets itself out as necessary and inevitable. Technical expertise 
establishes ‘accurate information’ which is said to be grounded in ‘evidence-
based knowledge’; in other words, technocracy hopes to establish an empirical 
utopia which constructs the empirical subject by way of a combination of 
positivist neutrality, instrumental rationality and qualitative learning. Thus, even 
though technocracy accepts that there are several knowledges to be learned, 
the discourse nonetheless acts to delimit which knowledge is acceptable and 
which is to be rejected. Such qualification of calculation is central to the police 
logic; it is not innocent. It qualifies; it creates a particular kind of knowledge as 
empirical practice. Technocracy turns migrants into sombre things which are 
managed through sanitized problem solving which is justified by the logic that 
anyone who would have to take a decision would be required to come to the 
same solution if presented with accurate information – technocracy renders 
Migration Management inevitable. 
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Juridification is then the process which institutionalizes technocracy. The fact of 
state is identical to the norm of rule, moral conduct is therefore to follow the rule 
– an emphasis on form not on agonistic debate over substance. Juridification 
thus suspends moral questions and agonism. Is allows governments to engage 
in morally contestable conduct under the guise of law. The effect of such a 
transformation in the context of Migration Management is that governments can 
easily claim to be in compliance with their legal obligations while acting to the 
contrary. This amounts to an abdication of responsibility by emphasising the 
technical and non-normative elements of regulation. It is then in this context that 
international migration is reconceptualised as a question of (legal) access and 
formulated in juridified terms. 
Such strategic use of the law, based on technocracy, produces the suspended, 
those without validity to exist and who have no recourse to the litigiousness of 
the law. The consequence of Migration Management for the suspended thus 
amounts to administrative killing, either by way of social death as a person’s 
juridico-political status is rendered invalid or through physical death when 
embarking on journeys across borders which are protected by agencies such as 
FRONTEX. 
Thus, whereas the legal are all those deemed beneficial and the illegal are 
construed as deviant but treatable, the transformation of agonistic law into 
juridified law cannot logically accept that there is something like the suspended 
in a system which is claimed to be comprehensive. In this system the 
suspended are not intelligible as either legal or illegal. In other words, order 
needs prescriptive codification and predictability. Order can understand breach 
of law but it cannot conceptualize challenges to the distinction between the legal 
and the illegal, i.e. the inaugurating agonism of constitution which is alegal. Yet, 
this is precisely the space of the suspended – those who are written out of the 
world. 
At the same time, it is the radical violence against those who inhabit the alegal 
spaces which has the capacity to provide a ground for rupture and, hence, 
suspension as well as a generative potential. This was discussed in the final 
chapter to this thesis. The question driving chapter seven was: how is 
technocracy contested? It moves on from the account of how technocracy 
 
237 
renders some people suspended by way of administratively killing them to show 
that beyond this devastation the suspended nonetheless act and thereby 
intervene. Agonism can account for generative moments arising out of 
suspension as it allows for validating the equality of those who are un-
ac/counted for. 
In this light, the chapter started with a brief discussion of the problematic way in 
which democracy is often conceptualized as either an ideal to come or 
something that must be brought about by an oligarchic order. Democracy on 
these accounts strives for a single principle which governs. In particular it is the 
vacuousness as well as the suffocating tendencies of consensus-democracy 
which are the barriers to the dispute of agonistic politics. Instead, democracy as 
Rancière puts it rests on the principle of excess where anyone and everyone is 
entitled to govern. Moreover, “[p]olitics exists because those who have no right 
to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting 
up a community by the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more 
than this confrontation” (Rancière, 1998: 27). 
The chapter therefore went on to show how dissensus in the form of agonistic 
politics is to be valued as a pragmatic approach to re-dress radical exclusion. 
On the background of this discussion it is then possible to think about and 
illustrate how the suspended force recognition of the wrong done on them – of 
rendering them irredeemable and invalidating their equality – by staging a 
political act such that a subjectivity is constituted. A subjectivity which had to 
that point not existed and is thus not incorporable into the established order of 
roles and functions. 
One example that was offered is of suspended people building a community 
which is governed by their own ministers. In mimicking the ‘proper order of 
things’ the suspended make themselves recognizable to the authorities not by 
way of complying to behaviour that is expected of them, but by staging a conflict 
about who they are to be. The Moroccan police force is faced with a prime 
minister sleeping rough in the woods. A symbolic move that is nonetheless not 
incorporable into the hegemonic order, it therefore disrupts. 
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Yet, the examples also shed light on the partial failure to bring about rupture 
and thus change. In order for agonistic politics to break technocracy it also 
needs thinking and judging in the Arendtian sense. Thinking is not identified 
with scientific knowledge production or with conformity to moral doctrine; rather 
it is the courageous and independent process of crystallization on unknown 
terrain. It is to make sure that plurality/excess is not reduced to an essence 
incorporable into the differentity of the social order. Judging then realizes such 
thinking. It is here that the managers of migration fail – they do not think. 
The examples then testified to the generative potential inherent in suspension 
which is. The third section of the chapter thus thought further about disruption 
and concluded that it would be illogical to demand of consensus-democracy to 
rectify the wrong – the radical violence – it is committing. Resistance accepts a 
notion of inevitability shared with what it is directed at and is therefore 
incorporable by the hegemonic order and thus not capable of bringing about 
change. In contrast, the disruption done by the suspended forces the dominant 
order to react whereby it transforms. Righting the wrong and therefore the 
political act proper which would re-dress the current situation of administrative 
killing would be to allow for asylum seeking. Yet, this is unthinkable for 
European managers of migration as they would have to acknowledge the 
equality of anyone and everyone and engage in an agonistic relationship, thus 
destabilizing Migration Management’s claim to ‘common sense’ universality. 
 
Practical implications: Finding an adequate response? 
What then is an adequate response to Migration Management, to the existence 
of the IGC and to the existence of suspended people? One possible response 
would be to simply reject Migration Management. This option would follow 
academic arguments coming out of the disciplines of economics and some 
normative scholarship, which makes a theoretically compelling case why 
allowing for the freedom of mobility without access requirements is a sensible 
thing. Moreover, this is problematic on various accounts. Practically, this call 
does not consider how to organize the social were there no limits to what and 
who counts. Yet, will this overcome the tendency to exclude? I have shown how 
boundaries are crucial for the establishment of meaning, so even if 
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governments did decide to abandon all territorial and juridical borders and there 
were no restriction on the mobility of people, we would have to invent an entirely 
new system of organizing the social in a meaningful way. This option places too 
many demands on the imagination not only of our governments. It is therefore 
more often than not simply laughed away.  
Another option would be to neither reject nor support Migration Management 
but rather to focus on a practical call for the adherence to Human Rights 
standards and theoretically abstain from comment. The practical solution of 
advocating for the adherence to Human Rights standards is the strategy chosen 
by many NGOs. I am not intending to undermine this attempt as it is important. 
However, I have shown throughout the discussion that calling for Human Rights 
misses the point of what the IGC/EU actually do – they invalidate the existence 
of some people to the point that logically Human Rights do not apply. Abstaining 
from theoretical comment inadvertently fulfills the same function that calls for 
Human Rights adherence do, that is, to point at the observation that something 
is criticize-able but not to follow-through in offering a response capable of 
rupture and actual change.  
There is a third option which I want to tentatively offer. The political is irreducible 
and thus any attempt at closure by a hegemonic discourse is futile as the 
moment of suspension is also generative of rupture. Consensus-democracy 
tries to counter this by de-politicizing, yet a discourse is always precarious 
which becomes visible precisely at the moment where the Global North is 
obsessed with difference and the ‘Other’ in order to reach stability and fixity. 
Technocracy is the practice of consensus-democracy and through juridification 
(where the state becomes identical to the norm of rule and creates ‘empirical 
right’) and expert calculations of ‘truth’ (which establish the empirical 
universality) it disconnects from scrutiny and is driven by pro-active prophylaxis 
which leads to the contraction of policy-making and policing into polic(y)ing to 
ensure closure and le partage du sensible based on the logic of differentity. It is 
this that makes technocracy banal and evil as it conceptualizes itself as 
corresponding to absolute reality but leads to disintegrated moments of rational 
competition and acting on self-evident facts to the point where action loses all 
significance; or in other words it leads to the abdication of responsibility and 
creates moments of radical violence. Accordingly Migration Management is part 
 
240 
of hegemonic consensus-democracy and therefore distributes people into roles 
and functions it controls and is responsible for suspension.  
Yet, the suspended live and intervene. Their being in the world compels a 
response as they show the social order to be (in-egalitarian, random and 
contingent) domination. The generative potential lies in the suspension of those 
people who, instead of submitting to this state, would rather not comply and 
make attempts at claiming their validity to exist. To account for the potential 
generative worldliness it is helpful to conceptualize the political as agonistic, as 
it allows for staging dissensus and undermines the Denkverbot imposed by 
consensus-democracy. Dissensus is the quarrel over basic definitions, 
assumptions and allocations of place and function. Agonism allows for 
problematizing foundational distinctions and engages in relentless questioning 
in order to scrutinize processes of normalization; it strives to courageously 
rupture conformity and emphasize equality and action as constitutive of the 
world. This is why agonism asks what problem the suspended solve for 
Migration Management? The answer being two-fold: it makes claiming asylum 
logically impossible because asylum is understood as assertion of randomness 
between those who command, obey or are without juridico-political status and it 
maintains the dominant order as it justifies a discourse based on a truth of 
rightful access at the same time as it opens up the possibility to be political and 
to refuse to observe place and function as allocated. 
Practically, this would mean the alegal space is inhabited and turned into a 
parallel world in which its inhabitants construct their own world and ways of 
organizing. This could then develop into a self-proclaimed autonomous 
neighborhood. Thus, there is an option for filling the alegal space with life and 
meaning. However, such alegal space would have to be recognized at least as 
a non-conformist space which stands in a relation with surrounding inhabited 
spaces. A way of relating to each other needs to be found, and this is to be 
negotiated between the suspended and, for example, the European Union and 
Morocco. As such, the suspended would have to be recognized as legitimately 
existing. This third option, hence, points to three implications:  
(1) Informal Plurilateralism - in particular the IGC - must not be possible as it is 
deeply un-democratic in its avoidance of any scrutiny and withdrawal of 
realms in which the information and thinking it uses and produces would be 
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open to question. A question arising out of this would be: How can a post-
modern agonistic politics in a globalizing world be thought and enacted in 
practice? 
(2) Suspension must not happen. This is closely tied to the above in that an 
organization in which a specific common and conceptual linguistic field is to 
be nurtured – as the IGC puts it – is likely to produce a truth, which if not 
closely scrutinized can produce effects of radical violence. Critical 
questioning is therefore crucial. A question arising out of this could be: How 
can meaning-making and boundary-construction be facilitated without – 
knowingly or not – causing such radical violence as can be witnessed in 
Migration Management? 
(3) The inhabitation of alegal spaces must be enabled as a way to give room to 
the staging of dissensus, to allow for constructive ungovernability and as a 
practical way to relate to disagreement. A question arising out of this could 
be: Can such places be instituted in such a way that thinking and judgment 
(in Arendt’s sense) can be nurtured so that the momentum of disagreement 
can form constructive relationships? 
This is where my thesis must currently end, asking one question leads to more 
questions. Yet one answer that I have arrived at is clear: in order to make sure 
that we do not engage in discourses reductive of difference to the point of 
radical violence and in order that we provide for the exercise of equality as 
constitutive of the world, we need the tedious platial as Elden suggests, a slow 
process of recognition and forming, not an efficient approach at managing 
behind closed doors.  
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